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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the information contained in the 
pricing of a set of financial contracts for identifying mechanisms important for shaping 
aggregate outcomes. The first chapter documents a large time-varying dispersion in the 
yields posted on insured time deposits over 1997-2011. The yield dispersion uncovers 
the presence of monopoly power over a homogeneous financial product that commercial 
banks have managed to consistently exploit throughout this period. I build and estimate a 
structural asset pricing model with heterogeneous search cost investors to characterize the 
implied search cost distribution that rationalizes the observed price dispersion. A large 
fraction of investors had high search costs ranging from 10 to 20 basis points per deposit 
offer. I further relate the observed price dispersion with the price rigidity of deposit yields 
and t heir asymmetric response to aggregate shocks within t he theoretical framework of 
costly search. 
Extending the time deposit dataset to the pricing of non-insured time deposits, t he 
second chapter studies the liability side of FDIC insured commercial banks as a unique 
laboratory for testing the importance of the government supply of safe and liquid assets 
for determining asset prices and allocations. An increase in the level of government debt 
and shortening of its maturity have a contractionary effect on the banks' balance sheets . 
VI 
The effect increases with the share of insured deposits in the total funding. The results 
provide evidence for a strong crowding-out effect of government debt on the banking sys-
tem's capacity to attract cheap sources of funding in the form of deposits and hence its 
ability to extend loans. 
The third chapter identifies disruptions in credit markets using a broad array of credit 
spreads constructed directly from the secondary bond prices on outstanding senior un-
secured debt issued by a large panel of nonfinancial firms. The portfolio-based bond 
spreads contain substantial predictive power for economic activity and outperform stan-
dard default-risk indicators. According to impulse responses from a structural factor-
augmented vector autoregression, identified credit shocks lead to large and persistent 
contractions in economic activity and account for more than 30 percent of the forecast 
error variance in economic activity at the two- to four-year horizon during the 1990-2008 
period. 
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Chapter 1 
In Search of a Risk-Free Asset 
1.1 Introduction 
Since t he seminal work by Stigler [1 961], it is well understood that search costs can generate 
first-order deviations for the predictions of behavior of prices, quantities and welfare in 
homogeneous product markets from what Walrasian theory would predict . While most of 
the theory on consumer search has focused on non-financial retail markets, there has been 
little work done on financial markets. When it comes to financial assets and money in 
general Jevon's law of one price has remained unchallenged. Standard asset pricing theory 
postulates perfect arbitrage and existence of a single price or expected risk-adjusted rate 
of return for any financial asset , otherwise, arbitrage can be made. In particular , t he price 
of a k-period risk-less bond derived from the Euler equation of a portfolio optimization 
problem would be the expected value of the stochastic-discount factor of the investor over 
this period - Mt ,t+k: 
Pt ,t+k = + = E ( Mt,t+k lit) 
Rt,t+k 
0 = E( Mt,t+l(~+1 - R{,t+1 )1It) 
(1.1a) 
(1.1b) 
where the expectation is conditional on the information set of the investor It· As long 
as there is active arbitrage, neither heterogeneity in the stochastic discount factor , nor 
heterogeneity in the information set of each investor would lead to deviations of the law 
2 
of one price. 
Two prominent examples of default-risk-free assets are government bonds and insured 
time deposits . A U.S. treasury bond is nominally riskless if held until maturity and its 
pricing to first-order approximation abides by the law of one price 1 . The pricing of the 
market for treasuries has been extensively studied in the modern asset pricing theory. 
Retail certificate of deposit contracts pricing has not been studied as extensively and for 
a reason. Up until 1982 the market for deposits was under Regulation Q which imposed 
an effective ceiling on the interest rates bank can charge on their deposits. Examining the 
pricing in retail market for certificates of deposits in the post-Regulation Q era, however, 
things look quite different from what standard asset pricing theory would predict. Figure 
(1.1) plots the time series variation of the 5th/ 95th percentiles of t he yields posted on the 
shortest 3-month and the longest 5-year maturity CD contracts by a large fraction of the 
US commercial banks over a sample period of 1997-2011. A striking and puzzling feature 
of the data is the large and time-varying yield dispersion. 
The certificate of deposit contract is a standard contract offered by commercial banks 
which closely resembles a treasury bond. It carries t he explicit insurance of the U.S. 
government up to an insurance limit which makes their pricing insensitive to the credit 
risk of the underlying institution. As such they are nominally riskless if held until maturity 
just like a Treasury bond of matched maturity. A CD contract of a particular maturity 
with an amount within the insurance limit is , therefore, a homogeneous financial product 
and under a world of perfect information would be consistently priced according to the 
asset pricing equation ( 1.1 a). The existence of price dispersion is, therefore, a puzzling 
1 A notable exception is the well-documented on-the-run-off-the-run spread puzzle (see Krishnamurthy 
[2002]) 
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fact with respect to the conventional asset pricing theory. It is distinct from the equity 
premium and the risk-free rate puzzles which standard asset pricing theory has dealt with 
since Mehra and Prescott [1985] . While the risk-free rate puzzle relates to failure of the 
consumption asset pricing model to generate a consistent risk-adjusted equalization of the 
returns on any risky asset with the risk-free rate, the observed price dispersion points to a 
violation of the law of one price for a homogeneous financial product . To give perspective 
Figure 1.1: Time series of the cross-sectional distribution of CD yields 
3-month 12-month 
7,---~----~----,----,----~----~----. 
6 
4 
2 2 
0 Jan95 Jul12 J~n95 Jul12 
24-month 60-month 
7 
6- 6 
5 
4 
3 3 · 
2 2 
J~n95 Jul97 JanOO Jul02 JanOS Jul07 Jan10 Jul12 J~n95 Jul97 JanOO Jul02 JanOS Jul07 Jan10 Jul12 
NOTE: The red line is t he matched maturity treasury yield. The shaded area is the 5th and 95th 
percentile of the CD yield distribution. The black continuous line is the median of the distribution. The 
black dashed lines are the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the distribution. 
SouRCE: RateWatch 
on the economic significance of the pnce dispersion shown m Figure (1.1) , Table (l .l) 
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summanzes the distribution of a measure of the yield dispersion across the 366 MSA 
local deposit markets for two years 2003 when the level of market interest rates was low 
and 2007 when the level was high. In 2003 market interest rates were low - the average 
Table 1.1: Distribution of the level (mean) and dispersion P(0.9)- P(O.l) of CD yields 
across MSA markets for 2003 and 2007 
2003 
Yield 3--month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 60-month 
min 0.61 0.84 1.14 1.55 1.80 2.65 
p25 0.88 1.10 1.43 2.02 2.52 3.25 
p50 0.95 1.18 1.53 2.12 2.61 3.37 
p75 1.01 1.27 1.61 2.23 2.71 3.46 
max 1.30 1.59 1.97 2.49 2.94 3.71 
P(0.9)-P(0.1) 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 60-month 
min 0.04 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.00 
p25 0.43 0.53 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.81 
p50 0.54 0.65 0.78 0.85 0.89 0.98 
p75 0.69 0.80 0.93 1.05 1.10 1.25 
max 1.37 1.37 1.62 1.66 1.96 2.46 
2007 
Yield 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 60-month 
min 1.82 2.53 2.78 3.19 3.29 3.36 
p25 2.72 3.44 3.82 3.90 3.95 4.14 
p50 2.98 3.67 4.02 4.06 4.09 4.29 
p75 3.27 3.87 4.20 4.22 4.26 4.42 
max 3.98 4.58 4.81 4.84 4.93 4.93 
P(0 .9)-P(0.1) 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 60-month 
min 0.37 0.62 0.39 0.07 0.05 0.25 
p25 1.45 1.52 1.20 1.04 1.04 0.98 
p50 1.88 2.00 1.47 1.31 1.25 1.17 
p75 2.34 2.29 1.79 1.58 1.51 1.37 
max 3.77 3.26 3.30 3.24 2.41 2.16 
NOTE: The table computes the distribution of the level of yields across the 366 MSA markets 
as well as the distribution of the measure of dispersion of yields within a market as measured by 
DISPm,t = P(0.9) - P(O.l)- the difference b etween the 90th percentile P(0.9) and the lOth percentile 
P(O.l). SOURCE: RateWatch 
12-month Treasury yield was 124 basis points , and so were t he level of interest rates on 
time deposits and the observed price dispersion. The yield posted in the median MSA 
market for the 12-mont h CD contract was 153 basis points and t he median price dispersion 
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measure DISPm,t = P(0.9) - P(O.l) was 78 basis points. During 2007 market interest 
rates were high- the 12-month Treasury yield was 452 basis points , while the median yield 
posted on the 12-month CD contract was 402 basis points and median price dispersion 
measured at 147 basis points. In 2003, if an investor in the median MSA market invested 
in a 12-month CD at the lowest lOth percentile as compared to investing in the highest 
90th percentile, she would have sustained a loss of 78 dollars on the median investment 
of 10 , 000 for a CD contract. The loss doubles to 147 dollars in 2007. The amount of 
savings over the term of the contract an investor would make if she picked the top 90th 
percentile for the 5-year contract as compared to the bottom lOth percentile for the 5-year 
contract are even larger. In 2003 the discrepancy in the total interest earned on a 10,000 
investment between the 90th and the lOth percentile for the median MSA was 478 dollars 
while in 2007 it increased to 568. These large forgone gains are a striking violation of 
arbitrage in these markets . 
A second stylized fact that emerges from Figure (1.1) and Table (1.1) is that the 
yield dispersion is time varying and pro-cyclical with respect to market interest rates . 
When market interest rates as measured by the matched maturity treasury are increasing 
and high the CD yield dispersion is also increasing and high. When interest rates are 
falling and low the CD yield dispersion is quickly collapsing and low. This asymmetry of 
the adjustment of retail deposit rates to market rates has been documented by previous 
research by Hannan and Berger (1991], Neumark and Sharpe [1992] and more recent work 
by Driscoll and Judson [2009] . Tables (1.2) and (1.3) document the distribution of the 
duration of price adjustment and the fraction of banks that adjust prices simultaneously 
over three distinct aggregate regimes - decreasing, constant and increasing level of the 
target Fed Funds rate . 
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Table 1.2: Duration in weeks between price adjustment 
Target Fed Funds decreased unchanged increased 
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
3-month 0 3 11 1 7 20 1 6 16 
6-month 0 2 7 2 6 17 2 5 12 
12-month 0 2 6 1 5 15 1 5 11 
24-month 0 2 6 1 5 14 1 5 12 
36-month 0 2 6 0 5 14 1 5 12 
60-month 0 1 5 0 3 12 0 3 12 
NOTE: The table computes the interquartile range of durations between price adjustments measured 
in weeks at the bank level for three regimes. The first regime is periods when the target fed funds rate 
is decreased , the second is when the target remains unchanged and the last regime is when the target 
is increased . The sample period is 1-J anuary-1997- 30-June-2011. 
SouRCE: RateWatch 
Let us examine the 3-month contract . The 3-month retail deposit rates are sluggish to 
adjust when the fed funds rate is increasing with a median duration of price adjustment of 
6 weeks during periods of increasing target fed funds rate. This is slightly lower than the 7 
weeks during periods when the target fed funds remains unchanged . In contrast when the 
target fed funds rate is decreasing the median duration is 3 weeks . All maturities display 
the same asymmetric response to changes in the market rates. Longer maturities, how-
ever , exhibit more flexible price adjustment in all three regimes. These facts are consistent 
with the earlier study of Driscoll and Judson [2009] who use a dataset with much smaller 
sample of banks and markets. 
The price rigidity in the retail time deposit markets is much smaller than the one 
documented for non-financial products in Bils and Klenow [2004] of 16 weeks. The asym-
metric price rigidity is also consistent with fact 3 in Nakamura and Steinsson [2008] for 
non-financial products which documents high positive correlation between inflation and 
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the frequency of price increases but not with price decreases. 
I next document the degree to which price adjustments are synchronized. Table (1.3) 
provides summary statistics for the fraction of banks that adjust every period. 
Table 1.3: Synchronization of price adjustments 
Target Fed Funds decreased unchanged increased 
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 
3-month 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.14 
6-month 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.16 
12-month 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.17 
24-month 0.16 0.25 0.36 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.14 
36-month 0.15 0.24 0.36 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.13 
60-month 0.15 0.24 0.34 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.12 
NOTE: The table computes the interquartile range of the fraction of synchronized price changes. 
The latter is computed as the fraction of banks that adjusted their price in a given week. As in table 
(1.2) the summary statistics are computed for three regimes for the target fed funds rate. The first 
regime is periods when the target fed funds rate is reduced , the second is when the target remains 
unchanged and the last regime is when the target increases. The sample period is 1-January-1997 -
30-June-2011. 
SouRCE: RateWatch 
Banks' price adjustment is not synchronized as can be seen in Table (1.3), nor does it 
display any seasonal components 2 . Although each bank is faced with the same aggregate 
shock - changes in the Fed Funds rate, there is little synchronization in the price adjust-
ment. During periods of increasing Fed Funds target the median fraction of adjusters is 
around 12 percent, slightly higher than the 11 percent in periods of constant target. The 
fraction doubles to 20 percent during periods of decreasing target Fed Funds rate. Unlike 
the duration of price adjustments, there aren't sizeable differences in the measure of price 
synchronization across the different maturities. 
2 Not reported but available upon request. 
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The observed price dispersion, its cyclical properties and the underlying price rigidity 
present a puzzle for standard asset pricing theory. Not only is an asset that is so closely 
related to the treasury priced so differently as evidenced in Figure ( 1.1) but within the 
same asset class the individual suppliers have managed to sustain large price dispersion 
while competing in prices for a homogeneous financial product. The large price dispersion 
uncovers the presence of monopoly power that banks have managed to consistently exploit 
when supplying insured time deposits over the sample period. While the pricing of insured 
time deposits seems inconsistent with the pricing of financial assets , it resembles patterns 
observed in the pricing of non-financial products . The question is what stands behind 
the monopoly power for such a homogeneous financial product? Understanding the retail 
nature of this market and the characteristics of the marginal investor are obviously the 
key clue for finding a plausible explanation. 
The existing empirical banking literature has been voluminous on testing models of 
banking market structure and competition and its impact on pricing of banks ' products. 
I refer the reader to an excellent summary of this literature in Degryse et al. [2009] . In 
order to test whether market characteristics such as market size, concentration and differ-
ences in the average investor in these markets have played a role in explaining the price 
dispersion, I perform simple reduced form regression analysis in Section ( 1.4). Although 
MSA markets display significant variation in market structure and investor characteristics, 
I find that standard measures of market competition as well as controls for market size 
and investor characteristics fail to explain the observed price dispersion nor the level of 
deposit rates offered. Product characteristics such as penalties for early withdrawal and 
minimum balance to open an account also do not play any role in the differential pricing 
across banks and markets. 
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Having ruled out theories based on competition through product differentiation and 
market concentration, I test to what extent information costs on part of investors as first 
conjectured by Stigler [1961] could generate monopoly power in this market which banks 
exploited to generate the price dispersion and price adjustment patterns in the data. I 
build on an asset pricing model which is an extension of Burdett and Judd [1983]. I ex-
tend the model by introducing het erogeneity in the search cost faced by each individual 
investor. This search cost distribution is the primitive of the model which combined with 
the equilibrium notion of Burdett-Judd generates an equilibrium price distribution. I es-
timate t he underlying search cost distribution that would rationalize t he observed yield 
dispersion using the methodology of Hong and Shum [2006] and Moraga-Gonzalez and 
Wildenbeest [2008]. T he model is able to fit reasonably well the observed price distribu-
tions for a number of years in the sample. Investors in these nmrkets could be roughly split 
in two distinct groups an uniformed ·group facing large search costs and informed group 
facing low search costs and ultimately observing t he best offers in the distribution. Almost 
half of investors in the market had very high search costs in the magnitude of 10-20 bp 
per sample of bank offer searched. This group of investors who remained uniformed about 
the availability of bett er offers was responsible for the ability of banks to post different 
rates on their t ime deposits and yet compete in prices. I further show that the model can 
generate the asymmetric price adjustment and price rigidity that I have documented in 
the data. The search cost hypothesis can consistently match the asset pricing facts. 
The only study up to date that explored this hypothesis for financial products is Hor-
tac;su and Syverson [2004] . They document the existence of sizeable price dispersion in the 
market for retail S & P 500 funds and is one of the few studies that documents violation 
of the law of one price for a homogeneous financial product. They attribute the existence 
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of price dispersion and the proliferation of these funds to the presence of search costs on 
the part of the investors in this market. 
The next section (1.2) describes the datasets used in the analysis. Section (1.3) de-
scribes in detail the characteristics of the Certificate of Deposit (CD) contract as well 
as characterizes the average investor in these assets. This section tests to what extent 
observable contract characteristics were priced. It also examines to the degree to which 
investors search among alternatives. Section (1.4) tests a reduced form model of market 
competition. Section (1.5) presents the model and sections (1.6) and (1. 7) present the 
empirical implementation and the results from the structural estimation. Section (1.8) 
explores the ability of the model to generate the observed price adjustment in a simple 
dynamic extension of the static equilibrium model with monetary policy shocks to the 
cost of funds of banks. Finally, section (1.9) concludes by providing discussion on the 
implication of costly consumer search markets for the pass-through of aggregate shocks 
and in particular monetary policy shocks. 
1.2 Data 
I employ a novel proprietary database constructed by RateWatch3 which contains the 
yields on the certificates of deposit (CDs) at weekly frequency over the period of 1997-
2011 offered by approximately 5,726 U.S. FDIC insured commercial banks in 75 ,879 local 
branch offices in over 10,000 cities across the US covering all 366 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA). I aggregate the data at the level of the individual bank and MSA market 
as banks priced uniformly across branches within the same MSA area. Over the same 
period the average number of operating commercial banks was around 7,500 in 2010 which 
3http://www.rate-watch.com/ 
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guarantees a good coverage of the universe of banks. The dataset is constructed and 
maintained by Rate\Vatch and contains both insured deposits of denomination less that 
hundred thousand dollars and non-insured large denomination deposits of amounts above 
one hundred thousand. This cut-off value is a standard for the industry and until 2008 
distinguished insured time deposits from non-insured before the limit of $ 100, 000 was 
increased to $ 250 ,000 thousand. 
For the purpose of this study I focus only on the small denomination CDs as these 
were consistently covered by the FDIC insurance. The yield information on deposits of 
denomination less than $100,000 is almost consistently covered by all banks in the sample. 
I also fo cus on banks that had offices in at least one of the 366 MSA areas. As a result 
the sample of banks is reduced to 3, 796 as I exclude a number of small community banks 
that operate in small towns not included in a MSA area. 
Information on the industry concentration, number of banks and number of branches 
at the MSA level is obtained from the Summary of Deposit database (SOD) 4 . Balance 
sheet and income statement information on the set of commercial banks is constructed 
from the Reports of Condit ion and Income ( a .k.a . Call Reports )5 . I also construct data 
from 2007 the Survey of Consumer Finances 6 to obtain information about actual CD 
holdings. Demographic and income information for the MSA markets is downloaded from 
the Census Bureau 7 . Finally, data on the return on the S& P 500 stock market index and 
the treasury market are obtained from CRSP 8 
4http ://www2 .fdic.gov/sod/ 
5https ://cdr. ffiec .gov/public/ 
6http ://vvw.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2007.htm 
7http ://www.census.gov/main/www/access.html 
8http ://www.crsp.com/ documentation/index.html 
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1.3 Certificate of deposit contract 
1.3.1 Characteristics of the CD contract 
It is important, first , to describe the characteristics of the certificate of deposit (CD) 
contract and relate it to a close substitute - a treasury bond with matched maturity. 
A Treasury bond and a CD are both a fixed income instrument with a predetermined 
maturity. The standard maturities that banks offer for the CD contract are 3-months, 6-
months , 1-year, 2-year, 3-year and 5-year. The contracts come in two main varieties- small 
denomination of deposits below 100, 000 dollars and large denomination of above hundred 
thousand. Before it was raised to 250,000 on October 3 2008, the hundred thousand cut-off 
distinguished insured from non-insured deposit accounts including time deposits. 
Except for the shorter maturities offered , CDs differ from government bonds in terms 
of their taxation, liquidity and riskiness . Unlike government bonds , certificates of deposits 
are taxed both at the state and the federal level. Part of the difference in the yields 
offered on the CD should reflect the size of the state tax. In terms of liquidity and price 
risk, CD contracts specify a pre-fixed penalty schedule for early withdrawal, thus, insuring 
the holder of the CD contract from market interest rate risk. Table (1.4) summarizes 
the characteristics of the penalty schedules for early withdrawal. For the 3-month CD 
contract the fee is worth 90 days of interest which means that if an investor withdraws 
before the maturity has expired she is going to lose part of the principal invested worth 
3-months of interest less the interest earned up to this point. Therefore, CDs are risky if 
investors are exposed to liquidity shocks forcing them to withdraw before maturity as in 
the Diamond and Dybvig [1983] set-up. Treasuries are risky as they contain price risk if 
sold before their maturity expires . However, the CD contract is significantly less liquid 
than the corresponding treasury as the expected losses from early withdrawal exceed the 
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expect ed price risk. Nevertheless, the amount that can be lost in case of early withdrawal 
is a pre-fixed and known quantity at the time of signing of the CD contract which could 
be valued if investors prefer early resolution of uncertainty. 
Table 1.4: Contract characteristics 
3-mont h 6-mont h 1-year 2.5-year 5-year 
median 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Min. deposit amount mean 1642.35 1444.53 1325.50 1361.67 1795.41 
std 1959.57 1721.50 1490.28 1556.77 2430.28 
median 2.86 3. 75 4.00 3.90 4. 07 
Yield mean 2.88 3.59 3 .81 3.80 4.06 
std 1.22 1.20 1.07 0.88 0 .83 
median 90 90 180 180 180 
P enalty (days) mean 70.32 96.35 151.62 201.18 246.67 
std 27.91 37.87 58. 14 76.75 157.86 
Spearman rank correlation 
Rank corr. -0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.05 
Min .amount - y ield p-value 0.35 0.93 0.85 0.94 0 .63 
Penalty (days) - yield Rank corr. -0.31 -0.15 -0.10 0.09 0.17 
p-value 0.00 0.15 0.31 0.41 0 .11 
Min.amount- penalty (days) Rank corr. 0.03 0.00 -0.19 -0.21 -0.13 
p-value 0.77 0.99 0.07 0.06 0 .22 
NOTE: The table gives summary statistics for the minimum deposit, the yield and the penalty fees 
for a survey of the 10 largest banks and thrifts in t he 10 largest deposit markets in the U.S. conducted 
by BankRate Monitor in 2006. The penalty fee is stated in days of accrued interest. The lower panel of 
the table contains the pai r-wise Spearman rank correlations and the corresponding p-values using the 
Sidak correction . 
SOURCE: BankRate Monitor 
The lower panel of the t able gives the Spearman pairwise rank correlation between 
the three characteristics of the cont ract - t he yield, the minimum deposit amount and the 
early-withdrawal penalty. The minimum amount correlates neither wit h the posted yield 
nor with the penalty fee for any of the maturities . Only for the 3-month CD contract, does 
the correlation between the penalty fee and the yield is significant from zero at 5 percent 
significance level but is insignificant for any other maturity. The correlation b etween the 
p enalty fee and the yield at 3-months is -0.31 and if anything goes against the intuition 
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that high penalty fee contracts should demand a higher yield. 
In summary, the observable product characteristics of the standard certificate of deposit 
contract exhibit sizeable variation across banks and markets. However, the two main 
product characteristics the minimum deposit amount and the penalty for early withdrawal 
do not affect the pricing of the contract. 
1.3.2 Participation in the CD market 
Who invests in CDs and for what reason? Using data from the 2007 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF2007), Table (1.5) shows that the participation rate in the CD market is 
16 % which is comparable to the direct participation in the stock market and the direct 
participation in the Tteasury market (savings bonds). 
Table 1.5: Direct participation in financial markets 
Transaction 
accounts 
Participation rate 92.1 
Certificates 
of deposit 
16.1 
SouRCE: Survey of Consumer Finance, 2007 
Savings 
bonds 
14.9 
Bonds 
1.6 
Stocks 
17.9 
Any financial 
asset 
93.9 
As expected, elderly households close to and after retirement increase their share in 
safe assets as compared to risky stocks or bonds and as can be seen in Table (1.6) the 
participation in the CD market increases both in rates and in absolute amounts invested. 
The participation rate and the absolute amount invested increase with higher income 
percentiles and net-worth. 
For the search theory explanation of the observed price dispersion to be viable, it must 
be true that investors in these markets are actively looking for the best yield and are 
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Table 1.6: Participat ion in CD market by household characteristics 
Age groups 
Less than 35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75 or more 
Participation 6.7 9.0 14.3 20.5 24.2 37.0 
Median amount 5.0 5.0 15.0 23.0 23.2 30.0 
Income percentiles 
Less than 20 20--39.9 40-59.9 60- 79.9 80-89.9 90- 100 
Participation 3.6 8.5 15.2 20.9 26.2 26.1 
Median amount 18.0 18.0 17.0 11.0 20.0 42.0 
Net-worth percentiles 
Less than 25 25-49.9 50- 74.9 75-89.9 90- 100 
P articipation 2.5 9.9 19.4 32.5 32.9 
Median amount 2.0 7.0 15.0 25.0 50.0 
SouRCE: Survey of Consumer Finance, 2007 
not locked into a long-term relationship with their bank. 9 Studies have uncovered the 
presence of large switching costs in the market for transaction deposit accounts such as 
checkings accounts. Further , attributes such as the closeness of bank's offices and the den-
sity of its branch and ATM networks bring valuable convenience and determine the choice 
of one bank over the other when it comes to transaction accounts . The presence of large 
switching costs could explain the large median duration of checking account relationships 
reported in SCF2007 as 20 years. 
When it comes to certificate of deposit contracts, however , the convenience of branch 
networks and ATM matters considerably less. Moreover, by t heir nature CD contracts 
relationships have a pre-determined maturity and need to be re-established after the rna-
turity of the contract expires. Due to the relative illiquidity of the CD investment in the 
9 Evidence for active search can be found on financial advisory websites such as BankRate.com 
and DepositsAccount. com recommend t hat savers shop around for best yields and warn that there 
is large existing price d ispersion in the contracts. An example is a recent article on Bank Rate 
Monitor with advice on investing in t he CD market http : //YYw.bankrate.com/finance/exclusives/ 
online-or- branch-where-is-the-best- yield--1.aspx 
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presence of early withdrawal penalties and the upward sloping yield curve, a commonly 
recommended investment strategy that optimizes the trade-off between the liquidity risk 
and the higher yield in longer maturity contracts is the so called "CD ladder" which re-
quires an investor to allocate her investment in multiple maturity CDs so that every period 
certain amount matures to satisfy liquidity needs. Yet another reason for investors to shop 
around for CDs in different institutions is that the F DIC insurance limit applies to ac-
counts with one institution for each depositor 10 . The presence of over 7,000 commercial 
bank institutions subject to FDIC insurance makes it possible to insure against credit risk 
large investments by distributing these investments over a large set of institutions. All 
these investment strategies, require that investors in these markets actively search for the 
best yield across different institutions. 
To further verify that investors did search for CD contrads over institutions different 
from their main checking account institution, Table (1.7) gives summary statistics on the 
number and average holding amount of time deposits and the number of institutions where 
these CD contracts are held with. 
Table 1. 7: Summary statistics of CD contract holdings 
mean min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max sd 
Number CDs 2.40 1 1 1 2 3 6 20 2.29 
Number institutions 1.28 1 1 1 3 10 0.73 
CD amount total 55,630.86 50 1,000 5,800 20,000 51 ,000 200,000 47,000,000 187,338.71 
CD amount average 24,083.64 50 1,000 4 ,000 10,000 25,000 100,000 16,000,000 102,936.57 
NoTE : The number of CDs and institutions are top-coded in the public dataset at 20 and 10, 
respectively. The statistics are computed using the weights provided by SCF 2007. 
SouRCE: Survey of Consumer Finance, 2007 
While a large fraction of the investors hold a CD with only one institution, it is not 
1
°FDIC allows the insurance coverage to be extended to joint account ownership to potentially cover 
amounts up to 3 ,000,000 for a single institution. See http : I / WYY. f dic. gov/depos i t / 
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necessary the same financial institution they have a checking account. SCF2007 reports 
that 45 % of investors had a CD account with an institution different from their main 
checking account institution. The median amount invested in a CD is 20 , 000 and half 
of the investors hold at least 2 CD contracts. Figure 1.2 presents the scatter plot of 
the number of CD contracts and the number of institutions these contracts are held with 
weighted by the amount invested represented by the size of the circle. Although large mass 
of surveyed households held no more than one CD and transacted with one institution, 
there is a clear positive relationship between the number of CD contracts and the number 
of distinct banks where these contracts are held with. The correlation coefficient between 
the two is 0. 75 . The total amount of the investment in CDs is weakly positively correlated 
with the number of institutions with a correlation coefficient of 0.25. 
The evidence in this section points to the fact that CD contract relationships are far 
shorter-lived than the corresponding transactions accounts and investors who purchased 
CDs held them with different institutions from their main transactions account institution. 
The deposit rate dataset contains information about active offers that banks have publicly 
made to both their existing customers but also to the general public and do not contain 
any additional elements such as bundling and other non-price elements. Competition in 
these markets, at least as recorded by the data provider Rate Watch, was through price 
competition. 
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Figure 1.2: Number of contracts and number of institutions 
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NOTE: The scatter plot weights the observations by the total amount invested in CD contracts. A 
larger circle means a larger amount invested . The number of CD contracts and the number of institutions 
are top coded at 20 and 10, respectively. SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances, 2007 
1.4 P rice dispersion - product differentiation and market structure 
The previous section revealed that investors interacted with multiple banks when investing 
in CDs. However , these interactions could have still been restricted to the local deposit 
market and the observed price dispersion could be due to the unique characteristics of these 
markets. In this section I examine the extent to which the observed price dispersion is due 
to the market structure for deposits and differences in market power both due to market 
concentration from the supply side and income, wealth and demographic characteristics 
from the demand side. To begin with, I need a working definition of what defines a deposit 
19 
market . As geographic restrictions have been completely removed by the Riegle-Neal Act 
of 1994 11 and with the advent of the era of internet banking and national banks , the geo-
graphic definition of a deposit market has become increasingly less pert inent . Despite this 
for the analysis that follows I use the common for the empirical baking literature definition 
of a market as a MSA area 12 . According to the Census Bureau there are 366 MSA areas 
which vary in both population size, average age and income of their inhabitants but also 
in terms of the number of banks operating in the market and the level of deposit market 
concentration. Table (1.8) gives summary statist ics for the distribut ion of characteristics 
of the 366 MSA level markets for 2007. MSA markets vary considerably in terms of 
Table 1.8: Summary statistics of MSA markets , 2007 
min p25 p50 p75 max 
Population 59 ,908 142,934 243,360 547,534 18,572 ,325 
Share population age 65 plus 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.14 0 .32 
Income per capita 18,824 30,970 34,002 38,072 80,139 
Deposits per capita 3,450 10,980 13,500 16,350 236,650 
Number of banks 4 12 16 26 264 
Number of branches 12 47 72 151 4,580 
Herfendahl-Hirshman index 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.59 
NoTE: Summary statistics are constructed for 2007. The first three rows are variables constructed 
from the Census Bureau data. The last four rows are variables constructed from the Summary of Deposit 
Database. T he Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) index is constructed as the sum of squared deposit 
market shares and takes values from 0 (the least concentrated) to 1 (the most concent rated ). SouRCE: 
Census Bureau and t he Summary of Deposits, 2007 
measures of market concentration- the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the num-
ber of operating banks. In 2007 the HHI for the least concentrated market was measured 
at 0.05 , the median market had HHI of 0.15 and the most highly concentrated market 
11Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
12 See Becker [2007] for the discussion on t he degree to which deposit markets are geographically seg-
mented. The U.S. Department of Justice also adopts the MSA level market definition and defines markets 
with HHl < 0.1 as unconcentrated and those with HHI > 0.18 as highly concentrated. Mergers and 
acquisitions are restricted by Antitrust Legislation in highly concentrated markets. 
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HHI equaled to 0.59. In terms of number of operating banks , MSA markets ranged from 
4 to 264 banks with the median market having 16 banks. On the demand side as we have 
seen in Table (1.6) important characteristic is the share of elderly people as measured by 
the share of the population of age 65 years and above has also exhibited wide variation 
across markets and so has income per capita and deposits per capita. 
I first examine the degree to which group effects can explain the total variation in the 
yields. In other words to what extent characteristics inherent to a particular bank and 
characteristics inherent to a particular market determined the total variation across banks 
and across markets. I run the following fixed effects regression on the yields: 
Yj ,m ,t = f--L + CY-j + ljt + /m + Ej,m ,t (1.2) 
where (aj j = l..N) are bank fixed effects, (rm, m = 1, ... , M) are market fixed effects 
and ( 6t, t = 1, .. , T ) are time fixed effects. Results from this regression are presented in 
Table (1.9). More t han 90 percent of the total variation is explained by variation in the 
time effects 6t which measure the aggregate level of market interest rates. The market 
and bank level fixed effects add marginally small explanatory power , albeit statistically 
significant. 
Although the group effects explain a large fraction of the total variation in the yields 
at all maturities , the remaining 5-8 % variation in yields captured by the residual variation 
is rather large as can be seen in Figure (1.3) where I have plotted the 5th-95th percentiles 
(shaded area) and t he 25th and 75th percentiles of the residuals of the fixed effects regres-
sion (1.2) for the 3-month and the 5-year CD contract. The group effects seem to remove 
the cyclical movement in interest rates from the 5-year contract but fail to do so for the 
3-month which displays sizeable heteroscedasticity. 
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Figure 1.3: Residual distribution after controlling for group effects - 3-month and 50-
month CD contract 
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NOTE: The figure plots the residual cross-sectional distribution from regression 1.2. The upper 
panel plots the residual for the 3-month contract and the lower panel plots the residual for the 60-
month contract . The shaded area is the 5th-95th percentile range, the green dashed lines are the 25th 
and the 75th percentiles and the black continuous line is the median. 
S OUR CE: RateWatch 
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Table 1.9: Bank, market and time effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
3-mo 6-mo 12-mo 24-mo 36-mo 60-mo 
R2 0.922 0.942 0.949 0.943 0.935 0.910 
F -test all group effects 19481.9 28458.1 32036.3 27845.7 22809.9 14181.1 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test time fixed effects 60399.55 88290.48 99404.24 86377.03 70598.20 43850.32 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-test bank fixed effects 94.81 121.6 146.5 141.5 137.3 133.0 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F -test market fixed effects 28 .90 39.65 46.84 44.54 44.64 42.40 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 959590 1004908 1005064 972440 929229 845508 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Significance level: * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , ••• p < 0.001 
NOTE: The table presents results from group effects regression ( 1.2). 
Faced with such heterogeneous demand conditions and market concentration, banks 
could price discriminate across different markets and post yields that relate to market 
conditions. If this were the case, we would observe banks post different rates across the 
different markets and large part of the observed price dispersion could be explained. In 
order to test whether banks price discriminate across different markets, I simply decompose 
the total variation Wt(Y[) = L Lm,j(YJ,m,t- y[) 2 in the deposit market yields two-ways 
- at the level of the bank and at the level of the market in (1.3). 
(1.3) 
where yJ7 m t is the yield posted by bank j in market m at time t and yt, YJ7 t and y-:n t 
l ' ' ) 
are the corresponding time, bank and market means. At the level of the market within-
market variation L Lm)YJ,m,t- Y-:n ,t) 2 measures the variation due to differences in yields 
posted by the banks in the same market and the across-market variation Nt Lm(Y~,t-y[) 2 
measures the variation of the market means from the time mean. Similarly, I decompose 
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total variation into within bank variation 2:: l::m,j (y J,m,t- ilJ,t) 2 and across banks variation 
M '""' (-T -T)2 L..Jj Yj ,t- Yt · 
The fraction of the overall variation explained by the within-market variation as well 
as the fraction of the across-bank variation are plotted in Figure 1.4 for the 3-month CD 
contract and the 5-year CD contract. Almost all of the total variation can be explained 
by differences across banks rather than differences across yields posted by the same bank 
across different markets . The share of within market variation and across bank variation 
exhibits a clear trend from roughly 70 percent of the total variation at the beginning 
of the sample to above 90 percent for the across bank variation and above 80 percent 
for the within market variation. The decomposition based on deviations from MSA-level 
markets also points that differences across markets is mainly attributed to differences 
in the composition of banks within each market, rather than differential pricing across 
markets. The results from this decomposition confirm that banks did not systematically 
discriminate across markets but rather priced uniformly across markets with widely varying 
concentration and demand conditions. 13 
Finally, I examine to what extent observable and time-varying characteristics of the 
markets can explain the cross-sectional differences in market dispersion. As a measure of 
dispersion I construct the difference between the 90th and the lOth percentile DISPm,t = 
{P(0.9) - P(O.l)} for each MSA market 14 whose summary statistics were presented in 
Table (1.1). To this goal, I run a set of reduced-form regressions (1.4) on the measure of 
price dispersion at the level of the market and then separate regressions on the individual 
13The results from the analysis confirm results in Park and P ennacchi [2009] who document similar 
uniform pricing using a much smaller dataset. They attribute the uniform pricing to the increasing 
prevalence of large multi-market banks which explains the upward trends in Figure (1.4). 
141 experimented with other measures such as the Gini coefficient and the interquartile range. The 
results do not change and are available upon request . 
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percentiles P(O.l), P(0.5) and P(0.9) of the distribution of yields in each MSA market. 
DISPm,t = io + im + Xm,tf3 + Ot + cm,k (1.4) 
P( ) -z - z X (3z s:z z Z m ,t = TO + Tm + m,t + Ut + cm,k (1.5) 
The regression includes a set of market characteristics Xm,t which are described in 
Table (1.8) as well as a full set of market am and time fixed effects Ot. The regression 
clusters at the level of the MSA market. Tables (1.10) and (1.11) summarize the results 
from the two set of regressions. 
The results from the regression confirm the hypothesis that standard measures of mar-
ket concentration such as HHI index and the number of operating banks in a market do 
not influence the level of price dispersion. The only exception is the statistically signifi-
cant positive impact of the number of banks on the price dispersion for the 3-month CD 
contract. The number of branches that are operational in a market have a statistically 
significant negative impact on yield dispersion for maturities above one year. The plau-
sible mechanism through which denser branch network markets lead to lower the price 
dispersion, however, is not very clear. Looking at table (1.11) where the individual per-
centiles are examined, the impact of the number of branches on price dispersion is through 
increasing the P(O.l) percentile and decreasing the P(0.9) percentiles. The coefficient es-
timates are mostly statistically insignificant and there is no statistically significant impact 
on the median. In summary, market concentration had played no role in the observed 
price dispersion nor on the level of interest rates. 
In terms of demographic, income and wealth characteristics of the MSA markets, only 
the income per capita has statistically significant positive impact on the level of interest 
rates. Also larger markets in terms of population exhibit larger price dispersion at for the 
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shorter maturities of the CD contract while higher income levels raised the level of interest 
rates. The share of eld~rly people in a market are not statistically significantly related to 
the observed yield d ispersion but have negative impact on the level of interest rates. 
Table 1.10: Panel regression - price dispersion and market characteristics 
Disp(P(0 .9)- P(0 .1)) 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 60-month 
HHI index 0.273 0.255 -0.00221 -0.0697 0. 193 0.290 
(1.22) (1.24) (-0.01) (-0.43) (1.08) (1.23) 
Number banks 0.161* 0.0705 0.0262 0.0891 0.106 0.0798 
(log) (2.29) (1.10) (0.45) (1.62) (1.80) (1.18) 
Branches per capita -0 .195 -0.174 -0.233** -0.307*** -0.299*** -0.277** 
(log) (-1.76) (-1.89) ( -2 .84) (-4.11) (-4.13) ( -3.07) 
Deposits per capita -0.0332 -0.108* -0.0318 -0.0175 -0.0500 -0.0905 
(log) ( -0.61) ( -2.23) ( -0. 72) (-0.41) ( -1.08) (-1.53) 
Share 65 + 4.020 2.949 2.499 2.041 1.156 0.0457 
(1.66) (1.39) (1.26) (1.05) (0.55) (0.02) 
Population 0.878*** 1.103*** 0.533** 0.381 * 0.146 -0.0444 
(log) ( 4.05) (5.65) (2.80) (2.20) (0.81) ( -0.22) 
Income per capita 0.246 0.413* -0.0222 -0.173 -0.157 0.0514 
(log) (1.16) (2.04) (-0 .11) (-1.00) ( -0.87) (0.28) 
Constant -15.68*** -19.31 *** -7.828* -5.016 -1.902 -0.977 
(-4. 17) (-5.70) (-2.29) (-1.58) (-0.59) (-0.28) 
Observations 4973 4973 4973 4973 4971 4971 
R 2 overall 0.101 0.0525 0.0700 0.0625 0.111 0.187 
R 2 within 0.598 0.617 0.471 0.405 0.386 0.370 
R 2 between 0.028 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.057 
F 212.3 181.4 145.2 120.3 93.15 110.2 
N markets 359 359 359 359 359 359 
t-statistics in parentheses 
Significance level: * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
NOTE: The left hand side variable is the P(0.9)- P(0.1) measure of dispersion calculated for each of 
the 366 MSA markets. The regression is run on 359 markets as some markets had too few observations 
in the RW survey. The regression is a fixed effects panel regression with clustered standard errors at 
the level of the MSA market controlling for serial correlation. 
Both regressions are able to fit reasonably well the within variation as measured by 
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Table 1.11: Panel regression- percentiles of price distribution and market characteristics 
lOth 
HHI index -0.431* 
(-2.23) 
Number banks -0.0790 
(Jog) (- 1.23) 
Branches per capita 0.108 
(Jog) (1.07) 
Deposits per capita 0.0545 
(log) (1.25) 
Share 65 + - 5.939** 
(-2.59) 
Population - 0.5 11* 
(log) (-2.49) 
Income pe r capita 0.0885 
(log) (0.42) 
Constant 7.488 * 
(1.97) 
O bservations 4973 
R 2 overall 0 .803 
R 2 within 0 .955 
R 2 bet ween 0 .0250 
F 3058.2 
N m arkets 359 
t-stat1stlcs m parentheses 
3-mo nth 
50th 
-0 .126 
(-0 .90) 
-0 .0164 
(-0.34) 
0 .0892 
(1.45) 
0 .0109 
(0.38) 
-3 .8 29* 
(- 2.52) 
-0 .127 
(- 0.96) 
0.0617 
(0.45) 
2.6 04 
(1.09) 
4973 
0.955 
0 .977 
0.161 
7992.8 
359 
90th lOth 
0.158 0 .0261 
(-1 .23) (-0 .19) 
0.0822 0 .00448 
(1.77) (0.10) 
-0.0876 0.223*"' 
(-1.26) (3.08) 
0 .0213 0 .0301 
(0.62) (0.86) 
-1.919 - 2.929 
(- 1. 20) (-1.94) 
0.368* 0 .0844 
(2.57) (0.65) 
0 .335* 0.590*** 
(2.50) (4.48) 
- 8.194 .. 
-4 .425 
(-3.24 ) (-1. 79) 
4973 4973 
0 .881 0.944 
0 .974 0.972 
0.0608 0 .144 
6245.9 7365.6 
359 359 
Significance level: * p < 0.05 , •• p < 0.01 , ••• p < 0.001 
24-month 
50th 
-0.0588 
(-0.48) 
0 .0382 
(1.06) 
0 .0801 
(1.57) 
0 .0369 
(1.81) 
-2.989** 
(-2.75) 
0.312 .. 
(3 .01) 
0.38 4**"' 
(3.39) 
-5 .873** 
(-3.25) 
4973 
0.909 
0 .986 
0 .0596 
13088.8 
359 
90th 
-0 .0958 
(-0.77) 
0 .0936* 
(2.42) 
-0 .0842 
(-1.62) 
0 .0126 
(0.49) 
- 0 .888 
(-0.72) 
0 .466*** 
(3.44) 
0.417* ** 
(3.50) 
-9.441*** 
(-4.14) 
4973 
0 .846 
0.986 
0 .0533 
101 24.0 
359 
lOth 
0 .364 
(-2 .04) 
-0 .0211 
(-0 .40) 
0 .127 
(1. 55) 
0.119* 
(2.53) 
-1. 328 
(-0 .92) 
0 .0311 
(0 .22) 
0.3 31* 
(2.13) 
-1.482 
(-0 .6 0) 
4971 
0.932 
0.958 
0 .201 
3963.6 
359 
60- mon t h 
50th 
-0 .118 
(-0 .99) 
-0.0357 
(-1.04) 
0.0101 
(0 .20) 
0 .0481** 
(2 .64) 
-2 .968* 
(- 2.54) 
0.0102 
(0 .09) 
0.296* 
(2.38) 
-0 .640 
(-0. 33) 
4971 
0.958 
0.979 
0.213 
7512 .5 
359 
90th 
-0 .0734 
(-0 .55) 
0 .0587 
(1.52) 
-0 .150** 
(- 2.96) 
0.0285 
(1.17) 
-1.283 
(-1.06) 
-0 .0133 
(-0.09) 
0.382*** 
(3.36) 
- 2.459 
(-1.06) 
4971 
0.950 
0 .976 
0 .144 
5109.0 
359 
NoTE: The left hand side variables are the P(0.1) , P(0.5) and P(0.9) percentiles of the distribution 
of yields for each of the 366 MSA markets but only 359 included as some markets had too few observations 
in the RW survey. The regression is a Fixed Effects panel regression with clustered standard errors at 
the level of the MSA market controlling for serial correlat ion . 
the R 2-within. However , in both regression the explained between-markets variation as 
captured by the R 2-between is rather disappointingly low. In other words these regres-
sions fail to explain the cross-sectional differences in markets. Although I performed the 
regressions as panel regressions with fixed effects, what I was interested is explaining the 
cross-sectional differences in price dispersion and the level of interest rates as a function of 
measures of market concentration and income and demographic characteristics. Measures 
of market concentration as well as measures of the characteristics of the average investor 
in these markets do not play a significant explanatory role for both the level of the interest 
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rates charged but also for the observed price dispersion. 15 
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is an unobserved factor that allows banks 
while competing in prices to sustain a large price dispersion. I have ruled out standard 
industrial organization theories commonly tested in the empirical banking literature as 
summarized in Chapter 3 of Degryse et al. [2009] through a set of reduced form tests . I 
next turn to building a structural model where the unobserved factor is the distribution 
of search or information costs the investors in these markets face. I turn back to the data 
to estimate these implied information costs. 
1.5 Model 
I take a partial equilibrium framework where a unit mass of investors conduct costly search 
for the best return on a T-period investment. There is public supply of a risky asset as 
well as 1/ N measure of retail banks per investor which offer retail time deposit contracts 
insured by the government. Deposit insurance rules out bank runs as in Diamond and 
Dybvig [1983] . In case of bank failure the deposit insurance fund would credibly cover 
the whole amount of the deposit contract obligation including the interest accrued. As a 
result of the deposit insurance bank characteristics are irrelevant in the pricing of the in-
sured deposit contract. Insured deposits are treated as homogeneous financial product by 
investors . Banks compete in prices facing a common marginal cost P. In order to sustain 
equilibrium price dispersion and extract monopoly profits , banks rely on the asymmetric 
information investors have about the position of the best offers due to the costly search 
151 could have performed the same regressions as a set of cross-section regressions as in Fama and 
MacBeth [1973] . However, the panel regression allows me to control for unobserved fixed effects and also 
allows me to correct for serial correlation. Estimation of regressions (1.4) and (1.5) as a series of cross-
section regressions leads to the same low goodness-of-fit as the panel regression. Results not reported but 
available upon request. 
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to obtain the information. Banks play symmetric mixed strategies in their deposit offers 
to generate an equilibrium price distribution of deposit offers Fp(P). In equilibrium each 
bank will be indifferent between posting any price in the support of the distribution and 
will earn a strictly positive monopoly profit . The notion of equilibrium extends that of 
Burdett and Judd [1983]. 
The model can be summarized as the sub-game perfect equilibrium where banks first 
play mixed strategies equilibrium in the pricing of the deposit contracts generating an 
equilibrium price distribution Fp(P) on a finite support [P, P]. Given this offer distribu-
tion and their individual search cost, investors decide whether and how intensely to search 
for the best deposit offer while they always have the outside option to invest in the risky 
asset. Given their best offer each investor makes a consumption-savings decision. Finally, 
pay-offs are realized in period T. 
Figure 1.5: Time-line of events 
Banks Investors 
t-1 Fp(P) on [E, P] 
Mixed strategies Search, consumption-savings 
The next sections describe in detail the investor and the banks problem and charac-
terizes the equilibrium in this economy. 
1.5.1 Investor problem 
Each period t a unit mass of investors enters the market for time deposits of maturity 
T > 1. The investors are interest ed in transferring wealth over this period of time to 
satisfy consumption at period T and do not consider any interim income, consumption or 
30 
the possibility to reinvest in a different asset. The investor maximizes utility which takes 
the following form: 
if (} =1- 1 
(1.6) 
if(}= 1 
This specification allows for the separation of risk-aversion 1 and the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution a. If an investor invests in the risky asset, her end-period 
wealth and consumption will be stochastic. The investor is risk-averse and the term 
;..t( ~) = ([E( c~-1')] 1 ~, ) measures the certainty equivalent of the risky-asset lottery. 
At the beginning of the period the investor has initial endowment w = (wo , wi)· The 
initial endowment wo is used during the search stage and can be thought of as the amount 
of available time to allocate between leisure and costly search while WI is the financial 
wealth that the investor considers for investment. The public information is the cross-
sectional distribution of posted deposit offers Fp(P) and the distribution of final pay-offs 
of the risky asset <I»(Pr) in period T. It is important to note the temporal nature of the 
resolution of uncertainty of the two types of saving vehicles. If the investor decides to 
conduct costly search and invest in a deposit contract, she is going to be faced with the 
uncertainty of the cross-sectional distribution of deposit offers. By choosing her search ef-
fort, she can reduce the uncertainty about the best offer she can obtain. The uncertainty 
of the final pay-off and final consumption using a deposit contract will be resolved after 
the costly search. While if she invests in the risky asset, the uncertainty is only resolved 
at the time of the final consumption. The investor does not have control over this return. 
The timing of the decision process for this investor is summarized in Figure (1.6). 
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Figure 1. 6: Time-line of events 
Invest deposit contract n :0:: 1, co = wo- ~(n - 1) 
/ 
/ Search- P = min{Pi}~=l Consumption-savings F inal consumption 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
(w = (wo , wl) , ~t/ / 
< 
Fp(P), q,(pr) ' 
' 
Invest risky asset 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Invest risky asset ' ' 
' 
n = O, co = wo 
Consumption-savings Final consumption 
Initially, the investor decides whether to invest in the deposit contract or invest in the 
risky asset. If she decides to invest in the deposit contract, she goes through a costly 
search stage during which she makes a decision on how many bank offers to sample nand 
considers the lowest price. The search is costly as the investor incurs an idiosyncratic cost 
~ per search. After the search stage the investor can either accept the best offer from the 
sample of offers she has or she still has the option to invest in the risky asset . If in the 
initial stage, she decides to invest in the risky asset , she saves on the costly search effort 
and expends the time endowment for leisure consumption co = wo. The investor does not 
have stochastic income in the future period and hence she doesn 't have hedging demand 
and would always choose the asset that gives her the lowest risk-adjusted price of future 
consumption. Whichever investment option she chooses, in the consumption-savings stage 
she decides on how much to consume today c1 versus how much to invest for future 
consumption c7 given the best price of future consumption she has available. The sections 
below describe and solve the problem of the investor starting with the consumption-savings 
decision. 
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Consumption-savings decision 
At the consumption savings stage, the investor has already made a decision on what type 
of asset to invest in and faces an expected price at which she can substitute consumption 
over time. 
(1.7) 
subject to: 
c 2: 0, A 2: 0 
i E {d , r} 
For analytical convenience, I assume that the risky asset holding period return over 
r-periods is distributed log-normally lnRr "'d N(lnRr- ~cr;, cr;). The term -~cr; corrects 
for the Jensen 's inequality and the implicit price ofT-period consumption using the risky 
asset is distributed log-normally lnPr "'d N(lnPr + ~cr;,cr;). The expected price is 
pr = .zir. I summarize the solution to the consumption savings problem as the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1.5.1 The solution of the problem is well-defined and takes the following 
form 
ci = hi(EPi) X WI 
. 1 . . 
c2 = - . (1- h2 (EP2 )) X WI p t 
Ai = (1- hi(EPi)) X WI 
(1.8) 
(1.9) 
(1.10) 
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The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth for() f. 1 takes the following functional 
form for deposits and risky assets: 
hd(P) = -~1-=-:-_ 
1 + wapl-a 
hr(pr) = 1 
1 + wa [Pre~a;J 1-a 
The indirect utility is linear in financial wealth: 
. . 1 
(1.11) 
(1.12) 
(1.13) 
where the marginal utility of wealth qi(P) = h~(P) 1-a- is a decreasing and convex function 
of the expected price i.e. ¢' (-) < 0 and¢"(-) > 0. 
Proof The results are straightforward to show and rely on the homogeneity of degree one 
of the utility function and log-normality of the return on the risky asset. For details , see 
the appendix 0 
If the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution exceeds 1, then the substitution effect dom-
inates the income effect in the consumption-savings decision. Conversely, if () < 1 the 
income effect dominates and in this case the marginal propensity to save is increasing 
the price of future consumption. Investors prefer smooth consumption profile. Unlike 
the deposit contract , the marginal propensity to consume for the risky asset contains a 
1 2 
risk-adjustment factor e 2'Yar which is a function of the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. 
Higher volatility of the pay-off of the risky asset increases the risk-adjusted price of the 
risky asset. The linearity in wealth property of the indirect utility allows me to normalize 
financial wealth to one for the rest of the analysis and will be useful in the empirical 
implementation of the model. 
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Non-sequential search 
At the search stage the investor is faced with the task of finding information about what 
specific price each bank offers. The only public information at this stage is the distribution 
of deposit offers Fdp(P) on a finite support [P, P]. She has no prior information about the 
past history of prices each bank posted and as will become evident this information would 
be stale. 16 She can observe one deposit offer for free. Information gathering is costly as 
each investor faces idiosyncratic search cost ~ per unit of search which increases linearly 
with the financial wealth of the investor. As a result she might not be able to uncover the 
lowest price in the population of offers. Her total search cost for a sample of n quotes is 
defined as: 
((n) = 
{ 
0 
(n- 1) x ~ if n > 1 
if n = 1 
(1.14) 
The first sample point is costless which ensures that there will be participation in the 
deposit market even for investors with high search costs 17 . Each time she searches for a 
new quote, it is randomly drawn from the underlying distribution of offers. If she decides 
on a sample of size n, then she picks the offer with the lowest price and this is the price at 
which she substitutes consumption today for consumption in T periods . The distribution 
of this minimal price is Pmin(n) =min{ PI , .. , Pn} '"'-'d 1- (1- F(P))n. 
In the search stage the investor has wo endowment of time which she uses for search 
and for leisure consumption ca. The problem of the investor at the search stage is to 
maximize expected ut ility by choosing the optimal sample size n while satisfying the 
16The assumption that the investor knows the distribution of offers is rather strong. Rothschild [1974] 
provides analysis for the case where the distribution is unknown. 
17 One can think of this assumption as follows . Each investor has a checkings account with a bank and 
can costlessly observe the price posted by this bank on time deposits. 
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budget constraint determined by her endowment of time wo and individual search cost. 
(1.15) 
subject to: 
The problem can be re-written as: 
Vd(~ , w) =max {wo- (n - 1) x ~ + {p ¢d(P)n(1- Fp(P))n- 1 fp(P)dP} ~N ~ (1.16) 
The quasi-linear utility assumption is chosen for analytical convenience but it also gives 
an alternative interpretation of the search cost as disutility of the time spent searching for 
the best return. The optimal search problem is discrete in nature as n takes discrete values 
1, 2, 3, .. , N. To solve the problem, let us define the extra utility gained from increasing 
the sample size by one extra offer given that the investor has already sampled n offers: 
~n = 1: ¢d(P) { (n + 1)(1- Fp(P)t- n(1- Fp(P))n- 1} fp(P)dP (1.17) 
The set { ~n};;'= l> defines a set of indifference points where an investor is indifferent be-
tween drawing sample of size nor n + 1 for n = 1, 2, .. , N. 
Proposition 1.5.2 The optimal non-sequential search problem can be re-defined as fol-
lows: 
(1.18) 
is well defined and has a solution. For any atomless deposit offer distribution Fp(P) and 
underlying distribution of cost types F~(O , the equilibrium search can be summarized as 
the segments of investors with different search intensity and a common reservation price 
( {qk}f= 1 , P7 ). Investors with search costs~ < ~N-1 search for N prices and incur a 
total search cost (N- 1)~ , those with search costs ~n- 1 < ~ < ~n search n deposit offers 
and those that have search costs ~ > ~1 only observe one offer price which is costless. 
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Proof By simple different iation it can be easily shown that ~n is non-increasing and 
convex m n . See appendix for details. The rest of the results are shown in the paragraphs 
below. 0 
The incentives to search for the investor are determined by the trade-off between paying 
t he search cost on one hand and both obtaining a lower expected minimum price but also 
reducing t he uncertainty about the pay-off. Bot h the mean and the variance of Pmin(n) 
are decreasing in n. The marginal utility of wealth qyd(P) is decreasing and convex in 
P. The degree of convexity is determined by the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution CJ is going to be crucial in det ermining the 
equilibrium level search and the observed price dispersion. 
Investors in t his market are heterogeneous with respect to their search costs. The 
individual search cost is drawn from a known population distribution F~(e) with support 
on JR+. Using the optimal search rule n*(e) : JR+ -+ Nand the distribution of search 
costs, investors are divided in distinct segments according to t he optimal sample size they 
choose to search. The fract ion of investors that search k = 1, 2, .. , N offers qk is defined as 
follows: 
N -1 
qN = 1- L qj 
j =l 
(1.19) 
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The set { Qk },;'=1 defines distinct market segments of investors who have different probability 
distributions of obtaining the best offers from the offer distribution. Each segment faces 
an offer distribution according to the distribution of the minimal price k(l - Fp(P) )k-l_ 
Once incurred search costs are sunk and regardless of the magnitude of the search 
cost an investor faces, she can always choose to invest in the risky asset. She can also 
always observe one deposit offer for free. An investor , therefore, faces ex-ante participation 
decision before observing the outcome of her search and an ex-post participation decision 
for the deposit market after the outcome of her search. 
Proposition 1.5.3 The reservation price and the choice to participate in a deposit con-
tract do not depend on the individual search cost or financial wealth. The reservation price 
is 
(1.20) 
Proof The results follow from the linearity in wealth of the indirect utility and the zero 
cost of observing one deposit offer. Ex-ante participation requires that the value of search-
ing and investing for the best deposit offer exceeds the outside option of investing in the 
risky asset Vd ( e, w) 2 V1d ( w) 2 vr ( E P;, w) . The outside option of the investor is defined 
as the value of investing in the risky asset: 
(1.21) 
and ·vl(w) = Vd(~ , w) = wo +w1 jj;_ ¢d(P)fp(P)dP is the value of participating in the 
deposit contract with the restriction that the investor draws only one costless sample offer 
n = 1. This value is always weakly dominated by the value of optimal search Vd(~, w) 
as n = 1 is always feasible. Hence ex-ante participation in the market does not depend 
on the endowment was it cancels out from V1d(w) 2 vr(EP;,w). Examining ex-post 
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participation an investor chooses the deposit contract if for some deposit offer price the 
result of optimal search pd: ¢d(Pd) 2: ¢r(EPr). It is obvious that if ex-post participation 
holds, so does ex-ante participation. I can define the reservation price of the investors in 
the deposit contracts as 
(1.22) 
Since the value function ¢d(Pd) is strictly monotonely decreasing in the deposit price, I 
can uniquely solve for the reservation price as defined above. 0 
The reservation price is a function of the expected price for the risky asset and the risk-
adjustment factor. The latter is independent of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
and is solely determined by expected return (price) , the volatility of the risky asset and 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Taking logs of the expression for the reservation price to define yields, I can express 
the reservation price in terms of risk-premium spread sr-d = yr - yd This 
specification is familiar to the consumption asset pricing literature. 
I have abstracted from participation in a government supplied riskless bond. The as-
sumption is that government supplied bonds while risk-free and potentially suitable to 
serve the same purpose as the deposit contract are traded in secondary markets where 
investors cannot purchase a particular maturity and need to purchase a portfolio of gov-
ernment bonds which is subject to price risk if its maturity does not match the maturity 
required by the investor. The risky asset could, therefore, be this portfolio of government 
bonds or any other asset whose return is uncertain over the relevant investment horizon. 
Banks in this model perform the role of financial intermediary which manufactures risk-
free assets of given maturity saving on the transaction costs an individual investor would 
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incur. Although transaction costs to accessing different financial markets are certainly 
important in t hese retail markets, I have abstracted from modeling them explicitly. It is 
important to make the distinction that the search (information) costs in this model are 
different from trading costs. Trading costs as modeled by Heaton and Lucas [1996], for 
example, imply that investors are fully aware of all their investment options and choose 
their portfolio subj ect to these trading costs and their hedging demands. I have also ab-
stracted from labor income risk and life-cycle considerations. Investors in this model are 
only concerned with the risk adjusted return.18 
In the rational expectations equilibrium defined below, the reservation price defines 
the upper bound on t he price distribution P :S P as no investor would participate in the 
deposit market ex-post if the deposit price exceeds the reservation price. Hence no bank 
would post an offer exceeding this upper bound. 
1.5 .2 Banks' problem 
Marginal cost of funds 
There are N banks that operate in lending and deposit markets . A bank maximizes per 
period profits by choosing its assets and its funding sources . On the asset side banks 
can lend funds to borrowers at a rate determined by a loan demand function Rf = g(Lt) 
and hold required reserves which earn a rate of return Rf. The latter is determined 
by the monetary authority. Banks fund their activities with insured retail deposits Dt 
and non-insured wholesale funding Bt. The cost of funds from wholesale funding is Rf 
is determined exogenously as t he Fed Funds rate or discount window ra t e set by t he 
monetary authority. Insured deposits are subject to reserve requirement a E (0, 1) per 
18See Curcuru et al. [2010] for an overview of recent theoretical and empirical developments in portfolio 
theory. Largely the emp irically observed portfolio allocations remain a puzzle and t h ere is no single 
unifying theory. 
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unit of insured deposits and I assume that banks do not hold excess reserves so all the 
reserves held by the banks are to satisfy the required reserve requirement- St = a.Dt . The 
banking problem is summarized as: 
(1.23) 
subject to: 
Rf = g(Lt) 
Substituting the budget constraint and the reserve requirement, the static profit function 
of a bank can be decomposed into two separate profit centers. 
(1.24) 
where I have defined R = aR3 + ( 1-a) RB as the opportunity cost of obtaining funds from 
deposits. This opportunity cost is exogenous to the individual bank and is the weighted 
average of the interest on reserves and the cost of obtaining funds from the wholesale funds 
market with weight equal to the reserve requirement. 
The banking profit maximization problem can, thus, be written as two separate profit 
centers- the lending activity and the deposit taking activity. For the purposes of this paper 
this separation is very convenient and allows me to focus on the problem of choosing the 
deposit interest rate policy independent from the lending activity. It also defines the 
marginal cost of supplying deposits as the exogenous cost of wholesale funds R common 
to all banks. The marginal cost of providing a unit of deposits is P = l I next turn to 
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characterizing the optimal pricing strategy for insured deposits. 
Deposit pricing 
Having defined the marginal cost for supplying deposits in the previous section and the 
optimal behavior of investors, I examine the optimal behavior of banks in the deposit 
market. Suppose that a bank indexed j posts a price of its deposit contract P E [P, P]. 
LetS= f01 wi,1di be the total financial wealth of the investors in deposit market. The total 
profit from all investors that choose this bank is 'lj;(P) = (P- P) x (1- hd(P))S. These 
are investors who after optimal search had P as their best offer. Investors who sampled k 
offers would choose this particular bank if this is their best offer in the sample which occurs 
with probability k(1- Fp(P))k- 1 . The share of investors who sampled k banks is qk and 
they are equally distributed over the existing N banks 19 . Summing over the the different 
market segments, the mass of investors this bank would attract is 2:r=1 ~ k(1- Fp(P) )k-1. 
Banks compete in prices and follow mixed strategies. The profit of bank j if it posts 
price P given the mixed strategies of the rest of the banks F?j (P) is defined as: 
N 
nd(P I F?j (P)) = 'lj;(P) x ( L ~k(1- F?j (P))k-1) = 1rd* (1.25) 
k=1 
In equilibrium bank j will be indifferent between posting any price along the support 
of the mixed strategies played by other banks F?j (P) as it earns the same equilibrium 
profit 1rd*. Any price outside the support of the equilibrium mixed strategy earns strictly 
lower profit. Let pm be the monopolistic price that maximizes pm = argmaxp'lj;(P). A 
bank would not post a price above this price, nor a price above the reservation price of 
investors. The upper support of the price distribution that guarantees full participation 
19 Note that N could be set to infinity which is the case in Burdett and Judd (1983] . In this case 1/N 
is the relative measure of banks to investors. 
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is P = min{ P, pm} . I focus on the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium 
Definition A symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in the deposit posting 
game with full participation is a deposit offer distribution Fp(P), a maximum price P = 
min{P, pm} and minimum price P which are consistent with the optimal search and 
consumption savings behavior of investors ({qk}f=1, P , hd(P)) . The equilibrium profit 
function is: 
~'(PI Fp(P)) = { if p E [P, P] 
if PrJ_ [P,P] 
(1.26) 
In order to sustain equal profits along the support of the price distribution, the fol-
lowing trade-off is at work. A higher price generates a higher profit per captured investor 
1/J( P) but attracts less investors. The two effects exactly offset each other along the sup-
port of the equilibrium price distribution. Even if the bank posts the lowest price, it will 
still not obtain the largest share in the market as only a fraction of the population will 
sample its price. Similarly, a bank that posts the maximum price P, it can still attract 
investors - the investors with the highest search cost who sample only once and happen to 
be unlucky and obtain this price as their only sample point . 
Lemma 1.5.4 The minimum price that a bank would post which defines the lower support 
of the price distribution is implicitly defined as: 
(1.27) 
Proof Using the indifference condition (1.26) for the lowest and the highest price 1rd(P) = 
1rd(P) one can solve for P. Unique solution is guaranteed as banks would always operate 
on the increasing portion of 'lj; ( P) . See appendix for details. D. 
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Examining (1.27), minimum price always exceeds the marginal cost of supplying de-
posits. As a result banks are making positive profits in equilibrium 1rd* > 0. Banks 
effectively exploit a mark-up over marginal cost along the price support of the offer distri-
bution. The ratio of the mark-ups for the lowest and the highest price of the equilibrium 
price distribution can be decomposed in two terms. An extensive margin mark-up which 
measures the share of high information cost investors and an intensive margin which is 
related to the elasticity of the marginal propensity to save at the two extremes of the price 
distribution. 
(P - F)/(P- P) = 
I:f=l kqk 
~
Extensive margin 
(1- hd(P)) 
X (1- hd(P)) 
~
Intensive margin 
(1.28) 
Just as in the baseline model of Burdett and Judd [1983], if the share of high information 
cost investors is equal to one q1 = 1, then the price offer distribution is degenerate at the 
monopoly price P . On the other extreme, if the share of the least informed agents is 
zero q1 = 0, then the the price offer distribution is degenerate at t he perfectly competitive 
price P. 
The deposit pricing equilibrium can be summarized as ( Fp (P), P , 1rd*) that satisfy the 
indifference condition 1.25. 
1.5.3 Equilibrium 
Having described the optimal behavior of the investors and the banks, I can define the 
equilibrium in this economy. 
( 
- d* N . ) Definition The set Fp(P), P , P , 1r , {qk}k=l' P is the market equilibrium with non-
sequential search and full participation if for a given distribution of investor types Ft;(~) 
and distribution of future pay-offs of the risky asset <P(Pr): 
44 
a) ( Fp( P ), P , P, nd") is a deposit pncmg equilibrium with full ex-ante participation 
P = m in{ P, p m} given the optimal consumption-savings and non-sequential search 
b) ( {qk}f=l ' P, h(P)) is a solution to the optimal consumption savings and search prob-
lems given the distribution of deposit offer prices Fp(P) and the endowment of the 
investors w. 
I next characterize the equilibrium price distribution for the case where a large enough 
fraction of investors search so that 0 < q1 < 1 and t he equilibrium price distribution is 
non-degenerate. 
Proposition 1.5.5 Given consumer search and consumption-savings behavior of investors 
( {qk}£'=1, P, hd(P)) and a mass of investors with large enough search costs such that 
q1 E (0, 1) , there exists a unique non-degenerate equilibrium price distribution of deposit 
offers Fp(P ) implicitly defined in (1.26). Fp(P) is continuous with connected support 
[P,P] . 
Proof See appendix for details. The results follow from slight modification of arguments 
in Burdett and Judd [1983/ and Moraga-Gonzalez et al. [2010}. 0 
The results of proposition (1.5.5) guarantee that the model is identified and estimable 
using only the empirical price distribution. I next turn to the estimation of the structural 
model using maximum likelihood approach. 
1.6 Maximum likelihood estimation 
I follow structural methodology of Hong and Shum [2006], Moraga-Gonzalez and Wilden-
beest [2008] and Moraga-Gonzalez et al. [2010] for estimat ing the primitives of t he model. 
This methodology allows me to estimate the model relying only on the observed price dis-
tribution without the need to have information on quantities as in Horta9su and Syverson 
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[2004] . I use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters based on the model implied 
likelihood function for observing the set of prices. 
Proposition 1.6.1 The model implied likelihood function can be derived as: 
PE [P,P] (1.29) 
otherwise 
where 7/J( P) = (P- F) (l - hd(P)) is the per investor profit function and the vector 
(Fp(P) , P , P ,nd*, {qk},;'=1,P) is a market equilibrium (1 .5.3) given the primitives of the 
model 8 = ( F~ , P, E(Pr) , O";, O", 1). 
Proof See Appendix D. 
Using the likelihood function defined in (1.29) , I can obtain maximum likelihood estimates 
of the model where I can identify the shares { qk}f=1 but not the infinite dimensional object 
of the search cost distribution. In order to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter 
space, I approximate the unknown search cost distribution by a set of Hermite polynomials 
as in Gallant and Nychka [1987] and Fenton and Gallant [1996] . The approximating search 
cost distribution A(~IO) ~ f~(~) is parameterized by a low dimensional vector e of size p. 
The parameter vector of the approximating model is 8P = (e , P, E(Pr) , O"; , O", 1 ) . Given 
a dataset of observed market prices {Pj }~1 of size M , the semi-nonparametric maximum 
likelihood problem is defined as: 
M 
max8PE8j, { L lnfp(Pj I8P)} (1.30) 
j=l 
subject to: 
(Fp(P) , fp(P), P , {qk},;'=1, hd(P), P)is an equilibrium as defined in 1.5.3. 
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When constructing t he likelihood function, I solve for the equilibrium as defined in (1.5 .3). 
The parameter set E-)~ is the set of admissible parameter values that guarantee that the 
likelihood function is a proper probability density function. 
1. 7 Structural estimates for the case rJ = 1 
In this section I present the results for the case where O" = 1. In this case the income and 
substitution effects exactly cancel each other. The investor invests a constant fraction of 
her initial wealth and the only concern in her search cost decision is obtaining the highest 
yield. 
Table 1.12: Summary statistics for Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
Pop. Income Banks Branches Deposits Share 65+ HHI DISP 12-m 
1997 8862719 il0296 259 1489 7.08 0.11 0.04 0.78 
1998 8949190 il2136 256 1607 8.01 0.11 0.04 0.61 
1999 9035654 il3157 260 1690 8.34 0.11 0.04 0.72 
2000 9113234 il5408 252 1846 9.86 0.11 0.05 1.27 
2001 9169580 ~{5816 258 1923 10.42 0.11 0.05 0.92 
2002 9206032 il6367 253 1971 11.52 0.11 0.05 0.97 
2003 9233303 il7021 293 2238 21.70 0.11 0.08 0.79 
2004 9260676 a8723 292 2385 21.81 0.11 0.06 0.95 
2005 9276302 40481 266 2593 23.78 0.11 0.07 1.52 
2006 9297749 43294 263 2728 25.99 0.11 0.07 2.02 
2007 9337140 45466 264 2898 27.23 0.11 0.06 1.78 
2008 9384555 46769 262 3062 28.28 0.11 0.06 1.29 
2009 9429498 45090 259 3136 29.50 0.11 0.06 1.04 
2010 9474363 45957 241 3097 29.47 0.11 0.06 0.70 
NOTE : All the definitions of variables are the same as in Table 1.8 . Deposits measures deposits per 
capita. The HHI index takes values from 0 (least concentrated) to 1 (the most concentrated) . DISP 
12-m is the average for the corresponding year of the DISP(P( .90) - P( .lO)) measure of yield dispersion . 
I estimate the search cost distribution for one representative market-Chicago-Naperville-
Joliet , IL-IN-WI for the month of June of each year from 1997- 2011 . This is the second 
largest MSA market after New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA. How-
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ever, it is the market with the largest number of operating banks. The important features 
of this market is that there hasn't been much dynamics in the measures of market concen-
tration. The number of banks and the HHI index have remained relatively constant and 
market concentration has been relatively low. There has been a dramatic increase in the 
number of branches in the market which more than doubled over the 1997-2010 period but 
this trend is consistent with the rest of the economy. There has been an increase in the 
nominal income per capita as well as steady increase in the population of approximately 
7 percent over this period. These trends are representative for the whole economy. 
I estimate the model using all maturities but present the results from the 12-month 
CD contract. The two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test presented in Table (1.13) 
shows a partial success in replicating the actual price distribution using the model gener-
ated one. The model is successful at generating a price distribution which is close to the 
empirically observed in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2011 for which the KS-test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis at 5 percent significance level. 
To further examine the goodness-of-fit of the model, I plot the empirically observed 
price distribution for selected years in Figure (1. 7) along with the model generated. What 
is immediately obvious from the plots is that the model is successful at fitting the low 
(high) percentiles of the price (yield) distribution. However, the model generates more 
mass in the high (low) price (yields) percentiles. This is a consistent pattern for all the 
periods of estimation. The upper panel of Figure (1.8) plots the percentiles P(.05) and 
P(.95) of the model generated and the observed in the data yield distribution of the 12-
month CD contract . The model fits precisely the P(0.95) but generates a significantly 
lower P(0.05) which is consistent with the results in Figure (1.7). 
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Table 1.13: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality between the empirical price CDF and 
the model generated 
KS stat KS p-value 
1997 0.17 0.00 
1998 0.21 0.00 
1999 0.33 0.00 
2000 0.14 0.01 
2001 0.21 0.00 
2002 0.15 0.00 
2003 0.19 0.00 
2004 0.13 0.02 
2005 0.09 0.12 
2006 0.10 0.08 
2007 0.07 0.35 
2008 0.13 0.01 
2009 0.12 0.01 
2010 0.13 0.01 
2011 0.09 0.06 
NoTE: The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is defined as the test statistic V(N)DN ---* 
SUPt!B(Fp(t)! where DN = supxfFf! (x) - Fp(x) ! and B(-) is Brownian bridge. The model gener-
ated distribution is Fp(x) and the empirical distribution is Ff/ (x) where M indexes the sample size. 
The table presents the values of the test statistic and the implied p-values for the 12-month CD contract. 
The null hypothesis is that the two distributions are the same. On rejects the null if the p-value is below 
a pre-specified significance level a E (0, 1) . 
The model effectively generates a higher price dispersion than the one observed in the 
data by tilting the yield distribution to the left. A larger mass of banks are able to post 
lower yields that what we observe in the data. As a result the model implies that the 
incentives to search were lower as compared to what we observe in the data. 20 
The lower panel of Figure(1.8) also plots the model implied marginal cost of funds 
implied from the data. I have also plotted a few empirical proxies of this marginal cost of 
20I still do not have complete understanding of why this is the case in the model or the data. In a 
work in progress, I estimate a more general version of the model where I allow for the estimation of a. 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution controls the curvature of the utility function and the risk 
preferences when faced with a particular distribution. These are important for determining equilibrium 
search and the model implied distribution 
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Figure 1. 7: Empirical price distribution and model generated 
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based on the estimates of the structural parameters. 
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funds such as the Federal Funds Rate, the rate on the 6-month negotiable CD as well as 
the 12-month Treasury yield. The model implies that the marginal cost of funds of banks 
over the entire period was strictly higher than the observed empirical proxies. 
The next set of figures examines the implied distribution of search cost types and the 
implied distribution of search costs. The estimation results show that the population of 
investors can be roughly split into two distinct groups . Figure (1.9) plots the estimates 
of ch,t and (j_Nt ,t· These are the two extreme segments of investors. The first segment are 
those investors who have high search costs and search only once and the second segment 
are those investors who have low enough search costs to be able and willing to sample 
the whole set of existing banks. I will label them uniformed and informed investors, 
respectively. The fraction of uniformed investors is rather high averaging 40 percent of 
all investors for most of the sample. The fraction of informed investors fluctuated around 
10 percent of the population of investors. The large fraction of uniformed investors is the 
key to generating large price dispersion as shown in (1.28) and is the source of monopoly 
power that banks were able to exploit. 
Surprisingly, there doesn't seem to be any distinct trend in these two market segments. 
The sample period 1997-2011 covers a period over which internet use and internet banking 
have seen dramatic increase which have reduced the cost of acquiring information about 
deposit offers.21 Yet neither the observed price dispersion, nor the estimated fraction 
of uninformed investors have experienced any significant decline. On the contrary the 
observed price dispersion documented in (1.12) has increased. If we compare two years 
when the level of interest rates were high, the price dispersion for the 12-month contract 
21 Websites such as BankRate.com and Google-Finance allow one to compare rates across banks and 
markets on a centralized internet platform where banks can post rates. In fact Rate Watch data provider 
is also organized in a similar way where banks voluntary provide the rates they offer to CDs. 
51 
Figure 1.8: Model implied distribution of yields and marginal cost of funds 
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NoTE: The upper panel of the figure plots the model implied percentiles P(5)-P(95) (dashed black 
line) against the realized data P(5) - P(95) for the 12-month CD contract. The lower panel of the 
figure plots the model implied marginal cost of funds from the 12-month contract and a set of empirical 
proxies . 
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has increased from 125 bp in 2000 to 202 bp in 2006. Similar trends are observed for all 
maturities. The ability of the banking system to sustain large price dispersion despite the 
increased information technology use is a puzzle. The model captures this trend in the 
price dispersion as an increase in the fraction of uninformed investors from 40 percent to 
60 percent. 
This finding mirrors results in Horta<;su and Syverson [2004] who document an increase 
in the price dispersion and proliferation of S&P 500 index funds . They attribute these 
trends to entry of novice investors with high search costs . They also document proliferation 
in money market mutual funds that give access to small investors to the treasury market 
and compete with banks in providing access to a safe interest paying alternative to bank 
deposits. In fact the money market mutual funds industry developed as a response to 
Regulation Q during the high-inflation period of 1970s when the ceiling on the rates banks 
could pay on their deposits started to bind and investors were looking for alternatives. 
Since the 1970s banks have started to lose their insured deposit customers to money 
market mutual funds and the share of insured deposits has steadily declined . This process 
continued in the post-Regulation Q era. The exit of more sophisticated investors from 
the market for CDs into the money market mutual funds could explain why technological 
advance in information technology has surprisingly left these markets intact . It could 
also explain the pricing patterns in the mutual fund industry if the low information cost 
investors who exited the CD market turned to be the high information cost investors in 
the mutual fund markets. 
Search is socially wasteful. In the special case of rJ = 1 examined in this section, social 
optimal is achieved if all banks charged the monopoly price and investors invested in their 
first deposit offer avoiding costly search altogether. Instead, sizeable resources are spent in 
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Figure 1.9: Fraction of high search cost investors and average search costs 
0.4 ........ ~- . . ,, 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
I 
I 
.. 
" .\ · 
: \ 
\ 
\ 
_: .... \ . 
\ 
\ 
1\ 
I \ 
' 
-: 
.: . . ;'" ·· .. \ " 
I 
' 
' 
.. .. 1 . .. ........ .. 
: I 
i 
f. 
I 
.' . 
O L-----~-------L-------L------~------~------L-----~------~ 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
NoTE: The figure plots the estimates of t he fraction of the highest q1 (dashed line) and the lowest 
qN (solid line) search cost investors. 
searching for the best deal on a virtually homogeneous financial product. The estimates 
of these costs are plotted on Figure (1.10) . The average investor in this market spent 
between 5 - 10 bp over the sample period. The implied search costs for t he uniformed 
investors varied between 10 - 20 bp. 
The distortions in t he market would be even higher if one allowed for the intertemporal 
elast icity to be different from one. In this case, banks' monopoly power at charging yields 
below the market rates translates into lower welfare and a reduction in the equilibrium 
amount of saving. 
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Figure 1.10: Fraction of high search cost investors and average search costs 
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NOTE: The figure plots the estimates of the total search costs spent by the two types . The average 
cost is computed as L~= l kfikqk. 
1.8 Price rigidity and pro-cyclical price dispersion 
How are price dispersion and price rigidity related? In a Calvo [1983] model of price ad-
justment, for example, price dispersion is a product of the assumption on the inability of 
firms to adjust prices continuously with changes in aggregate conditions. Absent shocks , 
however, the model cannot generate price dispersion. The structural model that I have 
presented can be easily extended to match the price rigidity in the yields of insured time 
deposits. Head et al. [2012] derive both price dispersion and price rigidity for a homoge-
neous product in a costly consumer search environment of the Burdett-Judd framework. 
The same logic applies in the model t hat I have presented and I follow the exposition in 
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Section 3 of their paper. 
Although the model is static, if I abstract from dynamic considerations in the deposit 
posting game or the investor 's problem, I can solve for dynamics as a sequence of static 
problems in which aggregate shocks impact the support of the price distribution but not 
the equilibrium strategies as defined in (1.5.3). 
For the purposes of this section, suppose that monetary policy controls directly the 
marginal cost of funds for banks R through a monetary policy rule of the form Rt+l = p,i Rt 
where P, = 1 ± "' and i = 1, 2, 3, ... Since 1994 the Federal Reserve has adopted operat-
ing procedures that change the target fed funds rate in multiples of 25 bp so "' could be 
thought of as the size of this discrete steps. 22 For convenience I summarize the bounds 
of the price distribution below and examine the case O" = 1. 
Although aggregate shocks can impact both the upper and the lower bound, the banks 
in the overlapping section St+1 = [Pt+1 ' Pt+1] n[Pt , PtJ, however, have no extra incentive 
to reprice since repricing will not change their profits. Equilibrium profits will change to 
a new equilibrium level nf+1 * but within the new price support any price will yield the 
same profit. I can exploit this indifference condition to generate price rigidity through an 
appropriately chosen repricing policy. 
Definition A repricing policy Ptf- 1 (P) given an equilibrium price distribution FP,t(P) in 
period t is admissible, if, given that all banks follow this strategy, the resulting distribution 
22 See Piazzesi [2005] for analysis of the implications of the operating procedures of the Federal Open 
Market Committee for the term structure of market interest rates. 
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in period t + 1 is an equilibrium distribution FP,t+l(P) where equilibrium is defined as in 
section (1.5.3) . 
There could be multiple admissible repricing strategies. However, suppose that the repric-
ing strategy is defined as follows. 
{ 
P' 
Pt+1(P) = 
Randomize {Pt, P'} with prob.(p,1- p) 
if P t/: [Pt+1 , Pt+l] 
if P E [Pt+l ' pt+l] 
(1.31) 
where P' is drawn from a distribution Gt+l (P) and p E [0, 1] is a parameter that determines 
the fraction of banks in the set St+l that choose not to adjust their price as they are 
indifferent between adjusting and non-adjusting. A fraction 1 - p of banks despite being 
indifferent between adjusting or not draw from the new repricing distribution Gt+l ( P). 
In the paragraphs below I examine three cases . The first case is monetary policy 
which increases the marginal cost of funds and examine the resulting repricing distribution 
Gi+l ( P) . The second case is monetary policy which reduces interest rates and the marginal 
cost of funds and examine the equilibrium repricing distribution Gi-f-1 (P). The third case is 
a policy which keeps interest rates constant. For each case, I examine the expected average 
duration of prices A(p )-, A(p )0 , A(p )+ and the fraction of adjusters <I>(p)- , <I>(p )0 , <I>(p )+. 
In all cases, I keep P as well as the distribution of search cost types fixed. 
First, let us examine the following scenario where the Fed announces a policy that 
it will increase interest rates in a sequence of equal steps of size fi = 1 + /'i, for T > 1 
periods. Thus the policy rate after i periods Rt+i = p,i Rt. An increase in the marginal 
cost of funds for the bank effectively lowers the opportunity cost of supplying deposits 
Pt+i = l; Pt . Through the equilibrium equation for the minimum price the lower bound 
1-l 
Pt+i < Pt+i- l < Pt is also reduced. However, the reduction in Pt is less than one-to-one 
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with the reduction of P as can be seen from the expression for the minimum price. 
aP q 
_t = 1- N l ,t < 1 
aPt I:k=l kqk,t 
(1.32) 
The lower bound is sluggish to adjust and this increases the average mark-up over 
marginal costs. Translating prices into yields, this implies that when market interest rates 
are increasing, the deposit rates are sluggish to adjust and increase by less than one-to-one. 
This is one of the stylized facts observed in the data. The pass-through coefficient defined 
in (1.32) is descreasing with the fraction of the uninformed investors q1 . 
Given a parameter p E [0, 1] an admissible repricing strategy imposes restrictions on 
the repricing distribution. For the case of the increasing interest rate policy, the law of 
motion of the equilibrium price distribution is described as: 
The equilibrium repricing distribution is , therefore: 
{ 
FP,t+l(P)-pFp,t(P) 
+ 1-p Gt+1 (P) = 
FP,t+l(P) 
1-p 
if p E [Pt, P] 
(1.33) 
(1.34) 
Suppose in period t all prices were adjusted. Starting from period t and tracking a 
price P E [Pt, P], after 1 < i ::; T periods the probability that the price changes in period 
t + i and not earlier is pi-l (1 - p). Since the initial price distribution support is always 
contained in the expanding set St = S t+i = [Pt, P], all prices in the initial support will 
have the same hazard rate of adjustment. The average duration of prices in the initial 
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price support during the policy implementation [t, t + T] can be derived as 
A+(p) = 0 X (1- p) + 1 X p(1- p) + 2 X p2 (1- p) + 
... + (T- 1) X PT- 1(1- p) = 1- PT- T(1- p)pT- 1 
1-p 
(1.35) 
The fraction of adjusters in every period during the implementation of the policy is con-
stant at 1- p 
<J>+(p) = 1- p (1.36) 
A policy of increasing interest rates under this repricing rule leads to the same duration 
and synchronization of price adjustments as would be the case if the policy was to keep in-
terest rates constant. In both environments the interval of inaction St remains unchanged. 
This shows that A+ = A 0 and <J>+ = <I>0 . However, the repricing policy Gi+1 (P) under 
increasing interest rates will draw from a much wider price support and hence the size 
of price adjustments will be larger than under the repricing policy in the costant interest 
rate regimes G~+ 1 (P). 
I have managed to reproduce the actual observed patterns of the duration and syn-
chronization of price adjustments of the deposit rates as documented in tables (1.2, 1.3) 
columns 2 and 3. There isn't significant difference in the price adjustment across regimes 
where the Fed Funds Target remains unchanged or is increased. The only difference is 
that the repricing distributions will differ across the two regimes and when interest rates 
are increasing the average deposit rate increase is larger as compared to the regime where 
the fed funds target remains unchanged. 
Next , let us examine monetary policy which is expansionary and reduces the costs of 
funds of banks in a series of interest rates cuts by a constant amount fi = 1 - "" for T 
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periods in a row. In this case the marginal cost of supplying funds increases by f-t = ~ > 1. 
J.L 
The overlapping set of inaction will be shrinking over time St+i = [J-ti Pt, .P] c St+i- 1 . A 
fraction FP,t+i-1 (J-ti P ) of banks will have to adjust with probability one to fit back into 
the new support of the changing equilibrium distribution FP,t+i every period i = 1, 2, .. , T. 
The equilibrium price distribution obeys the following law of motion. 
The admissible repricing distribution can be derived as 
Gi+l(P) = FP,t+1(P)- (FP,t(P)- FP,t(J-LFt))p 
1 - p + pFP,t(J-LPt) 
(1.37) 
(1.38) 
To compute the average duration of prices in the original price support let us suppose 
that in period T the price support shrinks but does not vanish J-LT Pt < P. Then for a 
price in the interval P E [J-ti- 1 Pt, f-ti Ptl the probability of adjusting in period j = 1, 2, .. , i 
but not earlier is (1- p)p:J - 1 and the expected duration is 1 -pi -~(~;p)pi-I after period i 
this price will have to adjust with probability one as it will fall out of the equilibrium price 
distribution support. There is a mass of Gi (J-ti Pt)- Gi (J-ti- 1 Pt) of banks in this interval. 
The average duration of prices during this policy regime is derived as the sum of these 
intervals weighted by the mass of banks in each interval: 
A-( )=;~(c-( iP)-G- ( i-1p))1-pi-i(1-p)pi-1 + P L, t f-t -t t f-t -t 1 _ i=I p (1.39) 
+(1- c - ( Tp )) 1- PT- T(1- p)pT-1 
t f-t -t 1 
-p 
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The fraction of adjusters in each period t + i for i = 1, 2, .. , Tis . 
(1.40) 
The average duration of price adjustments in this policy regime is strictly lower than 
the previous two regimes A- (p) < A+ (p) = A 0 (p) while the fraction of adjusters is 
stricthly higher cl>t+Jp) > ci>i+i(p) = cl>~+Jp). This result again is consistent with the 
results observed in the data. The main results of this section can be summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1.8.1 Given an equilibrium price distribution in period t - FP,t ( P) = Gt ( P) , 
an admissible repricing rule {1.31) with a fixed p E [0 , 1] and the following set of policy 
regimes with K, E (0, 1) 
1. Interest rate increase: interest rates are increased in a sequence described as Rt+i = 
f.Li Rt fori = 1, 2, .. , T with fL = 1 + K, 
2. Interest rates unchanged: interest rates are kept constant at Rt for T periods 
3. Interest rates reduced: interest rates are decreased in a sequence described as Rt+i = 
f.Li Rt for i = 1, 2, .. , T with fL = 1 - /'1, 
The average duration of price adjustments and the fraction of price adjusters is the same 
when interest rates are constant or increasing. When interest rates are decreasing, the 
average duration is lower and the fraction of price adjusters is higher than the previous 
two regimes. 
Proof The proof comes directly from the analysis above.D 
The results from this section point to the fact that within the framework of costly 
search, it is possible to replicate both the observed price dispersion and the price rigidity 
observed in the data. Moreover, the model is also able to fit the asymmetric response of 
price adjustment of deposit yields documented in Tables (1.2) and (1.3) in three distinct 
monetary policy regimes. 
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The final exercise for t his section is to test to what extent the model can generate 
t he pro-cyclical yield dispersion observed in the data. For this purpose, I conduct the 
following counter-factual experiment . I estimate the model for year 2005 and keep the 
estimated segments of investors { qk}£'=1 fixed. Then I solve for the model implied price 
distribution taking as given the marginal cost of funds of banks as measured by the 6-
mont hs negotiable CD yield and the lowest yield observed for the 6-month CD contract. 
The results of this exp eriment are plotted in Figure (1.11) . As expected the model can 
generate the pro-cyclical price dispersion. Moreover, it fits reasonably well the P (0.95) 
percentile of the actually observed price distribution for the 6-month CD contract. As 
expected from the results in the previous section, the model predicts much lower P(0.5) 
percentile than the data. The yield on the 6-month negotiable and non-insured CD falls 
below the maximum yield on the 6-month insured CD observed in the data. Within this 
model, this implies t hat this was not the marginal cost of funds of banks and banks must 
have faced a much higher cost of borrowing from non-insured sources of funds than the 
6-month negotiable CD yield. 
1.9 Conclusion 
Using a novel proprietary dataset , I have presented strong evidence that the price disper-
sion observed in the market for insured t ime deposits cannot be explained by standard 
models of product differentiation and market competition. Moreover, the pricing for in-
sured deposits resembles more patterns of price behavior observed in non-financial prod-
ucts than what standard asset pricing theory would have predicted. I have built on the 
model of costly consumer search of Burdett and Judd [1983] to estimate the search cost 
distribution that rationalizes the observed price dispersion. I have estimated that a large 
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Figure 1.11: Counter-factual model implied distribution of yields 
7 ~-,------,------,------,-----~======~=====c~ 
2 .. .. . .. . 
Data: P(5) - P(95) CD 6-month 
-Model: min(P) max(P) 
• - - Model: P(5) and P(95) 
-- Data: Negotiable CD 6-months 
2010 
NOTE: The figure plots the results of the following counterfactual experiment. The 6-month ne-
gotiable CD is assumed to be the marginal cost of funds. Given estimates of q for 2005, I solve for 
the model implied distribution using the equilibrium indifference condition (1.25). The figure plots the 
resulting minimum, maximum and the P(5) and P(95) percentiles of the resulting distribution. The 
shaded area is the dist ribution of the 6-month CD contract observed in the data. 
share of investors in this market had high search costs in obtaining information about 
the best return on their savings and this granted banks with monopoly power over this 
homogeneous financial product which they consistently exploited over the sample period 
of 1997-2011. 
The introduction and the rapid adoption of internet use and internet banking which 
should have reduced the information costs of obtaining the best offers in the market , have 
had little impact on the observed priced dispersion. On the contrary, the observed price 
dispersion has increased over the sample period and the model predicts that the share of 
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the highest cost investors has also increased. While this fact might be puzzling, it mirrors 
the related trends of increasing fee dispersion and proliferation of funds in the mutual 
funds industry documented in Hortac;su and Syverson [2004]. The mutual funds industry 
has experienced rapid growth over the past three decades while the share of deposits in 
banks' funding has been on decline. These trends are consistent with the hypothesis that 
sophisticated investors have left the deposit markets for the mutual funds markets leaving 
behind a higher share of high information cost investors in these markets. While low in-
formation cost investors for the deposit market , these switching investors might have had 
high information costs in the new mutual funds industry markets. To test this hypothesis 
one needs a more detailed dataset than what is currently available. 
Alternative explanation for the observed pricing pattern is that commercial banks have 
started to offer more services and charge for these implicitly by lower rates on time and 
savings deposits . This alternative, however , is less plausible as the CD contracts have 
experienced little if no financial innovation as compared to the increasingly complex fi-
nancial contracts offered elsewhere. Moreover , the dataset that I have examined contains 
information about active offers by banks that do not contain any other information about 
bundling or extra services offered. Over this period, banks have increasingly expanded 
their branch networks. The convenience yield of a denser branch network, however , is 
likely to affect only the transaction deposit accounts. If this was a source of the monopoly 
power, that banks have exploited, I should have been able to detect it in the panel data 
regressions. However, I was not able to find an economically strong effect of market struc-
ture either on the levels or the dispersion of deposit yields over this period. 
I have further documented asymmetric price rigidity in the setting of interest rates in 
these markets. I have managed to relate the price rigidity to the model of costly search 
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and explain the asymmetric response of price setting to different aggregate regimes. I have 
also managed to fit the procyclical price distribution all within the framework of costly 
search of Burdett and Judd [1983] . 
It is important to note that previous studies that have documented the asymmetric 
price rigidity of retail deposits such as Hannan and Berger [1991], Neumark and Sharpe 
[1992] and Driscoll and Judson [2009] have completely ignored the existence of large and 
time-varying price dispersion in the deposit market in their analysis. To my knowledge 
this is the first study that has documented both empirical facts and provided a consistent 
theoretical framework that can potentially explain these facts. The omission of price dis-
persion in these previous studies is not coincidental. Surprisingly, price dispersion is rarely 
studied in the empirical literature that examines price rigidity in non-financial products. 23 
However, price dispersion and price rigidity are the two sides of the same coin. The 
model that I have presented relied on no restriction of price adjustment on part of produc-
ers as commonly modeled in New Keynesian macro models. Yet , it managed to generate 
both price dispersion and price rigidity in one consistent framework. The omission of price 
dispersion in these previous studies is not coincidental because price dispersion is implic-
itly considered a by-product of the assumption on price rigidity and hence ignored from 
the analysis. Interestingly, the shape and the time variation of price dispersion could be 
used to potentially empirically differentiate between competing theories of price rigidity. 
The fact that the model generates price dispersion and price rigidity in a world where pro-
ducers can freely adjust prices raises the question of whether we need restriction on part 
of producers in their ability to adjust prices to generate price dispersion. This hypothesis 
was first suggested by Head et al. [2012]. I view my study as a t est and validation of their 
23 A notable exception is Lach [2002] 
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theory. In this regard, t he insured t ime deposit market is a perfect laboratory for testing 
theories of price rigidity as it consists of an arguably homogeneous product the marginal 
cost of which is determined by a common source of aggregate variation determined by the 
level of interest rates under the control of monetary policy. 
The fact that a large fraction of banks chose not to adjust their prices while faced 
with a common monetary policy is at the heart of the debate on the channels of monetary 
policy transmission. It also directly relates to debates on the instability of estimates of 
money demand equations as reviewed in Goldfeld and Sichel [1990] . The instability of 
money demand could be the result of at least two omissions in previous studies . The first 
is that researchers relied on aggregate quantities and prices which mask the stylized facts 
on the micro-level price setting I have documented in this paper. Second, they assume 
a reduced form model where money supply represented by fractional reserve banks was 
assumed to be under the complete control of the monetary authority. Although, I have 
deliberately excluded quantities in my analysis, it is obvious that the supply side of the 
market for t ime deposits is important to model. 
On the demand side, I have only examined the case of O" = 1 and thus demand for time 
deposits was assumed to be price inelastic. In work in progress I estimate the full set of 
parameters. The magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a crucial for 
determining the optimal amount of search in this model and is a crucial determinant of the 
interest rate elasticity of money demand. Its estimate is of an independent interest and 
time deposits provide an interesting alternative to estimating this parameter from using 
the aggregate stock or bond markets data24 . 
24 See Guvenen [2006] for a discussion on the debates regarding the magnitude of the intertempora l 
elasticity of substitution. 
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Finally, I argue t hat t he pricing of insured deposits is also of interest t o t he empirical 
asset pricing literature. I have documented t hat large fraction of investors are faced wit h 
a whole range of riskless rates of return. I have provided a new relevant yield of a riskless 
asset that defines t he magnitude of t he equity premium puzzle. 
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Appendices 
l.A Maximum likelihood construction 
I follow Moraga-Gonzalez et al. [2010] and construct a model generated likelihood function 
for observing the empirical price distribution. Define the profit per deposit dollar. 
'ljJ(P) = (P- P)(1- hd(P)) 
To construct the likelihood function implied by the model, I examine the indifference 
condition derived nd(P) = nd(P) . 
N 
G(P,z) = 'lf' (P) [Lkqk(1- z)k-l]- (P- P)(1- hd(P))ql = o 
k=l 
I can express each price as a function of the percentiles of the distribution by inverting 
the CDF of the price distribution P(z) = F?1(z) where z E [0, 1]. Applying the implicit 
function theorem to the equation above and using a~~z) = fpd'(z)) , the likelihood function 
implied by the model is 
(41) 
This proves proposition 1.6.1. To guarantee that the likelihood function is a proper pdf 
'l/J'(P) needs to be positive. The condition 'l/J'(P) > 0 implies that the profit function 
from the intensive demand is always increasing in the price for the support of the price 
distribution. This derivative can be expressed as 
{ P-P } 'l/J'(P) = (1- h(P)) 1 + (1- <7)--ph(P) (42) 
68 
The derivative is always positive if CT < 1 in this case 1 - h(P) is increasing in the price 
as the income effect dominates the substitution effect. For the case where cr > 1 one 
has to check whether 1 + (1 - CT) P[/' h(P) remains positive on the equilibrium support . 
The expression PI/ h(P) is increasing in P, therefore the likelihood function will be well-
defined as long as: 
P- P - 1 
---h(P) > --p -CT-1 (43) 
The condition ( 43) imposes a set of restrictions on the parameter set ((3, 1, cr;, f.l.r, F) 
conditional on CT > 1. These set of restrictions along with (!3 E (0, 1), 1 > 0, cr; > 0) 
define the set of feasible parameter values ~. The parameter set to be estimated is: 
Using the reservation price equation 1.20, I estimate the upper bound of the distribution 
and the implied risk aversion parameter by calibrating (E(Pr), cr;) to an aggregate stock 
market index and using the empirically observed maximum price. The lower bound is 
going to be estimated as the observed minimum price and Pis recovered from (1.27). 
The marginal cost at which banks supply funds is defined from the indifference condi-
tion for the two end points of the price distribution. 
- - N p = (1- h(P))Pq1- (1- h(E))E'f;k=l kqk 
(1- h(P))ql- (1- h(P)) Lk=l kqk (44) 
I have already specified that the opportunity cost of funds for the banks in supplying 
insured deposits is a weighted average of the treasury rate and the wholesale funding rate 
with a weight equal to the required reserve. I could potentially find an empirical proxy 
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for this measure but instead I estimate P from the price distribution as I have imposed a 
common cost across banks. 
The unknown distribution of search costs is an infinite dimensional object. I approximate 
it with a finite order Hermite polynomial defined in Fenton and Gallant [1996] - F~(~) ~ 
FH~IB = {Bi}f=1). See the section below for details. 
The parameter space of the actual estimation is 8P = {,8, /, 17, {Bi}f=1 } C 8~ and is a 
subset of the set of admissible parameter values 8~. Let the vector of observed prices 
in a market in a given period be JP>t = { P1, .. , PM }t where without lost of generality the 
prices are ordered in ascending order. The maximum likelihood estimation is defined as 
the following optimization problem 
M 
max8PEG~ { L:tnfp(Pji8P)} 
j=l 
(45) 
The construction proceeds by first using a change of variables. P(z) function is implicitly 
defined from the profit indifference condition as a function of percentiles of the price 
distribution z: 
(P(z)- F)(1- hd(P(z))) = (P- F) x (1- hd(f.>)) x N q1 (46) 
l:k=l qkk(1 - z)k-1 
I can then redefine the cut-off values of the utility gains ( 4 7) as: 
(47) 
The utility cut-off values then define the fractions of the population that search k = 1, ... , N 
where N is the number of banks in the market. Next, I approximate the unknown search 
cost distribution with the Hermite polynomial approximation. 
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N-1 
qN = 1- L qj 
j = 1 
l.B Semi-parametric approximation 
(48) 
The set of primitives contains an infinite dimensional object of the underlying search cost 
distribution. In order to reduce the size 25 of the parameter space, I follow the semi-
parametric approximation approach of Fenton and Gallant [1996]. I approximate the 
underlying search cost distribution by a family of polynomials: 
pn 
Fn = { fn : fn(x, e) = ( L ei(i(x ) r + Eo¢(x)l J fn(x, e)dx = 1} 
i=O 
(49) 
Pn 
Gn = {e: e = (eo,e1,···,epJ, L:e?+Eo = 1} (50) 
i =O 
where the expansion t erms are 
(51) 
i 2 2: (i = (x(i-1 - JT=l(i-z(x))/Ji (52) 
25 Hong and Shum [2006] identify only the cut off values /::,. k and then reconstruct the search cost 
distribution by interpolation. 
71 
and cp(x) is the standard normal and E > 0 is a constant. 26 This approximation 1s 
successful at approximating a variety of distributions with different shapes. 
I am going to replace the unknown search cost distribution F~(x) ~ Fcn( x, B) where F~ ,n E 
Fn· The infinite dimensional object is approximated by a polynomial with 8n = {81 , .. , Bn} 
parameters. I replace the original parameter space with 3 =< 8n , P, E(Pr) , cr?:, cr, 1 > 
26Fent on and Gallant [1996] recommend setting E = 0 and imposing that Bo = 1. 
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Chapter 2 
Measuring the Impact of Government Debt on the 
Convenience Yield of Default-Risk-Free Debt 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent influential empirical work by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012] has 
documented that the aggregate supply of U.S. government debt impacts the relative con-
venience premium placed on assets of varying degree of safety and liquidity - attributes 
given to money. An increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio leads to a decline in the spread 
between AAA-rated non-financial corporate bonds and Treasuries tracing out a downward 
sloping demand curve for public debt. This relationship is plotted in Figure (2.1) . 
The negative relationship between the relative price of the safest of all non-financial 
corporate bond debt and the debt-to-gdp also provides a direct observable variable that 
could shed light on a possible source of the large non-default component in the spreads of 
the non-financial corporate debt 1 . In Gilchrist et al. [2009] we documented that portfolios 
of low to medium credit risk corporate bond spreads have had high forecasting power for 
economic activity relative to known credit market condition indicators while the matched 
stock return indexes have none. A credit factor extracted from these spreads is also 
1 The large unexplained non-default component of credit spreads has been first documented by Collin-
Dufresne et a l. [2001a) and subsequently termed the "credit spread puzzle". In Figure (2.1) the probability 
of default of t he AAA rat ed senior unsecured corporate bond debt calculat ed by Fitch over a one year 
horizon is just 0.02 %. This tiny probability of default cannot explain the large observed spread over 
treasuries of more than 100 b.p. The literature has attributed this non-explained spread as coming for 
default risk premia. 
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Figure 2.1: The convenience yield of government debt 
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NOTE: The spread on the AAA non-financial corporate bonds is computed as the difference between 
Moody's Aaa-rated long maturity corporate bond yield index and the yield on long m aturity Treasury 
bonds (above 20 years of outstanding maturity). The debt-to-gdp ratio is obtained from Henning 
Bohn 's website http : I /w'INY. econ . ucsb . edu;-bohn/morepapers. html and details of the construction 
can be found in Bohn [2005] 
an independent source of business cycle fluctuations. Further Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 
[2011 J carefully decompose the spreads on non-financial corporate bonds and show that 
the common credit risk premium rather than the risk of default of the individual firms 
contains the forecasting power. As most of this debt is held , traded and ultimately priced 
by the large financial institutions , the non-default component is a measure of the risk-
bearing capacity of the financial sector. 
The demand for public debt is part of a broader demand for safe and liquid assets that 
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is met by both public supply and private supply. Gorton et al. [2012] document that the 
share of safe assets in the total financial wealth of the U.S. has been remarkably stable 
at roughly 30 percent of the total financial assets in the economy. The upper panel of 
Figure (2.2) plots an estimate of this share from the Flow of Funds data as well as its 
decomposition into government supply and supply from the private financial sector.2 The 
stability of the safe asset share is contrasted by the rapid growth in the total financial 
assets relative to GDP presented in the lower panel of the figure. Total financial assets 
(right axis) grew by a factor of 2 between 1980 and 2010. The observed growth was m ainly 
driven by the expansion of the financial sector which grew by a factor close to 4 over the 
same period. In contrast , the ratio of total equity issued to GDP has experienced little 
growth. Therefore, most of the growth in the total financial assets was growth in credit 
instruments or growth in leverage of the financial sector. 
Figure (2.3) examines the components of the financial sector safe assets. The rapid 
financial innovation over the period since 1980s has diminished the role of traditional 
bank debt in the form of deposits, the share of which has shrunk in half from more than 
80 % in the early 1980s to close to 40 % of safe debt of the financial sector in 2010. 
Since the 1990s most of the financial sector safe assets were manufactured in the largely 
unregulated shadow banking system in the form of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
other asset-backed securities (ABS). 3 This rapid structural change due to recent financial 
innovation is another aspect by which the relative constancy of the share of safe assets 
needs to be put into perspective. On the supply side, it is just a manifestation of a core 
function of the financial system of diversifying risk and producing information insensitive 
2 See the Appendix for details of the construction as well as Gorton et a!. (2012] . 
3 See Adrian et a!. (2010] for an account of the structure and development of the shadow banking system 
relative to traditional banking system as well as implications for financial regulation and monetary policy. 
75 
Figure 2.2: The share of safe assets m the total financial assets 
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NOTE: Total financial assets is the sum of debt and equity issued by all sectors of the economy. 
The government safe assets is the total government debt net of intra-governmental debt similar to the 
construct of Bohn [2005]. Private safe financial assets include deposits, money market mutual fund 
shares and asset backed securities. See Appendix for details. 
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riskless debt (e.g. Gorton and Pennacchi [1990]) which, judging from the rapid growth of 
financial assets, the financial sector has become increasingly good at 4 . On the demand 
side, however, stands a constant transaction function which requires a fixed proportion 
of safe debt to back a unit of risky debt. The non-default component in the pricing of 
risky non-financial corporate debt documented in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [2011] could, 
therefore, be just a measure of the efficiency with which the financial sector was able 
to produce safe debt out of risky debt - another potential interpretation of the effective 
risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector. 
The stable share of safe assets also means that changes in the public supply were ex-
actly offset by opposite sign changes in the private supply. This suggests that public debt 
and private debt were competing for satiating the underlying stable demand for safe assets. 
If the relationship in Figure (2.1) is structural, then increases in public debt by satiating 
the transaction demand lead to lowering the cost of holding and securing risky debt by 
the financial sector and hence the non-default component of credit spreads is reduced. 
However , as one can justifiably argue, the analysis so far is subject to different in-
terpretations as we really do not still understand what stands behind these aggregate 
relationships. The existing literature that has explored these aggregate correlations has 
focused on aggregate quantities and prices and has left these correlations subject to crit-
icism regarding their structural or causal interpretation. The importance of establishing 
a structural relationship between the supply of safe assets and asset prices and alloca-
tions is important for motivating theoretical work in the area of asset pricing and public 
finance. Moreover, understanding the mechanisms behind these fascinating facts is also 
4 Although according to evidence in Coval et al. [2009] the market for asset-backed debt largely mispriced 
disaster risk before the recent financial crisis. 
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Figure 2.3: Components of safe assets produced by the financial sector 
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NOTE: The figure plots the major components of the safe debt produced by the financial sector. 
See the Appendix for details of the construction. 
of paramount importance for policy analysis given the recent unconventional monetary 
policy experiments which targeted the maturity composition of government debt as an 
effective tool in lowering the costs of funds for the non-financial businesses 5 as well as the 
role of the Fed as a lender of last resort in which it directly backs private sector debt6 . 
This paper addresses the question of identification by looking at the heterogeneous 
response of FDIC insured commercial banks to shocks to the supply of public debt and 
5 The Operation Twist during the 1960s had similar goals as the goals of the Federa l Reserve in 2010. 
6 For example , the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility was 
a lending facility introduced by the Fed that allowed banks to borrow from the Fed against purchases of 
high quality ABCP between September 22, 2008, and February 1, 2010 
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its maturity composition. Although as seen in Figure (2.3), the role of the t raditional 
banking system in the overall financial system has diminished, it still supplies a signif-
icant share of the safe assets in terms of deposits. Examining the behavior of deposits 
is pertinent as these financial instruments have undergone little financial innovation as 
compared to the complex and rapidly evolving financial instruments used in the shadow 
banking system. FDIC insured commercial banks are also well suited for analysis as with 
the explicit government guarantee provided by the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company in 1933, insured "deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States Government" which made them as default-risk free as government issued 
debt and effectively made them a form of quasi-public debt. Therefore, banks were granted 
de facto the right to issue quasi-government debt and exploit the convenience yield placed 
on default risk-free debt. 
The conventional risk of bank runs on deposits as described by Diamond and Dybvig 
[1983] has been ruled out by deposit insurance and deposit inflows have become positively 
correlated with risk-aversion of investors as FDIC insured commercial banks have turned 
into safe haven for investors in episodes of "flight-to-quality". Evidence for this regime shift 
is presented in Pennacchi [2006] who documents that prior to deposit insurance banks were 
subject to large withdrawals of deposits and shrinkage of their balance sheets during pe-
riods of high risk aversion. After explicit insurance on deposits was established, insured 
banks experienced inflows of deposits in p eriods of high risk-aversion allowing them to 
provide liquidity insurance to the non-financial corporate sector in the form of credit lines 
as documented by Kashyap et al. [2002]. Becoming a safe haven for risk-averse investors, 
banks have started to compete with government debt for providing default-risk-free assets. 
Further reason for examining commercial banks is that from all financial institutions, 
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FDIC insured banks are unique as they fund their risky assets by a mix of insured safe 
and non-insured risky debt. This makes them a perfect laboratory to test the sign and 
magnitude of the impact of government debt on quantity and relative pricing of safe and 
risky financial debt. 
The contribution of the paper to the existing literature is to look at a proprietary 
database of the yields posted on both insured time deposits (small denomination Certifi-
cates of Deposit (CD)) and non-insured time deposits (large denomination Jumbo Cer-
tificates of Deposit (JCD)) for a large fraction of the banks in the existing commercial 
banking industry and match these with information on quantities from the commercial 
banks' balance sheets. The goal is to document how individual banks responded to the 
aggregate shocks to the level and maturity composition of government debt. The advan-
tage of the panel data is that I can control for the common and potentially unobservable 
aggregate factors that influence both government debt and the observed asset pricing and 
quantities of private debt . 
I employ similar identification strategy as Kashyap and Stein [2000] who test for the 
lending channel of monetary policy by looking at the cross-sectional differences in liquid 
assets across banks and their heterogeneous response to identified monetary policy shocks. 
Instead, I examine the liability structure of commercial banks and look at the share of 
insured time deposits in their total funding from time deposits as a proxy for the relative 
exposure of a bank to the time-variation in the aggregate convenience yield of safe debt. 
A change in the convenience yield due to a change in government debt would differentially 
impact the safe insured deposits relative to the risky non-insured wholesale funding. As a 
result banks that rely more on insured deposit will be more responsive to changes in the 
convenience yield. 
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I focus on time deposits because their contractual structure is most similar to Trea-
sury bonds and they do play a sizeable role in the overall funding of the banking system. 
Moreover , time deposits come in two varieties small denomination insured time deposits 
(a component of M2) and large denomination non-insured deposits (a component of M3). 
Since 1990, they are a non-reservable source of funding for the banking system and there-
fore , unlike demand deposits, are not under the direct control of the Federal Reserve. As 
a result the banking system as a whole and each individual bank could respond to changes 
in the aggregate convenience yield on safe and liquid assets by adjusting the margin at 
which they fund their operations across insured and non-insured sources of funding. If I 
assume that the level of government debt is exogenous to each bank and the market it 
operates, a reduction in government debt would lead to higher convenience yield on safe 
debt to which each bank responds by supplying more deposits and is able to do so at a 
lower spread relative to the yield of the government bond. In effect, I test to what ex-
tent government debt and deposits were substitutes as Figure (2.2) suggests and to what 
extent there is a systemic relative price response of safe and risky deposits to changes in 
government debt as Figure (2.1 ) implies. 
I first document that on average there was a large negative spread between the CD 
yields and matched maturity treasury yields over the period of 1997- 2008 when the FDIC 
insurance limit was at 100,000. I label this spread the relative convenience yield of time 
deposits with respect to treasuries. The spread exhibits an increasing term structure and 
higher volatility at the short end. On average banks were able to obtain insured deposits 
of 3 month maturity at 77 basis points lower yields than the corresponding 3-month T-bill. 
Examining Jumbo CDs of denomination exceeding the insurance limit of 100,000 during 
this sample period, I also uncover a somewhat unexpected fact that large denomination 
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non-insured CDs were also paying yields which on average were below the matched matu-
rity treasury. The spread between the 3-month JCD and the matched maturity treasury 
was on average negative at -47 bp. Moreover, despite being non-insured, large denomina-
tion CD spreads were not responsive to the individual default risk characteristics of the 
bank or the banking industry as a whole and thus contained a large non-default compo-
nent. I further document that the spreads between insured time deposits and matched 
maturity treasuries were positively correlated with the level of government debt and the 
share of government debt of maturity less than one year. 
In contrast, the spread between the non-insured JCD and insured CD as well as the 
spread between the large denomination negotiable CDs and matched maturity treasuries 
were negatively related to the level of government debt. These patterns are consistent 
with the aggregate facts presented in Figure (2.1 ). Examining quantities at the level of 
the banking industry, the level of government debt and the share of government debt of 
maturity less than one year were negatively correlated with both insured and non-insured 
deposits suggesting strong crowding out effect of government debt on bank deposits. 
I further explore these relationships in a set of panel data regressions. I define and com-
pute the share of insured time deposits for each bank. This share exhibits large persistent 
cross-sectional dispersion across different banks. I interact this share with a log-linearized 
convenience yield function of the level and maturity composition of government debt and 
proxy of risk-aversion of investors. The results from these set of regressions confirm the hy-
pothesis that the crowding out effect persists even after removing common macro-variation 
in the panel using time fixed effects. Moreover, it is stronger for banks that have higher 
share of insured deposits. Splitting the sample by size, I also uncover that the negative 
impact of government debt was present in both small and large banks which contrast the 
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results of Kashyap and Stein [2000] . 
The impact of the level and maturity composition of government debt on prices and al-
locations requires deviation from the Ricardian equivalence and a form of Modigliani-Miller 
condition for the type of financing of government debt. Wallace [1981] present conditions 
under which a form of Modigliani-Miller result holds for government debt financing . In 
t his regard the results of the paper relate to a burgeoning literature that documents the 
quantity effects of public debt on interest rates , risk premia and quantities and maturity 
composition of privately issued debt. However , this is first paper to be able to control for 
both quantities and prices at the level of the individual private firm . Greenwood et al. 
[2010a] document that the non-financial corporate sector as a whole plays an active role 
in the liquidity provision by filling in the gaps in the relative supplies of treasuries with 
respect to institutional demand for long-term safe and liquid assets . As compared to the 
non-financial corporate sector examined by Greenwood et al. [2010b], the banking sector 
has a comparative advantage at providing close substitutes to government debt due to 
the extensive explicit and implicit government guarantees on the liabilities of the banking 
sector. Most of the funding of commercial banks is in the form short-term debt of maturity 
less than one year. Hence the clientele of investors in bank debt is mostly seeking short 
term safety and liquidity. 
Vayanos and Vila [2009] develop a theoretical framework of preferred habitat investors 
where changes in the relative supplies of treasuries across different mat urities drives risk 
premia and the term structure of interest rates as arbitrage is constrained by the available 
capital of arbitrageurs. In a companion paper Greenwood and Vayanos [2010] t est the 
empirical implications of this theory and find significant impact of the supply of long-term 
bonds on risk-premia across the whole term structure of interest rates. Hamilton and Wu 
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[2012] apply this framework to an affine discrete time term structure model and examine 
the impact of government bond repurchases in a zero lower bound environment. 
Greenwood et al. [2010a] further document that it is the supply of short term treasury 
bills and the government debt maturity that matters most for liquidity premia and private 
money creation. Short term treasury bills are the closest substitutes to money and are 
thus bearing the largest convenience yield. They also develop a normative theory for the 
optimal maturity structure of government debt and in particular they claim that an opti-
mal choice of the maturity of government debt is the one that minimizes the externalities 
of excessive private money creation. Active policy on the maturity composition of govern-
ment debt by changing the convenience premium on riskless debt, crowds in or out the 
issuance of private debt to achieve a social optimum of private money. I also document 
that short term government debt of maturity less than one year has the largest impact on 
the relative convenience of bank deposits. However, it also has a strong negative impact 
on both the asset size and loan size of banks ' portfolios. Therefore, there is an inherent 
trade-off in designing policies that could potentially disrupt the supply of bank credit . 
Finally, the paper relates to a central question in monetary economics related to coex-
istence of assets of dominated returns such as money. Time deposits at commercial banks 
and government debt serve the purpose of facilitating transactions due to their stable 
nominal value and predictable liquidity. The former are mostly associated with facilitat-
ing transaction services of households while the latter with transaction services related 
to collateral values of large financial institutions and sovereign governments. Both are 
priced below what the standard consumption asset pricing model would predict - the so 
called the risk-free rate puzzle. Bansal and Coleman [1996] is the first paper to show that 
transaction services of government bonds are priced in equilibrium and can reconcile the 
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equity premium puzzle and the low risk-free rate. 
The paper has the following structure. Section (2.2) presents a stylized asset pricing 
framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Section (2 .3) describes the data construc-
tion. Section (2.4) documents the properties of the spreads on time deposit CDs and 
matched maturity treasuries . Section (2.5) documents aggregate properties of the relative 
convenience yield of time deposits and its dynamic relationship with public debt. Section 
(2.6) conducts and discusses the results from the panel data analysis and section (2. 7) 
concludes . 
2.2 Model 
This section introduces a simple theoretical asset pricing framework that rationalizes t he 
patterns in the data documented above. It will also guide the micro-data analysis in the 
sections to follow. The model consists of three agents - a representative household, the 
government and a set of banks. A simple asset pricing framework for pricing public debt , 
insured deposits and other risky assets is derived from the portfolio allocation problem 
of the representative investors . Government bonds and insured deposits issued by the 
banks carry convenience premium and are close substitutes. Changes in government debt 
impact the level of convenience premium and the spreads between insured and non-insured 
deposits. 
2.2.1 Portfolio allocation problem 
Each period there is an entry of a cohort of investors. The representative investor partic-
ipates in the market for two periods. In the initial period she starts with initial wealth 
Wt which she allocates between consumption today and investment in financial assets t o 
support consumption in T periods . She faces an uncertain income Yt+l in the next period. 
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Her utility is linearly separable in consumption today and consumption tomorrow 7 . She 
also derives convenience utility from holding safe and liquid assets v( eT + K.OD; St) over 
this period as these serve to save on transaction costs and time where v(-; St) is twice 
continuously differentiable increasing and concave. Government debt and insured deposits 
are perfect substitutes up to a factor K-. St is a vector of aggregate states that influences 
the relative demand of safe and liquid assets . In the final period the investor collects the 
return on her portfolio, consumes and exits the financial market. 
maxct ,ct+l ,E>t { u(ct) + f3Etu(ct+l) + v(ef + K-Of; St) } (2.1) 
Ct + P{ef + Pfef + Ptet = Wt 
Ct+l = er + ef + 08 (1- Xt+l + Xt+lQt+l) + ez(P{+l + dt+d + Yt+l 
where e = { eT) eD) e8 ) ez} is a vector of asset shares where T indexes treasuries, D de-
posits, B defaultable debt and z stocks . Pis the corresponding vector of prices . Treasuries, 
deposits and defaultable debt are zero coupon discount bonds. Deposits are supplied by 
commercial banks and are insured by the government. Deposit insurance is modeled as a 
pure subsidy by the government and removes the credit risk of the underlying bank that 
issues it. Banks as well as non-financial institutions issue defaultable debt. The final pay-
off of defaultable debt is summarized by whether default occurred x E {0, 1} and what is 
the recovery value in case of default Q E [0 , 1]. The stocks are issued by the non-financial 
corporate sector and are assumed to be in fixed supply. The set of optimality conditions 
7 u( ·) is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave 
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of the portfolio allocation problem define the following asset pricing equations : 
Pt = Etmt,t+l + v' ( er + K,()p; St ) 
PP = Etmt,t+l + "'v'(e[ + "'ef; st) 
ptz = E tmt,t+ l(Pf+l + d;+l) 
Pl = Etmt,t+l(1- Xt+I(1- Qt+l) ) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
where I have defined the stochastic discount factor as mt,t+l = ,Bu~~(~:)). Using these set 
of pricing equations, I can define the following set of spreads which will be important for 
the banks. 
Pt- PP = (1- "')v'(B[ +"'Of ; St) 
Pt- ptB = v'(e[ + K,ef; St) + Etmt,t+1(1- Qt+l)Xt+l 
PP- Pt8 = "'v'(B[ +"'Of ; St) + Etmt,t+1(1- Qt+I)xt+l 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
The spread between the price of the treasury and the price of the deposit depends on 
the marginal convenience of the port folio of safe and liquid assets e[ +"'Of. As can be seen 
from the structure of the spreads, changes in the supply of government debt , therefore, 
produce differential change in the spreads between insured deposits and defaultable debt. 
A crucial parameter which governs the relative convenience of deposits "' determines 
the sign of the spread. If"' > 1, deposits command a higher convenience premium relative 
to treasuries . In this case, the price of deposits (the yield of deposits) is higher (lower) 
relative to the price (yield) of government bonds. Further, "' > 1 also changes the sign 
of the relationship between the spread and the supply of government bonds which can be 
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directly seen by taking the derivative 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
Since v" ( ·) is negative, "' > 1 implies that increase in the supply of government debt 
increases the spread between the yields on deposits and government bonds. In contrast, 
an increase in the supply of government debt lowers the spread between defaultable debt 
and government bonds. 
2.3 Data description 
I construct a dataset that is composed of the following databases. I employ a novel pro-
prietary database provided by Rate Watch which contains the yields on the certificates 
of deposit (CDs) posted by approximately 5,500 U.S. FDIC insured commercial banks 
consistently tracked over the period of 1997-2011 over 10 ,000 local markets. I work with 
data aggregated at the level of the individual bank. The total number of FDIC insured 
commercial banks decreased from around 10,000 to around 7,500 in 2010. The dataset has 
good coverage of both small, medium and large banks in terms of assets and number of 
markets. 
The dataset contains both insured CDs of denomination less that $ 100,000 dollars and 
non-insured large denomination Jumbo CDs (JCDs) of amounts above$ 100,000 dollars. 
This cut-off value is a standard for the industry and until October 3, 2008, it distinguished 
insured time deposits from non-insured. Since the limit was increased to $ 250,000. The 
yield information on deposits of denomination less than $ 100, 000 is almost consistently 
covered all all 5,500 banks in the sample. The coverage of the large denomination Jumbo 
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CDs, however, is sparse in the beginning of the sample but it rapidly increases and by 
the end of the sample I observe 1355 banks. For most of the empirical analysis I use this 
group of banks for which I observe both the pricing of small and large time deposits. 
I merge the deposit interest rate data with the quarterly information on the balance 
sheet of banks from the Reports of Condition and Income 8 also referred to as "Call 
Reports". Data on the face value of the outstanding privately held public debt and its 
maturity composition are constructed from the CRSP where to be consistent with the 
literature I use the publicly available dataset developed by Hamilton and Wu [2012] who 
base their methodology on the data constructs of Greenwood and Vayanos [2010] 9 
2.4 Convenience yield of time deposits 
This section documents the properties of the spreads of the certificate of deposit over 
matched maturity treasuries. Figure (2.4) describes the time-series variation of the 5th-
95th percentiles of the distribution of the CD spreads for the 3-month and the 6 month 
contracts. The left panel is the small denomination insured CDs and the right panel is the 
large denomination Jumbo CDs. The figure also plots the matched maturity non-insured 
negotiable CDs for which I only have aggregate data. The latter is traded in secondary 
markets in denomination exceeding$ 1 million. 
There are a few notable features of the time-series and cross sectional behavior of the 
deposit spreads and their term structure. First and most important is the negative spread 
between the insured CD and the matched maturity treasury. Table (2.1) summarizes the 
8 The dataset is publicly available at the website Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council . 
9 Description of the construction of the dataset and the actual data can be found on the following 
webpage Hamilton and Wu (2010) 
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Figure 2.4: Cross-sectional distribution of CD spreads 
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NOTE: The figure plots the time-varying cross-sectional distribution (5th - 95th percentile) of CD 
yields posted in the 5,500 banks in the sample. The green dashed lined is the matched maturity Treasury 
yield, the blue line is the cross-sectional unweighed average. 
mean and standard deviation of this spread for the period of 1997-2008 when the insurance 
limit was $ 100,000. On average the un-weighted mean of the 3-month contract was 63 
basis points below the 3-month Treasury. If we weigh by the asset size of the bank, this 
spread is even lower at 77 basis points below the treasury. The spread increases with 
maturity and the unweighted mean is negative for maturities up to 1 year. The weighted 
mean remains negative for the all the observed maturities. This negative spread contracts 
with the strictly non-negative spread on the negotiable CD . 
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Table 2.1: The relative convenience yield: Summary statistics 
Insured ( < 100 K) mean s.d. mean (weighted) s.d. (weighted) 
Spread Insured- 'freas 3-mo 
-0 .63 0.82 -0.77 0.72 
Spread Insured - 'freas 6-mo 
-0 .27 0.72 -0.52 0.59 
Spread Insured- Treas 12-mo 
-0.05 0.62 -0 .34 0.47 
Spread Insured - Treas 24-mo 
-0.02 0.62 -0.29 0.48 
Spread Insured- Treas 36-mo 0.05 0.59 -0.24 0.48 
Spread Insured - 'freas 60-mo 0.09 0.49 -0.17 0.42 
Non-insured (> lOOK) mean s.d. mean (weighted) s.d. (weighted) 
Spread Non-insured - 'freas 3-mo -0 .35 0.66 -0 .47 0.67 
Spread Non-insured- 'freas 6-mo -0.15 0.60 -0 .31 0.54 
Spread Non-insured- 'freas 12-mo 0.01 0.53 -0.21 0.44 
Spread Non-insured - 'freas 24-mo 0.02 0.56 -0.19 0.43 
Spread Non-insured- 'freas 36-mo 0.07 0.52 -0.14 0.42 
Spread Non-insured - 'freas 60-mo 0.09 0.43 -0.06 0.38 
Non-insured - Insured mean S.d. mean (weighted) s.d . (weighted) 
Spread Non-insured- Insured 3-mo 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.26 
Spread Non-insured - Insured 6-mo 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.18 
Spread Non-insured - Insured 12-mo 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.14 
Spread Non-insured- Insured 24-mo 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.15 
Spread Non-insured- Insured 36-mo 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.12 
Spread Non-insured- Insured 60-mo -0.01 0.17 0.10 0.14 
Non-Insured Negotiable mean s.d . 
Spread Neg. CD- Treas 3-mo 0.46 0.50 
Spread Neg. CD- Treas 6-mo 0.40 0.44 
NOTE: The table summarizes the equally weighted and asset-weighted cross-sectional average of 
spreads of insured, non-insured (Jumbo) time deposits and negotiable non-insured certificates of deposit 
over matched maturity treasury as well as the spread between non-insured and insured time deposits. 
Period Jan-1997 - Jan-2008. SOURCE: RateWatch and FRED 
The second striking fact is the negative spread for the large denomination CDs. The 
JCDs exhibit very similar dynamics as the small denomination insured deposits . The 
middle panel of Table (2 .1) shows that on average the 3-month Jumbo CDs paid 35 basis 
points lower than the matched maturity treasury. Weighing by the asset size of the bank 
that posted the contract, the spread is even lower at minus 47 basis points. Just as the 
insured CDs, the JCDs spreads are increasing with maturity. 
Figure (2 .5) plots the spread yield curve for both types of CDs over matched maturity 
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treasury as well as computes the yield curve for the spread between the small and large 
CDs. Banks had to pay on average 28 basis points more on their large denomination 
3-month JCDs as compared to the small denomination. The time variation of the spreads 
is the highest at the short end. Also the standard deviation of the spreads for the retail 
small CDs and Jumbo CDs is higher than the corresponding standard deviation for the 
large negotiable CDs which means that banks were subject to substantial variation in the 
relative cost of funds across insured and non-insured deposits. I label the spread be-
tween the CD yield and the matched maturity treasury the relative convenience yield of 
CDs. Looking back at set of asset pricing equations (2.6) . This relative convenience yield 
is related to the amount of safe assets. Also the sign of the relative convenience yield of 
deposits versus government debt depends on the parameter K, which judging from the neg-
ative spread must have exceeded one K, > 1. The next section documents the relationship 
between the relative convenience yield of CDs and government debt outstanding. 
2.5 Convenience yield and public debt 
To motivate the analysis and relate to the existing literature, Figure (2.6) presents simple 
scatter plots of the aggregate quantities and spreads over treasuries of small time deposits 
and large time deposits relative to GDP and the debt-to-gdp ratio for the period 1982 -
2010. Since both the quantity series exhibit trends, I first remove these trends using the 
Hedrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
The first row of the figure plots the relationship between the small time deposits (in-
sured) and debt-to-gdp as well as the M2-own rate 10 . Debt-to-gdp above trend correlates 
10The micro-level dataset starts only in 1997 so I cannot construct a long enough time series of the 
aggregate time deposit rates. The M2-own rate is the weighted average of the rates received on the 
interest-bearing assets included in M2 and this includes also savings accounts. 
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Figure 2 .5: The relative convenience yield curve of t ime deposits 
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negatively with the small-time deposits to gdp on one hand and positively with the M2 
rate on the other. Looking at the large denomination time deposits , again debt-to-gdp 
correlates negatively with the quantities of large time deposits scaled by gdp. However, 
debt-to-gdp correlates negatively with the spread on the negotiable CDs. This pattern is 
similar to the spread of the AAA rate non-financial corporate bonds and debt-to-gdp in 
Figure (2.1). The micro-level dataset of CD yields covers only a short period 1997 -
2011. However , it allows one to control for the maturity composition of time deposits. 
Greenwood et al. [2010b] claim that most of the convenience yield derived from riskless 
debt is in the short maturity debt. Figure (2.7) presents the scatter plot of the spreads of 
insured deposits and matched maturity treasury and the spread between insured and non-
insured CDs against the share of government debt of maturity less than one year11 . The 
figure documents that higher share of short term government debt increases the spread on 
insured time deposits and lowers the spread between non-insured and insured. 
I further document in a vector-autoregression analysis the dynamic relationships be-
tween government debt and commercial banking debt. I estimate a simple VAR system 
of the following set of endogenous macro variables - the debt-to-gdp ratio , the share of 
government debt of maturity outstanding less than one year, small insured time, slope of 
the yield curve as measured by the spread on the 10-year and the 3-month Treasury, the 
spread on small time deposits of maturity 6 months 12 and the spread of negotiable non-
insured time deposits of maturity 6 months . I use the spread on negotiable time deposits 
instead of the measure I construct from the Jumbo CD data in order to have a longer time 
series. The vector-autoregression is estimated for the period 1986:Q1 _- 2007:Q4. I iden-
11 Government debt is measured at face nominal value and does not incorporate movements in the level 
interest rates . 
12The aggregate 6-month small denomination CD yield series is constructed by Ruth Judson and John 
Driscoll who kindly shared their dataset. 
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Figure 2.6: Substitutability of bank debt and public debt 
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Figure 2. 7: Correlation between CD spreads and t he share of government debt with maturity less than 1-year 
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tify structural shocks using a recursive Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix L: and ordering of the variables as described above. 
(2.11) 
The results from the VAR estimation are presented in Figure (2.8) which plots the 
mean impulse response functions as well as the 95 percent error bands of the endogenous 
variables to a one standard deviation shock to the level of government debt . A one-
standard deviation shock to debt-to-gdp, leads to a contemporaneous increase in the share 
of government debt of maturity less than one year as the level of government debt increases 
it is financed by short term debt. Changes in the level and maturity composition of 
government debt are persistent. On impact the shock to debt-to-gdp does not influence 
the amount of insured deposits in the baking industry. Within 20 quarters, however , the 
initial impact of the increase in government debt is transmitted almost one-to-one as a 
reduction in the amount of insured deposits. A 0.5 basis points initial increase in the 
debt-to-gdp leads to 0.6 points decrease in the insured deposits of the banking industry. 
In terms of spreads , a positive shock to debt-to-gdp produces a hump-shaped dynamics of 
the slope of the yield curve. The initial impact is negative but small, however, the slope 
increases by 20 basis points after 8 quarters following the impact. Conditional on the 
behavior of the slope of the yield curve, the most revealing finding from the VAR impulse 
response functions is the differential response of spreads on the insured and non-insured 
sources of funding. While the spread on non-insured deposits is decreasing , the spread on 
insured deposits increases. The increase in government debt leads to an increase in the 
insured deposit spread by 6 basis points and a reduction in the non-insured deposit spread 
by 7 basis points or a differential across the two types of debt of 13 basis points. 
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Figure 2.8: Vector autoregression: Substitutability of bank debt and public debt 
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NOTE: Cholesky ordering: the debt-to-gdp ratio, the share of government debt of maturity out-
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of maturity 6 months and the spread of negotiable non-insured time deposits of maturity 6 months. 
The system includes 4 lags of the endogenous variables and is estimated in levels. The sample period is 
1986:Ql - 2007:Q4. 
The VAR analysis provides a confirmation of the simple correlations analysis. Higher 
levels of government debt relative to gdp and also shorter maturities of government debt 
have persistent effect on the quantities and yields of bank debt. Both t he non-insured and 
insured deposits are crowded out by higher levels of government debt. This establishes 
facts related to the ones observed the studies of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
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[2012], Bansal et al. [2011] and Greenwood et al. [2010b]. It also speaks to the hypothesis 
discussed in the introduction that public and private debt compete for satiating a demand 
for safe assets which has remained remarkably stable over an extended period of time. 
However, none of these studies have documented the differential impact of government 
debt on the spreads of insured and non-insured deposits. The VAR analysis measures a 
differential impact of an increase of government debt by one standard deviation of 13 basis 
points. If the aggregate correlations are correct, then it must be the case that individual 
banks have responded to these changes in the relative cost of funds across insured and 
non-insured deposits. The next sections examine the impact of government debt at the 
level of the individual bank. 
2.6 Micro-level response to convenience yield shocks 
I have presented convincing evidence in the previous section that subject to shocks to 
the supply of government debt the commercial banking industry as a whole behaves in a 
way consistent with the hypothesis that government debt and private debt meet a stable 
demand for safe assets that is priced in equilibrium and make public and private supply 
substitutes. This section provides further tests to the hypothesis by examining the re-
sponse of the individual banks to changes in the convenience premium of safe debt and 
the differential pricing across safe insured debt and non-insured debt. 
The U.S. commercial banking industry has undergone rapid change since the deregu-
lation period of the 1980s and 1990s. Regulation Q was completely phased out by 1986 13 
which allowed banks to freely charge interest rates on savings and time deposits. In 1990 
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation D was modified and removed the reserve requirements 
13See The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
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on time deposits which further lowered the cost of funds of banks from interest bearing 
debt . The Riegle-Niel act of 1994 14 allowed banks to expand in multiple states and led 
to the creation of national banks which could compete for deposits in multiple locations 
throughout the nation. All these de-regulations changed the competitive structure banks 
face and allowed banks to compete more effectively for funding at a national level with the 
emerging shadow banking and mutual funds industries. However , as I have documented 
in Figure (2.3), the role of traditional deposits has diminished both in terms of its relative 
share but also in absolute amounts. As I will document in the p.ext section these dereg-
ulation most likely impacted the liability structure of the representative bank as well as 
altered the competitive environment it faces. Despite these rapid changes in the banking 
industry over the sample period 1997-2011, the contract structure of the time deposits has 
remained unchanged and so has the structure of the treasuries. As a result the two are 
most likely to be still very close substitutes and compete for the funds of the investors in 
these markets. 
I summarize the liability structure of each bank in terms of a one sufficient statistics -
the share of insured time deposits in the total funding from time deposits . The hypothesis 
is that the more a bank relies on insured deposits , the more it is exposed to variations in 
the aggregate convenience yield on safe debt as a result banks with higher share of insured 
deposits will be more responsive to changes in the aggregate convenience yield induced by 
changes in the supply of government debt. I next measure this response at the level of the 
bank. 
14Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) 
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2.6.1 Capital structure- share of insured deposits 
I first look at the size of the insured and non-insured deposit accounts reported in the Call 
Reports. Table (2.2) gives the average account size of insured and non-insured deposits. 
The average deposit account of insured deposits in 2007:Q4 was 12,000 and it increased to 
slightly below 16,000 in 2011:Q1 when the insurance limit was 250,000. The non-insured 
deposit average account balance increases from 265,000 to 652,720 over the same period. 
The accounts exceeding the insurance limit are insured up to the insurance limit. This 
might explain the negative spread on Jumbo CDs as nearly 40 %of the non-insured account 
balances were below the insurance limit and thus were subject to deposit insurance and 
as I will document the sample period 1997-2008 was characterized with very few actual 
defaults and extremely low probabilities of default. 
Table 2.2: Average account size 
2007:Q4 2011:Ql 
Insured ( < lOOK) Non-insured (> lOOK) Insured(< 250K) Non-insured (> 250K) 
mean (thousands) 12.42 265.90 15.95 652.72 
sd 6.29 116.62 13.08 269.28 
NOTE: The table summarizes the cross-sectional average size and the dispersion across banks in 
their average account size of insured and non-insured deposits. The first-two rows are computed for 
2007:Q4 and the last two rows are computed for 201l:Ql. The average size of the account is computed 
as the total amount of deposits divided by the number of accounts for the two types. SouRCE: Reports 
of Condition and Income 
Table (2 .3) summarizes the cross-sectional average of the share of insured and non-
insured time deposits across four maturity bins for 2007:Q4. The maturity breakdown 
is very similar across insured and non-insured deposits. This similarity in the maturity 
breakdown is observed across the whole sample period. Almost 80 percent of the deposits 
have maturity less than one year and only 4 percent have maturity longer than 3 years. 
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The table points to a stable demand for short-term maturity. Similarly, the relative 
convenience yield of bank time deposits as compared to treasuries is the largest and most 
volatile for maturities less than a year. The observed stable distribution of maturities of 
time deposits for the banking industry points to a stable demand for short term safety and 
liquidity from the investor. The data on deposit yields also confirms this intuition as the 
maximal maturity posted on certificates of deposits both small and Jumbo is 5 years15 . 
This is also consistent with the main function of the banking system of transforming long-
term illiquid assets into short term liquid assets. In equilibrium this function is rewarded 
with exploiting the convenience yield concentrated in the short-term safe debt . What the 
relative convenience shows us is that the banking sector as a whole was able to provide an 
asset with larger relative convenience than the matched maturity treasury bond. This is 
a new fact that the existing literature has not fully explored. 
Table 2.3 : Maturity breakdown of insured and non-insured time deposits 
Insured time deposits Non-insured time deposits 
3m 3-12m 1- 3 y >3y 3-m 3 - 12m 1-3 y >3y 
mean 0.29 0.52 0.16 0.04 0.32 0.51 0.13 0.04 
median 0.27 0.52 0.14 0.02 0.30 0.52 0.10 0 .01 
std 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.06 
NOTE: The cross-sectional average share of insured and non-insured time deposits by maturity bins 
computed for 2007:Q4. SouRCE: Reports of Condition and Income 
Although I do not have a precise measure of what fraction of the time deposits are 
negotiable and traded on secondary markets, I can measure the the amount of brokered 
deposits on the banks balance sheets large fraction of which are traded in secondary 
150ccasionally banks would post mat urities of 7 years but t hese are very uncommon and sparsely 
reported. 
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markets. Call reports also a breakdown into what fraction of the brokered deposits are 
insured and whether their outstanding maturity exceeds one year. This information is 
summarized in Table (2.4) . Brokered deposits were mainly used by larger banks and are 
a relatively small share in the total funding of the banking industry. 
mean 
median 
std 
Share brokered 
0.03 
0.00 
0.08 
Table 2.4: Brokered deposits 
Share insured 
0.52 
0.58 
0.46 
Insured ( < 1 yr) 
0.73 
0.92 
0.34 
Non-insured ( < 1 yr) 
0.65 
0.79 
0.37 
NOTE: The share of brokered time deposits 2007:Q4. SoURCE: Reports of Condition and Income 
For each bank I construct the share of insured time deposits as the ratio of insured 
time deposit accounts over the total time deposit amount. Table (2.5) shows the summary 
statistics of the balance sheet information of the 5,500 banks that enter the analysis. 
Approximately 40 percent of the total funding of the commercial banking industry comes 
from time deposits . I compute the cross-sectional averages of each balance sheet item 
for the quintiles of the distribution of the share of insured deposit. The first two rows in 
each panel show that for 1998 and 2007 most the banks that were with the lowest share of 
insured time deposits were larger banks- the average bank in Q1 being close to ten times 
larger than the average bank in Q5. In contrast in 2011 there is no monotone relationship 
between the share of insured deposits and the average size of the bank. The share of time 
deposits in the total funding of the bank was uniform across the different quintiles and 
across time. 
Other than size, all other characteristics of banks are uniform across the different 
quintiles. Time deposits are not inherently related to features of the type of lending or 
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share of liquid assets nor is there any difference across the different type of liabilities. 
Figure 2.9: Cross-sectional dispersion in the share of insured deposits 
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Condition and Income 
Although on average larger banks had a small but also more volatile share of insured 
deposits, within the group of large banks there is a large cross-sectional dispersion. Figure 
(2.9) plots the cross-sectional dispersion of the share of insured time deposits across the 
three size categories for 1998:Ql and 2007:Q2. Although the cross sectional mean has 
decreased for all three size groups, the cross sectional dispersion is just as large for all size 
categories. I exploit this cross-sectional dispersion in the microeconomic analysis in the 
next section. 
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics: Balance sheet information of FDIC insured commercial 
banks by share of insured deposits 
1998:Ql 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Assets 
Assets (1998, millions) 1271.58 743.96 284.36 139.13 135.92 
Fraction total system assets 0.49 0.29 0.11 0.05 0.05 
Share liquid assets 0.40 0 .36 0.36 0 .37 0.39 
Share loans 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 
Share Real estate loans 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.35 0 .34 
Share C&I loans 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Liabilities 
Share equity 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 
Share subordinated debt 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 
Share total deposits 0.85 0 .86 0.86 0.85 0.85 
Share demand deposits 0.14 0.12 0 .11 0 .10 0.10 
Share time deposits 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0 .44 
Share time deposits > lOOK 0.18 0.13 0.10 0 .07 0 .04 
Fraction of insured in total time deposits 0.57 0.72 0.79 0.84 0.91 
2007:Q4 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Assets 
Assets (1998, millions) 3363.29 1751.77 1015.43 271.87 204.31 
Fraction total system assets 0.51 0.27 0.15 0.04 0.03 
Share liquid assets 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 
Share loans 0.6fi 0.67 0 .68 0.68 0.65 
Share Real estate loans 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.43 
Share C&I loans 0 .12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Liabilities 
Share equity 0.12 0.11 0 .11 0.11 0.12 
Share subordinated debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share total deposits 0 .81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Share demand deposits 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Share time deposits 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Share time deposits > lOOK 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.08 
Fraction of insured in total time deposits 0.38 0.54 0 .63 0.70 0.80 
2011 :Q1 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Assets 
Assets (1998, millions) 1858.15 1228.99 1875.93 1575.29 622.39 
Fraction total system assets 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.09 
Share liquid assets 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.33 
Share loans 0.62 0.63 0 .63 0.62 0.60 
Share Real estate loans 0.46 0 .47 0.46 0.45 0 .42 
Share C&I loans 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Liabilities 
Share equity 0.11 0.10 0.10 0 .10 0.11 
Share subordinated debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share total deposits 0.84 0 .85 0 .85 0.84 0.85 
Share demand deposits 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Share t ime deposits 0.36 0.39 0.38 0 .36 0.36 
Share time deposits > 250K 0.24 0.20 0 .16 0.13 0.09 
Fraction of insured in total time deposits 0.31 0.48 0.57 0.64 0 .76 
NoTE: Ql-Q5 are the five quintiles over the s hare of insu red t ime deposits in total time deposits. All the variables are 
computed as a simple mean within each group. Fraction of total system assets meas ures the share of assets in each grouping over 
the total asset s in the industry. All s h are vari able s are computed as a sh are over total assets of the bank except for the share of 
insured time depos its which is computed as a share over total time deposits. The insurance Limit was ch anged from lOOK to 250K 
on October 3, 2008. SouRCE: Reports on Condition and Income 
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Figure (2.10) plots the time series variation of the share of insured time deposits for 
the three size groups of banks - small banks (bottom 75 percentile), medium-large banks 
(75-99th percentile) and the very large banks (top 99-th) percentile for the period 1985 -
2010. There is a clear hump-shaped dynamics of the trend of the share of insured deposits 
which peaks in 1994 and then gradually falls down until 2007 where the capital structure 
of the three size categories converges to roughly 60 % share of insured deposits. The lower 
panel of the figure shows the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. The largest banks display 
the largest volatility of the time series variation in the share of insured deposits and the 
volatility of the share is monotonely increasing with size. The largest banks were able 
to quickly substitute from one source of funding into the other. All three size groups 
exhibit counter-cyclical share of insured deposits which is consistent with the idea that 
large non-insured deposits are exposed the credit risk of the banking industry which is 
counter-cyclical. 
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Figu re 2. 10: T ime series variation in the share of insured time deposits by s1ze group 
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SouRCE: Reports of Condition and Income 
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2.6.2 Pricing of default risk in the CD spreads 
To what extent credit risk of the underlying banking institutions was priced in the spreads 
of the insured and non-insured CD contracts? I use Merton [1974] model to construct 
a measure of the probability of default. The model consists of a specification for the 
stochastic process for the assets of the firm dAt/ At = J.LAdt+(J AdBt (a geometric Brownian 
motion), the amount of debt outstanding Dt and a maturity Tat which the debt must be 
repaid. Default occurs if assets fall below the amount of the debt outstanding in period 
T- Ar :S Dr. The conditional default probability can be computed by first defining the 
distance to default Xt = ln(At/Dt) as the number of standard deviations of the asset value 
lTA 
. . ( ln(A; t/ D; t) +k(JLA ; -&~ /2) from the default pomt. The standardized value u t, t + k) = - ' '_ Vk ' ·' 
lT A ,i k 
has a standard normal distribution <I>(·) and p(t, t + k) = <I>(u(t , t + k)) is the conditional 
probability of default in k periods. The expected default probability over a k period 
horizon for each bank is computed from the data as: 
ln(A- t/D t) + k(iiA ·- Q- 2 /2) 
Pi(t, t + k) = Pr(Defaulti ,t+kiit) =<I>(- ~ . ~. ~ ..fie .~ A,i ) 
() A,i k 
(2.12) 
where Ai,t is the asset value of the bank, Di,t is the value of its liabilities, J.lA; and ()A; are 
the mean growth and volatility of its assets computed as a moving average over the past 
8 quarters . 
Figure (2.11) plots the average implied default probability and the actual realized de-
faults during the period of 1984-2011. While this is not a very rigorous way of constructing 
expected default probabilities for the banking industry, the constructed measure and the 
actual realized defaults are highly positively correlated. 
The period of the late 1980s was characterized with high volatility and large number 
of banking failures. The period of the 1990s was characterized with capital build up which 
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significantly reduced default risk of the institutions and ultimately lead to few observed 
defaults for the whole period before the financial crisis of 2008. l6 
Figure 2.11: Probability of default and realized defaults 
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NOTE: The figure juxtaposes the number of realized defaults and the computed one year ahead 
default probability from a Merton [1974] model described in (2 .12) . 
SouRCE: Reports of Condition and Income 
Having constructed a measure of default, I run a set of regressions of the CD yields on 
this measure of default to examine the extent to which credit risk was priced in the CD 
spreads. The regression includes one lag of the measure of default risk defined above, the 
return on assets, the share of commitment lending in total lending, the size of the assets 
of the bank and the share of insured deposits as controls. It also have full set of t ime and 
bank fixed effects . Table (2 .6) presents the results. The probability of default does not 
16 See Flannery and Rangan [2004] for an examination for this rapid reversal in default risk . 
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influence the pricing of the CD spreads. The only statistically significant coefficient is the 
spread on the 36-month JCD. Default risk is priced neither in the non-insured spreads 
over treasuries nor in the spread between non-insured and insured deposits. This might 
not be surprising as the probability of default during the sample period was extremely low 
and so were the number of realized defaults. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous 
section, large fraction of the average non-insured deposit accounts were covered by deposit 
insurance. The results in this section confirm Hall et al. [2003] who also examine whether 
Jumbo CD holders priced credit risk and find no evidence that credit risk was priced. 17 
2.6.3 Changes in the aggregate convenience yield and the individual bank's 
response 
I extend the model of the previous section by adding a component related to a proxy of 
the aggregate convenience yield presented in asset pricing equation (2.7). The relative 
convenience of deposits over government debt was defined as Pt- PP = (1- rL)v'(B'[ + 
rLBf; St), the relative convenience of non-insured deposits over government debt was defined 
as Pt - Pl = v'(B'[ + rLBf; St) + Etmt,t+l(1 - Qt+l)Xt+l and the spread of insured 
deposits over non-insured also contained the convenience yield of deposits PP - ptB = 
K.v'(B'[ + rLBf ; St) + Etmt,t+l(1 - Qt+l)xt+l· Linearizing these equations , I arrive at the 
following empirical specification. 
17This contrasts with an earlier study by Ellis and Flannery (1992] who find that large negotiable CDs 
issued by large money market center banks contained large priced default risk. As we have seen in Figure 
(2.4) the negotiable CD spread was always non-positive .. Another reason default risk may not be priced 
is if the market anticipates bailouts by the government. Recent work by Kelly et al. (2011] examines how 
the market priced the government guarantee by documenting whether put options on the financial sector 
index were cheaper relative to put options on its member banks. They find a substantial discrepancies 
as evidence that the market anticipated that the government would guarantee the debt of the financial 
system as a whole. 
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Table 2.6: Regression: Pricing of default risk in CD spreads 
Spread Insured CD - Treasury 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SpreadRT3 SpreadRT6 SpreadRT12 SpreadRT36 SpreadRT60 
L .default 
-0.0498 0 .177 -0 .0894 0.133 0 .0569 
(-0 .3 1) (- 1.35) (-0. 84) (1.29) (0.44) 
L .Return on assets 0 .234 1.072 1.171 0 .184 0 .400 
(0 .33) (1.56) (1.67) (0 .27) (0 .47) 
L.Commitment lending -0 .0824 0.106 0 .0825 0 .230 0 .125 
(- 0.52) (0.82) (0 .64) (1.29) (0.53) 
L.Share of insured deposits (total time d eposits) -0 .0795 -0 .155° -0.179 * * 
-0 .0791 0 .0943 
(-1.1 3) (-2 .47) (- 3.04) (-0.86) (1.00) 
L .Size (assets) 1.611 0 .84 1 0 .359 -1.033 -2 .478 
(1.15) (0 .67) (0 .23) (-0.57) (-1.2 7) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 11619 8913 
R 2 withi n 0 .872 0 .859 0 .833 0 .720 0.601 
R 2 between 0. 654 0.592 0. 544 0 .239 0 .0170 
R 2 overall 0.812 0.780 0.734 0 .557 0.338 
N umber groups 1232 1352 1355 1047 869 
Spread Non-insured JCD- Treasury 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
S preadJT3 SpreadJT6 SpreadJT12 Sprea dJT36 SpreadJT60 
L .default 0 .01 83 -0 .136 -0.0488 0.177 0.0842 
(0.13) (-1.08) (-0.49 ) (2 .13) (0 .64) 
L .Return on assets -0 .0750 0.555 0 .567 0.0640 0 .433 
(-0 .09) (0.73) (0.74) (0 .08) (0.43) 
L .Commitment lending -0 .185 -0 .0590 -0 .0930 0 .13 1 -0 .0926 
(-0 .99) (-0.39) (-0 .65) (0.69) (-0 .36) 
L.Sh a re o f i ns ured deposits (total time deposits) -0 .237"'* -0.267*** -0 .227*** -0.0465 0 .103 
(-2.94) (-3.66) (-3 .55) (-0 .53) (1.04) 
L. Size (assets) 0. 300 -0 .797 -2 .382 -2 .296 -2 .617 
(0 .20 ) (-0 .68) (- 1.88) (-1. 6 7) (-1.76 ) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 116 19 8913 
R 2 within 0 .814 0 .82 1 0 .799 0 .694 0 .573 
R 2 between 0 .571 0 .540 0.525 0 .254 0 .0238 
R 2 overall 0.750 0 .744 0 .716 0 .548 0.330 
Number groups 1232 1352 1355 1047 869 
Spread Non-insured JCD- Insured CD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sprea dJR3 SpreadJR6 SpreadJR12 SpreadJR36 SpreadJR60 
L.de fa ul t 0 .0681 0.0407 0.0406 0 .0440 0.0273 
(1.08) (0 .87) (1.64) (0 .94) (0 .45) 
L.Return on asset s -0 .309 -0 .517 -0.604. -0.120 0 .0327 
(-0 .75) (-1.53) (-1.99) (-0 .28) (0 .06) 
L. Commitm ent lending -0.103 -0.165° -0.175"' -0 .0990 -0 .218 
(-0 .92) (-2 .05) (-2.50) (- 1.08) (-1.85) 
L.Sh are of insured deposits (total t ime deposits) -0 .15 7 ** -0 .112** -0.0484 0.0326 0 .00909 
(-3.07) (-2.78) (-1. 52) (0.61) (0.17) 
L.Size (assets) -1.3 11 -1.638 -2.741° -1.263 -0 .140 
(-1. 63) (-1.61) (-2 .25) (-1.85) (-0 .17) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 11619 8913 
R 2 within 0 .139 0 .0868 0.0571 0 .0359 0 .0 409 
R 2 between 0.0514 0 .0382 0.01 65 0 .000 500 0.000000333 
R 2 overall 0.109 0.0599 0.0264 0 .010 2 0 .0182 
N umbe r groups 1232 1352 1355 1047 869 
t statJstJcs m parentheses 
• p < 0.05 , •• p < 0.01 , ••• p < 0.001 
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si,r,t = (/o,r + /1 ,rlnG~yr + /2,rlnG/Yt- 1 + /3,rlnNFCPSprt-1) x Sii,t- 1 + (2.13) 
spreads - the spread between retail insured time ( < lOOK) deposits over matched T-
maturity treasury, the spread between retail Jumbo non-insured time deposits (> lOOK) 
over matched maturity treasury and the matched maturity spread between the insured 
and non-insured time deposits, respectively. The regression equation (2.13) above tests 
the following thought experiment. Banks that rely more on insured deposits should be 
the ones that respond the most to aggregate shocks to the convenience yield coming from 
changes in the supply of government debt of maturity less than one year. The regression 
interacts the lagged share of insured time deposits in total time deposits ~ t - 1 with the 
log-linearized aggregate convenience yield of riskless debt. I proxy the convenience yield 
defined as v'(e'[ + "'ef; St) with the debt-to-gdp ratio computed as the face value of pri-
vately held government debt f, the share of government debt of remaining maturity of 
less than one year G'(- 1yr as well as a change in the risk-aversion of investors proxied by 
the spread on non-financial commercial paper N FC P Sprt· The latter has been used in 
empirical studies of Pennacchi [2006] and Gatev and Strahan [2006]. Finally, X i,t-1 is the 
same set of control variables used in the regression of Table (2.6) most importantly the 
probability of default and { o:i,r, 5t,r} is the set of bank and time fixed effects, respectively. 
Banks that rely more on insured deposits should be banks that face a higher aver-
age relative cost for non-insured sources of funding. One possible reason could be that 
these banks operate in markets with higher demand for deposits due to the demographic 
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characteristics of the market. 18 
As documented in figure (2.9) banks across different size classes exhibit significant 
cross-sectional dispersion in their share of insured sources of funding which allows me to 
identify a heterogeneous response using the share as a state variable for the bank which 
cannot be changed contemporaneously albeit pricing of deposits can. Thus I can capture 
the price response of individual banks to changes in the convenience yield driven by supply 
shocks of public debt . 
The regressions include a full set of bank and time fixed effects. The bank fixed effects 
take out any time invariant bank characteristic that I do not control for. The time fixed 
effects control for the observed secular trends in the substitution across the two types of 
debt as shown in figure 2.10 as well as macroeconomic conditions other than the level and 
maturity composition of government debt. The interpretation that I give to the regression 
is that it is a cross-sectional regression. A bank is sampled randomly and its only defining 
characteristic is its share of insured deposits. Subjected to a shock to the convenience 
yield banks with different shares of insured deposits should exhibit different behavior. In 
particular, the hypothesis is that banks that rely more on insured deposits would be the 
ones that respond more to changes in the convenience yield by paying a larger yield on 
their insured deposits relative to banks that rely less. 
The second set of regressions I perform are based on the quantity response of banks to 
18Becker [2007] uses the share of the population of age 65 and above as an instrument for the supply of 
deposits in local deposits markets. I have also instrumented the share of insured time deposits using this 
instrument as well as variables such as the average income and the population size of the average market 
each bank faces . This first stage regression, however , did not produce a high enough explanatory power 
and significance of the instruments. 
113 
aggregate shocks to the convenience yield. 
LH i ,t+k = (i'o,T + i'l ,TlnG/Yt + i'2 ,TlnG~lyr + i'3,TlnNFCPSprt) x S i i,t + 
+~' xi,t + ai,T + Jt ,T + Ei,T,t 
(2.14) 
The regression equation (2.14) examines the impact of the variation in the convenience 
yield due to changes in government debt for the future choices of funding across insured 
and non-insured deposits as well as its impact on the growth in total assets and loans at 
the individual bank level. The set of left-hand side variables Yi,t+k,f includes the growth 
in insured deposits (b.D), the growth in non-insured time deposits (b.B), the growth in 
total assets (b.A) and the growth in total loans (ilL) over a horizon of k p eriods. 
In a Modigliani-Miller world changes in the composition of financing would not impact 
the size of the balance sheet of banks. In a world with financial constraints, however, 
some banks are more likely to find it hard to substitute from insured sources into non-
insured. If the share of insured deposits defines a proxy for this relative cost, then the 
hypothesis I test with the regression equation (2.14) is that banks that have higher share 
of insured deposits should be the ones that would reduce by more their borrowing from 
insured deposits and will ultimately shrink in size as the reduction in insured deposits 
cannot be compensated by borrowing from non-insured sources. I further split t he samp~e 
of banks into the three size categories defined above and run the regression on each size 
group separately. 
The hypothesis is that smaller banks will be more responsive to increases in government 
debt as these set of banks are more likely to be financial constrained and face a steeper 
cost of accessing the market for non-insured funds. 
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2.6.4 Panel regression results 
The results from the two sets of regressions are presented in the tables below. Table (2.7) 
shows the results of the spreads regressions for the three spreads. The first panel presents 
the estimates for the spread of the insured CDs over matched maturity treasury. Both 
the level of government debt and its share of maturity less than one year have statistically 
significant effect on the spread. A higher share of short-term government debt increases 
the spread on insured deposits. If we take a bank that has a share of insured time deposits 
of 1/ 2 an increase in the share of short term government debt from 30 % to 40% of total 
debt would lead to 4 bp increase in the spread on insured time deposits for this bank. 
The coefficient is almost uniform across the different maturities. Surprisingly, the impact 
of the level of government debt is significant only for the long maturities and comes with 
a negative sign. Similar pattern is observed for the non-insured JCD presented in the 
middle panel of the table. However, now the share of short term government debt impacts 
only the long maturity CD spreads. The sign of the coefficient is negative on the level 
of government debt as with the insured spread. Finally, looking at the bottom panel the 
convenience yield does not impact the spread between the non-insured and the insured 
CDs. This regression shows that the relative convenience yield was present in both small 
and large denomination CDs. Forming the spread between the two, therefore, differences 
out the convenience yield. This is confirmed in the bottom panel where the convenience 
yield doesn 't impact the spread between non-insured and insured deposits. 
The results from the quantity regressions are presented in Table (2.8) for the small 
and medium sized banks and Table (2 .9) for the largest banks. The top panel of Table 
(2.8) presents the response of the group of smallest banks in the sample. Given a share of 
insured deposits , an increase in the amount of short term government debt reduces the size 
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of the balance sheet by crowding out non-insured deposits. Similarly, higher debt-to-gdp 
shrinks the total size of the banks ' balance sheet and crowds out non-insured deposits. 
The reason we do not observe a reduction in insured deposits could be that the positive 
response on the spreads documented could be enough to preserve the base of insured 
deposits. An increase in debt-to-gdp seems to lead to an increase in the size of the total 
loans. However, since the total size of the balance sheet is reduced, the growth in loans 
must have been financed by reduction in the amount of liquid assets. During this period 
small banks had higher share of liquid assets as compared to large banks which served as 
a buffer stock. 
Examining the response of the medium size banks in the bottom panel of Table (2.8), 
one observes the same pattern. Higher share of short term government debt reduces the 
size of the balance sheet and crowds out non-insured deposits. The mean effect is larger 
than the one observed for smaller banks. Higher level of government debt as measured by 
the debt-to-gdp has positive effect on insured deposits, albeit being marginally significant. 
Finally, the response of large banks is presented in Table (2.9). Increases in the share of 
short term government debt has a stronger contractionary effect on the balance sheets of 
the largest banks as compared to the smaller size groups. This contrasts with findings 
of Kashyap and Stein [2000] who document that the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission is evident mostly in smaller banks. 
116 
Table 2.7: Regression: Impact of the convenience yield on CD spreads 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Insured CDs - Treas 3-mo 6-mo 12-mo 36-mo 60-mo 
L.Share insured time deposits ('y _ 0) 0.656 0.511 0.217 0.388 -0.0431 
(1.62) (1.55) (0.77) (1.10) ( -0.10) 
L.Share insured X Jn(Share gov.debt < 1yr) ('y_1) 0.753* 0. 771 ** 0.676** 0.877** 0.661 * 
(2.55) (3.16) (3 .09) (3.29) (2.03) 
L.Share insured X In( debt-gdp) ('y _ 2) -0.0583 -0.0969 -0.234* -0.355 -0.735** 
(-0 .42) ( -0.80) (-2.12) (-1.89) (-2.95) 
L.Share insured x Non-fin .comm.spr.3-mo ('y _ 3) -0.189 0.0201 0.0997 0.107 -0.0402 
(-1.89) (0.24) (1.15) (0.74) (-0.22) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 11619 8913 
R 2 within 0.872 0.859 0.833 0.722 0.605 
R 2 between 0.653 0.590 0.536 0.198 0.000409 
R 2 overall 0.812 0.780 0.734 0.549 0.319 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Non-insured JCDs- Treas 3-mo 6-mo 12-mo 36-mo 60-mo 
L.Share insured time deposits ('y _ 0) -0.0812 0.00372 -0.0432 0.282 -0.131 
(-0.15) (0.01) (-0.13) (0.77) (-0.29) 
L.Share insured X Jn (Share gov.debt < 1yr) ('y _1 ) 0.328 0.463 0.444 0.828** 0.769* 
(0.86) (1.61) (1.81) (3.10) (2.23) 
L.Share insured x In( debt-gdp) ('y _ 2) -0.197 -0.182 -0.223 -0.462* -0.944*** 
(-1.10) (-1.23) (-1.73) ( -2.38) (-3.51) 
L.Share insured x Non-fin.comm.spr.3-mo ('y _ 3) -0.221 * -0.0417 0.0512 -0.0329 -0.155 
(-2 .07) (-0.46) (0.57) (-0.22) (-0.74) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 11619 8913 
R 2 within 0.815 0.821 0.799 0.696 0.579 
R 2 between 0.567 0.536 0.519 0.212 0.00139 
R 2 overall 0.750 0.743 0.715 0.539 0.309 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Non-insured JCD- Insured CD 3-mo 6-mo 12-mo 36-mo 60-mo 
L .Share insured time deposits ('y _ 0) -0. 737* -0.507* -0.260 -0.106 -0.0879 
(-2.14) ( -2.06) (-1.28) (-0.49) ( -0.33) 
L.Share insured X Non-fin.comm.spr.3-mo ('y _ 3) -0.0312 -0.0619 -0.0485 -0.140 -0.115 
(-0.52) ( -1.26) (-0.98) (-1.93) ( -1.28) 
L.Share insured X ln(Share gov.debt < 1yr) (!' _ 1) -0.426 -0.308 -0.232 -0.0485 0.107 
(-1. 77) ( -1. 77) (-1.55) (-0.31) (0. 73) 
L.Share insured X Jn(debt-gdp) (1'_2) -0.139 -0.0851 0.0113 -0.107 -0.209 
(-1.30) (-1.08) (0.15) (-0.99) (-1.19) 
Observations 18950 21530 21745 11619 8913 
R 2 within 0.141 0.0880 0.0578 0.0375 0.0436 
R 2 between 0.0497 0.0379 0.0153 0.0000834 0.000664 
R 2 overall 0.109 0.0604 0.0266 0.0111 0.0193 
Number groups 1232 1352 1355 1047 869 
NOTE: The regression includes a full set of bank and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the level of the bank. The regression includes the same set of variables as in Table (2.6) as controls 
but not reported to save on space. Sample period 1997:Ql-2007:Q4 
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Table 2.8: T he impact of t he convenience yield on balance sheets by asset s1ze 
Small b a nks - b ottom 75 p ercentile of assets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ll.ln D i, t ± l 6-lnBi, t±I 6-LnLi. t±I Ll.lnA ; tj;.l 
L Share m sured time d e pos1ts ( "Y 0) -0 .0561 -0 .312* 0 .157 * -0 .261 ~ 
(-0 .70) (-2 .11) (2.25) (-4 .41) 
L .Sh a re ins ured X ln (S hare gov.debt < 1yr) (-y_1) 0 .0173 - 0.254 "'** -0 .0144 -0 .0776** 
(0.46) (- 3 .70) (-0.43) (- 2.80) 
L .S h are insured X ln (debt-gdp) (-y 2) 0.0119 - 0.269*** 0 .122*** -0 .138"'** 
(0.29) (- 3.70) (3. 39) (- 4.66) 
L .S hare insured X Non-fin comm spr 3-mo (-y 3) 0 .0145 -0.0249 0 .00945 0 .0258* 
(0.96) (- 0.96) (0 .75) (2. 16) 
L.defa ul t -0.00106 -0.00276** -0 .00212 ... -0 .00367*** 
(1.95) (2.85) (4.04) (8.8 2) 
L .R eturn on assets 0 .511*** 1.499 ... 0.417* 0 .754*** 
(3 .39) (6.26) (2.57) (6. 20) 
L .Commitment lending 0 .0514*** 0 .0695 *** 0 .408*** 0 .0533 *** 
(6. 02 ) (4.53) (29.55) (6.5 9) 
L .S ize (assets) - 9 16.5*** -805.4 ••• -631.9*** -1449.6*** 
(-9 .58) (-4.86) (-6 .63) (-15.60 ) 
Observations 822 71 77660 82639 82697 
R 2 within 0 .0604 0.0431 0 .108 0.0369 
R 2 between 0 .00993 0.00394 0.0250 0 .0221 
R 2 overall 0 .0260 0.00499 0 .0408 0.000307 
Numbe r groups 3729 3731 3733 3734 
M edium banks - 75- 99 p erce ntile of asset s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C::..l n D i. t±I C::..lnBi.t±I Ll.lnLi,t±1 C::..lnAi. t±l 
L .Share ins ured t ime d e posits (-y 0) 0 .200 -0 .219 -0 .124 -0 .3 15 .. 
(1.23 ) (-0.99) (-0 .87 ) (-2.76) 
L Share m s ured X ln (Share gov debt < 1yr) (-y 1) 0 .0165 - 0 .296"' * -0 .104 -0 .187*** 
(0 .20 ) (-2.62) (-1.52 ) (-3.30) 
L .Share ins ured X ln (debt-gdp) h 2) 0 .195. -0.0363 - 0.0117 -0.0935 
(2.39) (- 0.35 ) (-0 .17) (-1.74) 
L .S hare ins ured X Non-fin comm spr 3-mo (I' 3) - 0 .0124 0.0662 0 .0144 -0 .00626 
(-0 .40) (1.59) (0 .74) (-0 .3 1) 
L .defa ult -0 .00112 -0 .00233 -0 .00232* -0 .00370 "'"'"' 
(0 .78) (1.44) (1 .98) (3 .75) 
L .Return on assets 0 .959 1.757 0 .373 0 .707 
(1. 80 ) ( 1.77) (1.14) (1.46) 
L .Commitment lending 0.0483* 0 .125 *"'* 0 .299 "'*"' 0 .0950* *• 
(2 .19) (4.54) (14 .07) (6. 69) 
L .S ize (asset s) - 51.41"'*"' -44 .02 -30 .22 -40 .80* 
(-3. 70) (-1.49) (- 1.81) (-2.42) 
Observations 26469 25021 265 58 26623 
R 2 within 0 .0673 0.0378 0 .0443 0.0185 
R 2 betwee n 0.0273 0.00135 0 .002 59 0.0194 
R 2 ove r a ll 0 .0386 0 .0107 0 .0121 0 .0000659 
N umber groups 1394 139 1 1395 1395 
NOTE: The regression includes a fu ll set of bank and t ime fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at t he level of the bank. Sample period 1997:Ql-2007:Q4 
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Table 2.9: The impact of the convenience yield on balance sheets by asset size 
Large banks - top 99 percentile of assets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ll.lnD ;, t ± l ~lnB i 1 t± l ll.lnL;,t;,f:l ll.lnA; t;tl 
L .Sh a re insured time dep osits (-y 0 ) 0 .86 8 0.514 -1.497 - 1.385 
- (1.10) (0 .52) (-2.04 ) (-2 .25 ) 
L S h a re m s ured X ln (S h a r e gov debt < 1y r ) (-y 1 ) 0 .489 -0 .364 -1.312* -1.077 ** 
(0 .87 ) (-0 .56) (-2 .53) (-2 .89 ) 
L. Sh are insured X ln (d e b t -gdp) (-y _2 ) 0 .363 0 .533 -0 .183 -0 .213 
(1 .3 7) (1.38) (-0.76) (-0 .84) 
L Sha re m sured X Non-fin comm s pr 3-mo (r 3) -0 .03 77 -0.0114 -0 .297 -0 .18 2 
(-0 .22 ) (-0.04) (-1. 78) (-1.34) 
L .d e fa ult 0 .00273 0 .028 1* -0 .0243 -0 .0119 
(-0 .24 ) (- 2 .22 ) (1.99) ( 1.30) 
L .R eturn on asset s -0 .36 1 7 .241 7.455* 5. 279 
(-0 .10) (1. 85) (2.19) (1.26) 
L .Commit ment le ndi_n g 0 .168 0 .0861 -0 .0825 -0 .0 85 8 
(1.38) (0 .64 ) (-1.03) (-1.00) 
L .Size (asset s) -0 .6 88 -0 .436 -0 .836 -1.148 
(-0 .87 ) (-0 .57) (-1.65 ) (- 1.88) 
Observa tio ns 670 538 678 674 
R 2 within 0 .254 0 .121 0.111 0 .0886 
R 2 b e tween 0 .0261 0 .000348 0.0296 0 .00150 
R 2 ove r a ll 0 .101 0 .0679 0 .0402 0 .00741 
N umber g roups 39 38 37 3 7 
t stat1st1cs m parentheses 
• p < 0.05 , •• p < 0.01 , ... p < 0.001 
NOTE : The regression includes a full set of bank and time fixed effects . Standard errors are clustered 
at the level of the bank. Sample period 1997:Ql-2007:Q4 
The results from this section corroborate the hypothesis that changes in the level 
and maturity structure of government debt have sizeable effect on the banks' balance 
sheets. The response of the private sector as represented by the FDIC insured commer-
cial banking industry is more involved than the aggregate correlations documented in the 
previous section. The banking sector through the system of explicit and implicit govern-
ment guarantees is able to effectively compete with government debt . Over the sample 
period examined, the banking sector has provided safe debt at much lower yield than the 
corresponding government debt which determined a negative spread between CDs and 
matched maturity treasuries. The results of the two set of regressions confirm that banks 
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did respond differentially to changes in the aggregate convenience of safe debt induced by 
changes in the level and maturity structure of government debt . Banks that had higher 
share of insured deposits were the ones that reduced their balance sheets the most to in-
creases in government debt and this effect was present in both small and large banks. The 
micro7level price response was consistent with the aggregate convenience yield hypothesis 
of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012]. However, the quantity response was not . 
The hypothesis predicted that by changing the relative cost of funds across safe and risky 
debt, the banking sector would have substituted away from safe debt into risky. The panel 
regression analysis was not able to find such effects. 
The results from these regressions, however, have to be taken with caution. I have 
not been able to provide a convincing theoretical and empirical explanation for why banks 
arrive at the particular capital structure in terms of the share of insured deposits . I have 
used its relative persistence to define an endogenous state variable for the regression anal-
ysis. In unreported results I tried instrumenting this share with a set of instruments using 
the insight of Becker [2007]. Since banks operate in distinct geographic markets , they 
face different deposit demand conditions from the local households and businesses. Becker 
[2007] claims that the share of seniors in a geographic area is a good exogenous instrument 
for these demand conditions. However, as he documents the geographic segmentation of 
deposit markets has been less pertinent over the past decade with the arrival of national 
banks and could be a reason why I do not find such a strong correlation to be used as an 
instrument. 
What I claim we have learned from this analysis relies on the use of the panel data. 
The cross-sectional and time-series dimension allowed me to take out the common macro-
economic variation with the fixed effects and examine only the role of tlle interaction 
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terms. All previous studies relied on aggregate data and were not able to potentially 
control for an omitted common factor that could influence both the level and maturity of 
government debt and the pricing of risky debt. Largely, however, t he remaining challenge 
for the literature is to build t he necessary theory to guide the empirical analysis. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
Using a novel dat aset of the yields posted on insured and non-insured time deposits by 
t he commercial banks in t he US over the period 1997-2011 , I have documented a large 
relative convenience yield of certificates of deposits over treasuries. The convenience yield 
is measured as the spread between the yield on CD and matched maturity Treasury. This 
spread is on average negative and exhibits large time variation as well as large time varying 
cross-sectional dispersion. These facts point to an inherent convenience of bank deposits 
over a similar default risk-free investment such as a Treasury bond of matched maturity. 
Moreover, t he time variation in the convenience yield of insured deposits and non-insured 
deposits is related to the level and maturity composition of government debt. 
To the extent that these are ret ail markets segmented from the rest of the asset markets 
in the economy, the effect that I identify is coming from the role of the banking system as 
a provider of default-risk free assets to the household and firm sectors. This role comes 
from the explicit government insurance on deposits and from an underlying strong prefer-
ence for safety and liquidity from the investors in these markets . Shortage of government 
debt translat es into larger negative spread and larger convenience yield of certificates of 
deposits as t he banking system monopoly power at providing quasi-government debt in-
creases. Conversely, increases in government debt and shortening of its mat urity reduce 
the ability of the banking system to attract safe debt . I have also documented that most 
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of the convenience of safe debt is concentrated in maturities below one year. As a result, 
the changes of the maturity structure of government have an independent effect from the 
changes in the level of government debt. 
To identify the impact of shocks to government debt on the convenience yield of de-
posits , I have examined the behavior of the banking system in t erms of its response to 
shocks to the level and the maturity structure of government debt . I have explored the 
heterogeneity of the capital structures of banks in terms of the share of insured deposits 
in their total time deposits. Banks that have more insured deposits in their total funding 
are more exposed to time variation in the convenience yield caused by variation in the 
aggregate supply of public debt. As a result these banks were responding more elastically 
to changes in the aggregate supply of government debt. Higher volumes of government 
debt led to a crowding out of deposits and had strong negative impact on the size of banks ' 
balance sheets. It is also important to emphasize that time deposits are no longer subject 
to reserve requirements and are thus not under the full control of monetary policy. As a 
result , what I am identifying is a form of a risk-based channel of transmission 19 of the 
joint monetary and fiscal policy through the size and maturity composition of public debt, 
rather than the levels of interest rates themselves. 
The importance of the empirical findings bear to a large literature that has documented 
the impact of government debt on asset prices and allocations . The large impact of the 
level of government debt on the size of the banks balance sheet and their relative capital 
structure in terms of insured and non-insured deposits poses the question on what is the 
impact of government debt on the banking industry as a whole both in the short-run and 
in the long run. In order to examine this question Yankov [2011] builds a structural model 
19See Atkeson and Kehoe [2008] for the link between monetary policy and risk premia in asset prices 
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of bank capital structure with customer bases of depositors and examines the implication 
of government debt for the industry dynamics. The unprecedented high levels of govern-
ment debt as well as the unconventional monetary policy experiments over the past years 
have raised questions about how to measure the long-run impact of government debt on 
the financial industry. The crowding-out effect that I have documented for the banking 
industry has persistent effects on the ability of the banking industry to raise funds and 
extend loans. Using a structural model, I perform counterfactual analysis on the impact 
of a higher government debt on the industry dynamics. 
The results from this paper also cast a warning to the previous literature which has ex-
amined the effect of changes in government debt on the cost of funds for the non-financial 
industry (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012]). The main message from the 
analysis is that higher levels of government debt by satiating the demand for safe assets 
also reduce the cost of funds for the non-financial sector. However , this analysis takes only 
a partial view of the financial system. Higher levels of debt crowd out the quantities of 
privately created safe debt which I have documented for the commercial banking industry 
in terms of the amount of insured deposits . Since the crowding out effect requires banks 
to substitute into borrowing from riskier types of debt , some banks reduce their size and 
cut down on lending to bank dependent borrowers . Understanding the exact mechanisms 
behind the stable share of safe assets and the nature of the competition for supplying safe 
assets is of paramount importance for designing future policy rules which aim at altering 
the maturity composition of government debt. 
I have examined the interplay of government debt and private money creation for a 
country without default risk on government debt such as the U.S. If government debt 
is subject to default risk, then the credibility of deposit insurance is just as good as the 
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default risk of government debt itself. Higher level of government debt or shorter maturity 
financing increase the default and roll-over risk of public debt and have perverse effects on 
the credibility of deposit insurance and implicit government guarantees. In such instances 
the banking industry is subject to time-variation in the perception of the safety of both 
insured and non-insured deposits. Such interaction has been observed in the recent Euro-
pean Union debt crisis , where the high risk of default on Greek sovereign debt lead to large 
deposit withdrawals from the Greek banking system. It is , therefore , of great importance 
to extend the analysis to cases where there is the possibility for default on the government 
debt as the recent experience of countries in the European Union provides. 
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Appendices 
2.A Safe asset definitions 
The construction of the safe share in Figure (2.2) follows the definitions by Gorton et al. 
[2012] . 
Table 2.A: Financial sector 
Flow of Funds code Definition 
FL 794190005 Financial business; total liabilities 
FL 794110005 Financial business ; net interbank transactions; liability 
FL 793120005 Financial business; checkable deposits and currency; liability 
FL 793130005 Financial business; total time and savings deposits; liability 
FL 794104005 Financial business ; credit market instruments; liability 
FL 793169100 Financial business; commercial paper ; liability 
FL 792150005 Financial business ; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; liability 
FL 793163005 Financial business; corporate and foreign bonds; liability 
FL 793178005 Financial business; taxes payable; liability 
FL 793190005 Financial business ; total miscellaneous liabilities 
FL793169005 Financial business; other loans and advances; liability 
FL634090005 Money market mutual funds ; total financial assets 
FL663170003 Security brokers and dealers; trade payables; liability 
FL663167005 Security brokers and dealers; security credit; liability 
FL 723169103 U.S. commercial banks; asset-backed commercial paper; liability 
FL733169103 Bank holding companies; commercial paper ; liability 
FL673169105 Issuers of asset-backed securities; commercial paper, liability 
FL613169100 Finance companies; commercial paper; liability 
FL503169105 Funding corporations; commercial paper ; liability 
FL 783169605 Private depository institutions and money market mutual funds 
FL423161705 GSE and federally related mortgage pools ; liability 
FL403161785 GSE: other GSE issues ; liability 
FL403161795 GSE: securitized GSE issues; liability 
FL413065005 Agency-and GSE-backed mortgage pools; total mortgages; asset 
FL 723163003 U.S . commercial banks; corporate and foreign bonds; liability 
FL 733163003 Bank holding companies; corporat e and foreign bonds; liability 
FL443163053 Savings institutions OTS reporters; corporate and foreign bonds; liability 
FL673163005 Issuers of asset-backed securities; corporate and foreign bonds; liability 
FL613163003 Finance companies; corporate and fore ign bonds; liability 
FL663163003 Security brokers and dealers; corporate and foreign bonds; liability 
FL503163005 Funding corporations ; corporate and foreign bonds 
FL693168005 Priv.nonbank fin . institut ions ; bank loans not elsewhere classified; liability 
FL643165005 Real est at e investment trusts; total mortgages; liability 
FL653164205 Mutual funds; mutual fund shares; liability 
FL543140003 Life insurance companies; life insurance reserves; liability 
FL153050005 Households and nonprofit organizations; pension fund reserves; asset 
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Table 2.B: Government sector 
Flow of Funds code Definition 
Federal government 
FL314190005 Total liabilities 
FL313111303 Special drawing rights (SDRs) allocations; liability 
FL 713014003 Monetary authority; SDR certificates issued by fed .government; asset 
FL313112003 Treasury currency; liability 
FL314104005 Credit market instruments; liability 
FL313161400 U.S. savings bonds; liability 
FL313161705 Budget agency securities; liability 
FL313165403 Multifamily residential mortgages; liability 
FL313170005 Trade payables; liability 
FL313140003 Life insurance reserves ; liability 
FL313190005 Total miscellaneous liabilities 
FL343150005 Federal gov. retirement funds; nonmarketable Treasury securities; asset 
FL313190015 Total misc.liab., excl. nonmarketable sec.held by fed .gov. retirement funds 
FL313193013 Liability due to FICO 
FL313131003 Postal savings system deposits ; liability 
FL313195105 Retiree health care funds ; liability 
State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds 
FL214190005 Total liabilities 
FL214104005 Credit market instruments ; liability 
FL213162005 Municipal securities and loans; liability 
FL213162400 Short-term municipal securities and loans ; liability 
FL213169203 U.S. government loans; liability 
FL213170003 Trade payables; liability 
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Chapter 3 
Credit Markert Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: 
Evidence from Corporate Bond and Stock Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
After markets for securitized credit products collapsed dramatically in the second half of 
2007, growth in a number of industrialized economies slowed markedly, suggesting that 
disruptions in financial markets can have important macroeconomic consequences. The 
fact that sharp and sudden deteriorations in financial conditions are typically followed by 
a prolonged period of economic weakness is a feature of a growing number of economic 
downturns in the U.S. and abroad. During periods of credit market turmoil, financial 
asset prices, owing to their forward-looking nature, are especially informative of linkages 
between the real and financial sides of the economy: Movements in asset prices can provide 
early-warning signals for such economic downturns and can be used to gauge the degree 
of strains in financial markets. 1 
Past research on the role of asset prices in signaling future economic conditions and 
in propagating economic fluctuations has emphasized the information content of default-
risk indicators such as corporate credit spreads-the difference in yields between various 
corporate debt instruments and government securities of comparable maturity- for the 
1This is joint work with Simon Gilchrist and Egon Zakrajsek. A version of this paper was published 
in The Journal of Monetary Economics Gilchrist et al. (2009] 
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state of the economy and risks to the economic outlook. 2 In a recent paper, Philippon 
[2009] provides a theoretical framework in which the predictive content of corporate bond 
spreads for economic activity-absent any financial frictions-reflects a general decline 
in economic fundamentals stemming from a reduction in the expected present value of 
corporate cash flows prior to a cyclical downturn. Rising credit spreads can also reflect 
disruptions in the supply of credit resulting from the worsening in the quality of corporate 
balance sheets or from the deterioration in the health of financial intermediaries that 
supply credit- the financial accelerator mechanism emphasized by Bernanke et al. [1999] . 
In this context, a contraction in credit supply causes asset values to fall , incentives to 
default to increase, and yield spreads on private debt instruments to widen before economic 
downturns, as lenders demand compensation for the expected increase in defaults. 
In terms of forecasting macroeconomic conditions , the empirical success of this vein of 
research is considerable. Nevertheless , results vary substantially across different financial 
instruments underlying the credit spreads under consideration as well as across different 
time periods . For example, the spread of yields between nonfinancial commercial paper 
and comparable-maturity Treasury bills- the so-called paper-bill spread-has lost much 
of its forecasting power since the early 1990s.3 In contrast, yield spreads based on indexes 
2 The predictive content of various corporate credit spreads for economic activity has been analyzed, 
among other , by Stock and Watson [1989] ; Friedman and Kuttner [1998] ; Duca [1999]; Emery [1999] ; 
Gertler and Lown [1999] ; Ewing et al. [2003]; Mody and Taylor [2004] ; and Mueller [2007] . In addition, 
Stock and Watson [2002b] have pointed out the ability of credit spreads to forecast economic growth using 
dynamic factor analysis, and King et al. [2007] find that corporate bond spread indexes contain important 
information about the near-term likelihood of a recession . In a related vein, an extensive empirical 
literature has emphasized the extent to which the slope of the yield curve-the so-called term spread-
provides a signal for forecasting economic growth or for assessing the near-term risk of recession; see, for 
example, Dotsey [1998], Estrella and Hardouvelis [1 991], Estrella and Mishkin [1998], and Hamilton and 
Kim [2002]. More recent work on this topic includes Ang eta!. [2006] and Wright [2006] . A comprehensive 
review of the literature on the role of asset prices in forecasting macroeconomic outcomes is provided by 
Stock and Watson [2003a]. 
3 Indeed, Thoma and Gray [1998] and Emery [1999] argue that the predictive content of the paper-bill 
spread may reflect one-time events. 
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of high-yield corporate bonds, which contain information from markets that were not in 
existence prior to the mid-1980s, have done particularly well at forecasting output growth 
during the previous decade, according to Gertler and Lown [1999] and Mody and Taylor 
[2004]. Stock and Watson [2003b], however , find mixed evidence for the high-yield spread 
as a leading indicator during this period, largely because it falsely predicted an economic 
downturn in the autumn of 1998. This dichotomy of findings is perhaps not surprising, 
because as financial markets evolve, the information content of specific financial assets 
prices may change as well. The fragility of results may also reflect the fact that this 
research has generally relied on a single credit spread index, rather than on multiple 
indexes reflecting a broad cross-section- in terms of both default risk and maturity-of 
private debt instruments. 
In addition to focusing on a single credit spread index, researchers often ignore the 
information content of other asset prices when evaluating the forecasting ability of different 
default-risk indicators. Although it is straightforward to control for the general level 
of equity prices in such analysis , it is usually not possible to obtain equity valuations 
of the borrowers whose debt securities are used to construct the credit spreads under 
consideration.4 Such information could potentially be used to distinguish movements in 
corporate credit spreads that are due to general trends in financial asset prices associated 
with a given class of borrowers from the movements in spreads that are specifically related 
to developments in credit markets. 
When assessing the information content of corporate credit spreads for economic activ-
ity, it is also important to control accurately for the maturity structure of the underlying 
4 Fama [1981], Harvey [1989], Stock and Watson [1989], and Estrella and Mishkin [1998] examine the 
predictive content of various stock price indexes for economic activity and compare it to other financial 
and nonfinancial indicators. 
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credit instruments. The widely used paper-bill spreads, for example, are based on short 
maturity instruments-typically between one and six months- whereas the specific matu-
rity structure of corporate bond spread indexes such as the high-yield spread or Baa-Aaa 
spread- though much longer- is not generally known. In general, short-term credit in-
struments reflect near-term default risk, whereas longer-maturity instruments are likely 
better at capturing expectations about future economic conditions one to two years ahead, 
a forecast horizon typically associated with business cycle fluctuations . Thus, a correct 
assessment of the ability of credit spreads to forecast at business cycle frequencies likely 
requires careful attention to the maturity structure of securities used to construct credit 
spreads. 
This paper considers credit spreads constructed directly from monthly data on prices 
of senior unsecured corporate debt traded in the secondary market over the 1990- 2008 
period, issued by about 900 U.S. nonfinancial corporations. In contrast to many other 
corporate financial instruments , long-term senior unsecured bonds represent a class of 
securities with a long history containing a number of business cycles , an attribute that 
is most useful in the valuation process of debt instruments. In addition, the rapid pace 
of financial innovation over the past twenty years has not affected the basic structure of 
these securities. Thus, the information content of spreads constructed from yields on senior 
unsecured corporate bonds is likely to provide more consistent signals regarding economic 
outcomes relative to spreads based on securities with a shorter history or securities whose 
structure or relevant market has undergone a significant structural change. 
We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity of our data by constructing an array of 
credit-spread portfolios sorted by the issuer 's ex-ante expected probability of default and 
the bond's remaining term-to-maturity. In the construction of these "bond portfolios," we 
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rely on the monthly firm-specific expected default frequencies (EDFs) constructed by the 
Moody's/ KMV corporation. Because they are based on observable information in equity 
markets, EDFs provide a more timely and potentially more objective assessment of credit 
risk compared with the issuer's credit rating. Importantly, by building bond portfolios 
from the "ground up ," we can also construct portfolios of stock returns- sorted by the 
same credit-risk categories- corresponding to the firms that issued those bonds. These 
matched portfolios of stock returns, in turn, serve as controls for news about firms' future 
earnings as these corporate borrowers experience shocks to their creditworthiness . 
Two empirical methods are employed to assess the role of credit market factors in eco-
nomic fluctuations. First, the analysis documents the predictive content of corporate bond 
spreads in our credit-risk portfolios for measures of economic activity such as the growth 
of nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production, and we compare the forecasting 
power of credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios to that of other default-risk indi-
cators emphasized in the literature. The results show that at shorter forecast horizons, the 
information content of credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios for these monthly 
measures of economic activity is comparable to that of standard credit spread indexes. 
At longer forecast horizons , however, our portfolios of credit spreads outperform-both 
in-sample and out-of-sample-standard default-risk indicators by almost a factor of two. 
The results from these forecasting exercises indicate t hat the predictive power of corpo-
rate bond spreads comes from the middle of the credit-quality spectrum, a result also 
documented by Mueller [2007] who examines the predictive content of corporate bond 
spread indexes across different rating categories. Our results also indicate that at longer 
forecasting horizons, the predictive power of corporate bond spreads is concentrated at 
long maturities. At these forecasting horizons, the predictive content of publicly-available 
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long maturity investment-grade corporate bond spread indexes-such as those rated be-
tween BBB and AA-is comparable to that of our low-risk long maturity EDF portfolios. 
All told, these results imply that the forecasting ability of credit spreads is well captured 
by a single index that measures credit spreads of long maturity bonds issued by firms with 
low to medium probability of default. 
The second empirical approach assesses the impact on the macroeconomy of move-
ments in credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios within a structural factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) framework proposed by Bernanke and Boivin 
[2003], Bernanke et al. [2005], and Stock and Watson [2005], an approach particularly 
well-suited to our case given the large number of variables under consideration. Within 
the FAVAR framework, we identify credit market shocks from the corporate bond spreads 
that are orthogonal to general measures of economic activity, inflation, real interest rates, 
and various financial indicators , as well as to equity returns of firms whose outstand-
ing bonds were used to construct credit spreads in our EDF-based portfolios . According 
to the results from our FAVAR analysis, an unanticipated worsening of business credit 
conditions-identified through the widening of corporate bond spreads that is orthogonal 
to other contemporaneous information- predicts substantial and long-lasting declines in 
economic activity. The decomposition of the forecast error variance implies that these 
credit market shocks account, on ,average, for more than 30 percent of the variation in 
economic activity (as measured by indust rial production) at t he two- to four-year horizon. 
We also find that incorporating information from the stock market does not alter any of 
our conclusions. Thus to the extent that equity returns capture news about firms ' fut ure 
earnings, our FAVAR specification identifies shocks to credit spreads that are orthogonal 
to such news and hence are specific to events that lead to disruptions in the corporate 
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bond market.5 Overall, our results suggest that disturbances specific to credit markets 
account for a substantial fraction of the volatility in U.S. economic activity during the 
1990- 2008 period. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the characteris-
tics of our underlying security-level data, the construction of portfolios based on expected 
default risk, and presents the key summary statistics of and statistical relationships be-
tween our EDF-based financial indicators. Section 3 presents our forecasting exercises. 
Section 4 contains results of our FAVAR analysis . Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 Data description 
The key information for our analysis comes from a large sample of fixed income securi-
ties issued by U.S. nonfinancial corporations. Specifically, for a sample of 899 publicly-
traded firms covered by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), month-end 
secondary market prices of their outstanding long-term corporate bonds were drawn from 
the Lehman/ Warga (LW) and Merrill Lynch (ML) databases. These two data sources 
include secondary market prices for a significant fraction of dollar-denominated bonds 
publicly issued in the U.S. corporate cash market. The ML database is a proprietary data 
source of daily bond prices that starts in 1997. Focused on the most liquid securities in 
the secondary market , bonds in the ML database must have a remaining term-to-maturity 
of at least two years, a fixed coupon schedule, and a minimum amount outstanding of 
$100 million for below investment-grade and $150 million for investment-grade issuers. By 
5By examining the joint behavior of stock prices and TFP, Beaudry and Portier (2006}, identify a 
component in stock returns that captures news about future permanent changes in TFP ; moreover , they 
show that movements in this component explains a significant portion of U.S . business cycle fluctuations . 
Jermann and Quadrini (2007] develop a theoretical framework in which news about future technological 
opportunities raises firms' current equity valuations , which relax credit constraints, thereby boosting 
current investment and output. 
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contrast, the LW database of month-end bond prices has a somewhat broader coverage 
and is available from 1973 through mid-1998 (see Warga [1991] for details). 
To ensure that the bonds yields used to construct portfolios are obtained from com-
parable securit ies, the analysis is restricted to senior unsecured issues only. For such 
securities with market prices in both the LW and LM databases, option-adjusted effective 
yields at month-end-a component of t he bond 's yield that is not attributable to embed-
ded options-are spliced across t he two data sources. To calculate the credit spread at 
each point in time, the resulting yield on each individual security issued by the firm is 
matched to the estimated yield on the Treasury coupon security of the same maturity. 
The month-end Treasury coupon yields were taken from the daily estimates of the U.S. 
Treasury yield curve reported in Giirkaynak et al. [2006]. To mitigate the effect of outliers, 
the analysis eliminates all observations with credit spreads smaller than 10 basis points 
and with spreads greater than 5,000 basis points; in addition, eliminated were issues with 
a par value of less than $1 million, as such small issues are likely plagued by significant 
liquidity concerns. These selection criteria yielded a sample of 5,045 individual securities, 
covering the period from January 1990 to September 2008. 
Table 3.1 contains summary statist ics for the selected characteristics of bonds in our 
sample. Note that a typical firm has only a few senior unsecured issues outstanding at any 
point in time- the median firm, for example, has two such issues trading in the secondary 
market at any given month. This distribution, however, exhibits a significant positive skew, 
as the average firm has almost six different senior unsecured bond issues trading in the 
market at a point in time. The distribution of the market values of these issues is similarly 
skewed , with t he range running from $1.1 million to nearly $6.7 billion. Not surprisingly, 
the maturity of these debt instruments is fairly long, wit h the average maturity at issue 
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Table 3.1 : Summary statistics of bond characteristics 
Bond Characteristic Mean SD Min P50 Max 
# of bonds per firm/ month 5.66 8.42 1.00 2.00 75.0 
Mkt. Value of Issue a ($mil.) 312.0 318.8 1.11 234.5 6,657 
Maturity at Issue (years) 13.7 9.3 1.0 10.0 50.0 
Term to Maturity (years) 10.8 8.67 0.01 7.54 30.0 
Duration (years) 5.95 3.27 0.00 5.40 26.4 
S&P Credit Rating D BBB1 AAA 
Coupon Rate (pet.) 7.60 2.00 0.00 7.38 15.9 
N aminal Effective Yield (pet.) 7.46 3.16 1.20 7.08 57.4 
Credit Spreadb (bps.) 192 299 10 114 4,995 
Panel Dimensions 
Obs. = 275,880 N = 5, 045 bonds 
Min. Tenure= 1 Median Tenure = 48 Max. Tenure = 224 
NOTE: Sample period: Monthly data from January 1990 to September 2008 for a 
sample of 899 nonfinancial firms. Sample statistics are based on trimmed data (see text 
for details). 
aMarket value of the outstanding issue deflated by the CPl. 
bMeasured relative to comparable maturity Treasury yield (see text for details). 
of almost 14 years; the average term-to-maturity is about 11 years. Because corporate 
bonds typically generate significant cash flow in the form of regular coupon payments , 
the effective duration is considerably shorter, averaging about 5.95 years over the sample 
period. Although our sample spans the entire spectrum of credit quality-from "single 
D" to "triple A"-the median bond/ month observation, at BBB1 , is still solidly in the 
investment-grade category. 
The coupon rate on our sample of bonds averaged 7.60 percent during the sample 
period, and the average total return, as measured by the nominal effective yield, was 
7.46 percent per annum. Reflecting the wide range of credit quality, the distribution of 
yields is quite wide, with the minimum of about 1.2 percent and the maximum of more 
than 57 percent. Relative to lieasuries, an average bond in our sample generated a return 
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of about 192 basis points above the comparable-maturity risk-free rate, with a standard 
deviation of 299 basis points. 
A portion of observed credit spreads reflects compensation demanded by investors for 
bearing the risk that a firm who issued the bonds will default on its payment obligations. 
To measures this firm-specific likelihood of default at each point in time, we employ a 
monthly indicator that is widely used by financial market participants- the "Expected 
Default Frequency" (EDF). This measure of default risk is constructed and marketed by 
the Moody 's/ KMV Corporation (MKMV). It measures the probability of default over the 
subsequent twelve-month period. The theoretical underpinnings to these probabilities of 
default are provided by the seminal work of Merton [1973 , 1974]. According to this option-
theoretic approach , the probability that a firm will default on its debt obligations at any 
point in the future is determined by three major factors: the market value of the firm 's 
assets; asset volatility; the risk-free interest rate and the firm 's leverage.6 These factors 
are combined into a single measure of default risk called distance to default, defined as 
[Mkt . Value] [Default] 
[ 
Distance ] of Assets - Point 
to Default - [Mkt. Value] x [ Asset J · 
of Assets Volatility 
Because the market value of assets and the volatility of assets are not directly observ-
able, they have to be computed in order to calculate the distance to default. Assuming 
6In t he original work of Merton (1974], the default point is equal to t he book value of liabilities. Later 
structural default models relax this assumptions and a llow for endogenous capital structure as well as 
strategic default. In these models, both the default time and default boundary are determined endoge-
nously and depend on firm-specific as well as aggregat e factors; the voluminous literature on structural 
default models is summarized by Duffie and Singleton (2003]. Recent t heoretical work has examined the 
importance of aggregate risk and different specifications of investors' preferences for generating default-risk 
premiums and matching historical credit spreads; see, for example, Chen et a!. (2009] and Chen [2010] . 
Empirically, however, MKMV has found that most defaults occur when the market value of the firm 's 
asset s drops to the value equal to the sum of the firm 's current liabilities and one-half of long-term lia-
bilities (i.e. , Default P oint= Current Liabilities+ 0.5 x Long-Term Liabilities), and the default point is 
calibrated accordingly. 
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that the firm's assets are traded, the market value of the firm's equity can be viewed as 
a call option on the firm 's assets with the strike price equal to the current book value of 
the firm 's total debt. 7 Using this insight , MKMV "backs out" the market value and the 
volatility of assets from a proprietary variant of the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing 
model, employing the observed book value of liabilities and the market value of equity as 
inputs (see Crosbie and Bohn [2003] for details). In the final step, MKMV transforms the 
distance to default into an expected probability of default- the so-called EDF- using an 
empirical distribution of actual defaults. 
3.2.1 Default-risk based portfolios 
We summarize the information contained in bond spreads and excess equity returns for 
our sample of firms by constructing portfolios based on expected default risk.8 These 
default-risk portfolios are constructed by sorting credit spreads and excess equity returns 
in month t into five quintiles based on the distribution of EDFs in month t-1. To control for 
maturity, we split each EDF-based quintile of credit spreads into four maturity categories: 
(1) short maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of less 
than (or equal) to 3 years; (2) intermediate maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the 
remaining term-to-maturity of more than 3 years but less than (or equal) 7 years; (3) long 
maturity: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more than 
7 years but less than (or equal) to 15 years; ( 4) very long maturity: credit spreads of 
bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more than 15 years. We then compute 
an arithmetic average of credit spreads in month t for each EDF / maturity portfolio and 
7The assumption that all of the firm 's assets are traded is clearly inappropriate in most cases. Never-
theless, as shown by Ericsson and Reneby (2004), this approach is still valid provided that at least one of 
the firm 's securities (e.g., equity) is traded. 
8 Excess equity returns, which include dividends and capital gains, are measured relative to the yield 
on one-month Treasury bills. 
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an arithmetic average of excess equity returns in month t for each EDF portfolio. This 
procedure yields 20 bond portfolios of credit spreads (five EDF quintiles and four maturity 
categories) and five EDF-based stock portfolios of excess equity returns. 
Table 3.2 contains summary statistics of our variables by the five EDF quintiles. The 
average expected probability of default increases in a roughly linear fashion between t he 
first and the fourth quintiles before jumping sharply for firms in the fifth quintile. Consis-
tent with the increase in the probability of default , both the average and the median credit 
spread increase monotonically across the five EDF quintiles in all four maturity categories. 
The Sharpe ratio within each maturity category is fairly constant for the portfolio of bonds 
in the first three EDF quintiles. However, the Sharpe ratio drops markedly for portfolios 
containing bonds issued by the riskiest firms. 
The bottom panel of Table 3.2 examines the time-series characteristics of monthly 
excess equity returns of firms in our five credit-risk categories. Excess return increase 
monotonically across the firs t four EDF quintiles, but the Sharpe ratios associated with 
these four stock portfolios are essentially constant . By contrast, firms in the fifth EDF 
quintile registered considerably lower returns relat ive to their less risky counterparts, with 
an average (monthly) excess return over the 1990- 2008 period of only 0.24 percent. 9 
3.3 Credit spreads and economic activity 
This section examines the predictive power of credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfo-
lios and compare their forecasting performance-both in-sample and out-of-sample-with 
several commonly used credit spread indexes . Letting yt denote a measure of economic 
9 T his paltry p erformance is especially st ark when one considers the Sharpe ratio for this cat egory 
of firms , which is considerably below that of the less risky portfolios. The finding is consistent with the 
distress risk anomaly documented by a large empirical literature that has used different measures of default 
risk ; see, for example, Griffin and Lemmon [2002] and Campbell et al. [2008] . 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of financial indicators by EDF Quintile 
Financial Indicator Quintilea Mean SD S-Rb Min P50 Max 
EDF 1 0.05 0.03 - 0.01 0.04 0.14 
EDF 2 0.12 0.09 - 0.03 0.10 0.46 
EDF 3 0.24 0.19 - 0.05 0.19 0.90 
EDF 4 0.55 0.42 - 0.08 0.38 2.07 
EDF 5 4.70 3.02 - 0.61 3.76 15.5 
Spread (under 3 yrs.) 1 0.79 0.38 2.09 0.32 0.69 2.69 
Spread (under 3 yrs.) 2 1.03 0.49 2.10 0.41 0.89 3.44 
Spread (under 3 yrs.) 3 1.21 0.55 2.22 0.50 1.09 3.30 
Spread (under 3 yrs.) 4 1.84 1.00 1.84 0.67 1.54 5.13 
Spread (under 3 yrs.) 5 5.28 3.74 1.41 1.16 3.79 22.3 
Spread (3-7 yrs.) 1 0.92 0.33 2.75 0.52 0.85 2.56 
Spread (3- 7 yrs .) 2 1.26 0.49 2.58 0.52 1.17 3.32 
Spread (3- 7 yrs.) 3 1.52 0.55 2.75 0.71 1.38 3.57 
Spread (3-7 yrs.) 4 2.20 0.93 2.37 1.15 1.91 5.05 
Spread (3-7 yrs.) 5 5.69 2.87 1.98 1.99 4.83 16.4 
Spread (7-15 yrs .) 1 0.86 0.38 2.29 0.38 0.74 2.49 
Spread (7- 15 yrs.) 2 1.15 0.51 2.27 0.49 1.04 3.04 
Spread (7- 15 yrs.) 3 1.38 0.58 2.37 0.67 1.21 3.09 
Spread (7-15 yrs.) 4 2.00 0.85 2.35 0.81 1.73 5.27 
Spread (7-15 yrs .) 5 5.20 3.24 1.61 1.59 4.19 18.8 
Spread (above 15 yrs.) 1 1.02 0.41 2.47 0.45 0.92 2.38 
Spread (above 15 yrs.) 2 1.28 0.47 2.72 0.58 1.22 3.07 
Spread (above 15 yrs. ) 3 1.45 0.56 2.60 0.55 1.32 2.91 
Spread (above 15 yrs.) 4 2.11 0.84 2.51 0.93 1.91 4.96 
Spread (above 15 yrs.) 5 3.79 2.03 1.87 1.10 3.41 12.0 
Excess Equity Return 1 0.60 3.20 0.19 -11.5 0.77 11.5 
Excess Equity Return 2 0.75 3.90 0.19 -14.5 1.03 12.5 
Excess Equity Return 3 0.80 4.28 0.19 -16.3 0.92 13.1 
Excess Equity Return 4 0.90 5.19 0.17 -19.5 1.16 15.6 
Excess Equity Return 5 0.24 7.42 0.03 -28.1 0.78 30.7 
NoTE: Sample period: Monthly data from February 1990 to September 2008. Credit spreads 
are expressed in percentage points; EDFs are expressed in percent ; and excess equity returns are 
expressed in percent. 
aThe average of financial indicators in month t in each quintile is based on the EDF distribution 
in month t- 1 (see text for details) . 
bSharpe ratio . 
activity in month t , we define 
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nhv _ 1200 l (yt+h) 
v Lt+h = -h- n T ' 
where h denotes t he forecast horizon. Nonfarm payroll employment (EMP) published 
monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Reserve's monthly index of 
industrial production (IP) are used to gauge the state of the economy. In addition, the 
analysis presents forecasting results for a broader index of economic activity that summa-
rizes the eleven indicators of economic growth employed in our FAVAR analysis. 
For our first two measures of economic activity, we estimate the following bivariate 
vector autoregression (VAR) , augmented with two sets of credit spreads: 
11 11 
f3o + L f31i V'EMP t-i + L f3zi VIP t-i + 1]~ Zu + 1J~Zzt + E1 ,t+h(3.1) 
i=O i=O 
11 11 
1o +I: / 1iVEMPt- i +I: 'Yzi V'IPt-i + e~zlt + e~zzt + Ez,t+h (3.2) 
i=O i=O 
In the VAR forecasting system given by equations 3.1-3.2, Zlt denotes a vector of standard 
credit spreads indexes; Zzt is a vector of credit spreads in the four maturity categories asso-
ciated with a particular EDF quintile; and E1,t+h and E2,t+h are t he forecast errors. 10 The 
following t hree specifications are considered: ( 1) a benchmark specification that includes 
only the vector of standard credit spread indexes Zlt; (2) an alternative specification that 
includes only the vector Z zt, elements of which correspond to credit spreads in the four 
maturity categories of an EDF quintile; and (3) a specification that includes both the 
vector of standard credit spread indexes Zlt and the vector of spreads in a particular 
10 An alternative approach to the direct h-step ahead prediction method specified in equations 3.1-3.2 
would be to specify a VAR-or some other joint one-step ahead model for employment growth, industrial 
production, and credit spreads- and then iterat e this model forward h periods. If the one-period ahead 
joint model is correctly specified, iterated forecasts are more efficient , whereas the direct h-step ahead 
forecasts are more robust to model missp ecification; see Marcellino et al. [2006] for details . 
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EDF quintile Z2t · For each specification and a forecast horizon of 3 and 12 months we , 
estimat e equations 3.1 and 3.2 by OLS. To take into account serial correlation induced 
by overlapping forecast errors, the estimated covariance matrix is computed according to 
Newey and West [1987], with the "lag truncation" parameter equal to h + 1. 
The set of standard default-risk indicators-the vector Zit-consists of four credit 
spread indexes, all of which have been used extensively to forecast real economic activ-
ity; see Stock and Watson [2003a] for a comprehensive review. Specifically, we consider: 
(1) paper-bill spread: the difference between the yield on one-month nonfinancial AA-
rated commercial paper and the yield on the constant maturity one-month Treasury bill; 
(2) Aaa corporate bond spread: the difference between the yield on an index of seasoned 
long-term Aaa-rated corporate bonds and the yield on the constant maturity ten-year 
Treasury note; (3) Baa corporate bond spread: the difference between the yield on an 
index of seasoned long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and the yield on the constant 
mat urity ten-year Treasury note; and ( 4) high-yie ld corporate bond spread: the difference 
between the yield on an index of long-term speculative-grade corporate bonds and the 
yield on the constant maturity ten-year Treasury note.l1 Note that by including a paper-
bill spread with spreads on long-term corporate bonds , our set of standard credit spread 
indexes captures the information content of default-risk indicators at both short and long 
horizons .12 
1 1 Commercial paper rates are taken from the "Commercial Paper R at es and Outstanding" Federa l 
Reserve statistical release. The source of Treasury yields and yields on Aaa- and Baa-rated corporat e bonds 
is "Select ed Interest Rates" (H.15) Federal Reserve statistical release. To construct the high-yield spread, 
we use the High-Yield Master II index, a commonly used benchmark index for long-term speculative-grade 
corporate bonds administered by Merrill Lynch. 
12 Note that we construct our standard corporate bond spread indexes using the ten-year Treasury yield . 
As emphasized by Duffee [1998), the corporate-Treasury yield spreads can be influenced significantly by 
time-varying prepayment risk premiums, reflecting the call provisions on corporate issues. According to 
Duca [1 999}, corporate bond spreads measured relative to the yield on Aaa-rated bonds are more reflective 
of default risk than those measured relative to comparable-maturity Treasuries, which makes the former 
spreads more correlated with economic downturns. For comparison, we computed the Baa and the high-
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3.3.1 In-sample predictive power of credit spreads 
This section examines the in-sample predictive power of various credit spreads for our 
two measures of economic activity. The upper panel of Table 3.3 contains the results 
of this exercise for the short-run forecast horizon (3 months), whereas the lower panel 
contains results for the long-run forecast horizon (12 months). In both cases, we report 
p-values associated with the exclusion tests on the two sets of credit spreads along with 
the explanatory power of each forecasting equation as measured by the adjusted R 2 . As 
a benchmark, the Memo item in both panels contains the in-sample fit from the VAR 
specification that excludes all credit spreads . 
When forecasting employment growth, the inclusion of credit spreads leads only to a 
modest improvement in the in-sample fit at the 3-month forecast horizon. As evidenced 
by the p-values reported in the upper panel of Table 3.3, both the standard credit spread 
indexes and credit spreads in each EDF quintile are statistically significant predictors of 
employment growth three months ahead. Moreover, when both sets of credit spreads are 
included in the forecasting VAR, they all tend to remain statistically significant. Never-
theless, adding either set of credit spreads to the VAR results only in a relatively modest 
improvement in the explanatory power of the equation for employment growth. For exam-
ple , the specification that excludes all credit spreads yields an adjusted R 2 of 69 percent, 
only about 9 percentage points below the adjusted R 2 from a specification that includes 
standard credit spread indexes and credit spreads in the second EDF quintile. 
The inclusion of credit spreads in the equation for industrial production, in contrast, 
leads to a substantial increase in predictive accuracy at the 3-month forecast horizon. 
According to the Memo item, lags of industrial production and employment growth ex-
yield bond spread relative to the Aaa yield, and our results were virtually identical. 
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Table 3 .3: In-sample predictive content of credit spreads 
Forecast Horizon h = 3 (months) 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
Credit Spreads Pr > W1 Pr > W2 Adj . R2 Pr > W1 Pr > W2 Adj. R 2 
Standard 0.000 0.761 0.000 0.291 
EDF-Q1 0.002 0.734 0.000 0.370 
EDF-Q2 0.000 0.746 0.000 0.361 
EDF-Q3 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.337 
EDF-Q4 0.000 0.725 0.000 0.304 
EDF-Q5 0.042 0.725 0.000 0.343 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.002 0.006 0.775 0.033 0.001 0.392 
Standard & EDF-Q2 0.002 0.004 0.782 0.717 0.005 0.357 
Standard & EDF-Q3 0.006 0.007 0.780 0.017 0.000 0.371 
Standard & EDF-Q4 0.002 0.074 0.771 0.091 0.029 0.322 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.000 0.016 0.781 0.004 0.000 0.377 
Memo: None 0.695 0.169 
Forecast Horizon h = 12 (months) 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
Credit Spreads Pr > W1 Pr > W2 Adj. R2 Pr > W1 Pr > W2 Adj. R 2 
Standard 0.003 0.665 0.109 0.200 
EDF-Q1 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.563 
EDF-Q2 0.000 0.759 0.000 0.641 
EDF-Q3 0.000 0.739 0.000 0.528 
EDF-Q4 0.000 0.704 0.000 0.439 
EDF-Q5 0.000 0.685 0.000 0.420 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.000 0.000 0.809 0.297 0.000 0.585 
Standard & EDF -Q2 0.016 0.000 0.817 0.128 0.000 0.677 
Standard & EDF-Q3 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.000 0.000 0.645 
Standard & EDF-Q4 0.000 0.000 0.795 0.021 0.000 0.552 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.000 0.000 0.791 0.015 0.000 0.499 
Memo: None 0.537 0.042 
NOTE: Sample period: Monthly data from February 1990 to September 2008. Dependent variables in 
the VAR specification are \!hEMP t+h and VhJp t+h, where h is the forecast horizon. Each VAR specification 
also includes a constant , current , and 11 lags of VEMPt and VIPt (see text for details). Pr > W1 denotes 
the p-value for the robust Wald test of the null hypothesis that coefficients on standard credit spread indexes 
are jointly equal to zero; Pr > W2 denotes the p-value for the robust Wald test of the null hypothesis that 
coefficients on EDF-based credit spreads in a particular quintile are jointly equal to zero. 
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plain only about 17 percent of the variation in the growth of industrial output three 
months ahead. By including standard credit spread indexes in the forecasting VAR, the 
adjusted R 2 increases to almost 30 percent. Specifications that include credit spreads in 
our EDF-based portfolios yield even greater improvements in the in-sample fit. Note also 
that the best in-sample fit comes from specifications that include credit spreads in the 
lowest two quintiles of the EDF distribution (EDF-Q1 and EDF-Q2). 
The lower panel of Table 3.3 examines the in-sample explanatory power of credit 
spreads at the 12-month horizon. At this longer horizon, the information content of credit 
spreads for both measures of economic activity is considerable. In the case of nonfarm 
payroll employment, for example, standard credit spread indexes explain 66 percent of the 
variation in the 12-month ahead growth rate, a significant increases in the goodness-of-fit 
relative to the specification that relies only on lags of employment growth and lags of the 
growth rate in industrial production. Credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios 
do even better. The information content of our default-risk indicators for the growth of 
employment is highest for the second and third EDF quintiles (EDF-Q2 and EDF-Q3) , 
with the average spreads in these two quintiles yielding adjusted R 2s of about 75 percent . 
Results are even more striking in the case of industrial production, a measure of economic 
activity for which the explanatory power of our portfolio credit spreads significantly ex-
ceeds that of standard default-risk indicators. Whereas standard credit spread indexes 
explain about 20 percent of the variation in the 12-month ahead growth of industrial pro-
duction, credit spreads associated with the first t hree EDF quintiles (EDF-Q1- EDF-Q3) 
explain over 50 percent of the variation in the 12-month ahead growth rate of industrial 
output. 
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Figure 3.1: Long maturity credit spreads and economic activity indicators 
Nonfarm payroll employment 
12- month percent change 
Monthly NBER 
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Industrial production 
Monthly 
12- month percent change 
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NOTE: The solid lines in the two panels of the figure depict the actual 12-month growth in nonfarm 
payroll employment and industrial production. The dotted lines show the fitted values from a regression 
of each variable on a 12-month lag of very long credit spreads in the second EDF quintile (EDF-Q2) . 
Shaded vertical bars correspond to NBER-dated recessions. 
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The results in Table 3.3 highlight the gains in in-sample predictive accuracy for employ-
ment and industrial output growth at longer forecast horizon obtained from conditioning 
on credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios. The results of these forecasting exer-
cises indicate that the information content of credit spreads is concentrated in the low to 
medium risk categories. As we show below, the predictive content of credit spreads is also 
concentrated at the long end of the maturity spectrum. This result is shown graphically in 
Figure 3.1 , where the two panels depict the actual12-month ahead growth of employment 
and industrial production along with their respective fitted values obtained from simple 
regressions of these two variables on the credit spreads in the very long maturity EDF-Q2 
portfolio- that is , the portfolio with the highest overall predictive content , according to 
the results in Table 3.3. Not e that these fitted values are a simple renormalization of 
the credit spread dated 12 months before the time period over which the growth in em-
ployment and industrial production was computed. Remarkably, this single credit spread 
forecasted employment growth throughout the 2001 recession and the subsequent recovery. 
It also accurately predicted the current slowdown in employment growth, which peaked in 
January 2006. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3.1, the ability of this long-horizon 
relatively low-risk credit spread to predict accurately future economic activity as measured 
by the 12-month ahead growth in industrial production is even more striking. 
3.3.2 Out-of-sample predictive power of credit spreads 
This section examines the predictive content of credit spreads for our two measures of 
economic activity using pseudo out-of-sample forecasts. Specifically, for each forecast 
horizon h, the forecasting VAR given in equations 3.1- 3.2 is estimated using all available 
data through, and including, November 1999. We then calculate the (annualized) h-month 
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ahead growth rates of nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production and the 
associated forecast errors. The forecast origin-that is , November 1999-is then updated 
with an additional month of data, the VAR parameters are re-estimated using this new 
larger observation window, and new forecasts are generated. This procedure is repeated 
through the end of the sample, thereby generating a sequence of pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasts for the two measures of economic activity. 
Tables 3.4 contains the results of this exercise. To quantify the pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasting performance of the different VAR specifications, we report the square root 
of the mean squared forecast error in annualized percentage points (RMSFE) for each 
specification. To compare the predictive accuracy of credit spreads in our EDF-based 
bond portfolios with that of standard default-risk indicators, we then compute the ratio 
of the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) of the VAR specification augmented with 
EDF-based credit spreads with the MSFE of the specification that includes only standard 
credit spread indexes ; p-values of the Diebold and Mariano [1995] test of equal predictive 
accuracy indicate whether the difference in predictive accuracy between these two non-
nested models are statistically significant. 13 
In the case of employment growth, the VAR specifications that include credit spreads 
in our EDF-based bond portfolios yield lower MSFEs at short-run forecast horizons than 
the specification augmented with standard credit spread indexes. At the 3-month fore-
cast horizon, the out-of-sample forecasting performance of credit spreads in the first three 
EDF quintiles (EDF-Q1-EDF-Q3) for employment growth exceeds that of standard credit 
spread indexes by 20 to 25 percent , and these improvements in predictive accuracy are 
13Because the data in our forecasting VAR specification are overlapping, the asymptotic (long-run) vari-
ance of the loss differential used to construct the Diebold-Mariano S-statistic allows for serial correlation 
of order h. 
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statistically significant at the 10 to 15 percent level. The out-of-sample forecasting per-
formance of credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios for the growth of industrial 
production also exceeds that of standard default-risk indicators at the 3-month forecast 
horizon, although the differences in predictive accuracy are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
The gain in out-of-sample predictive accuracy at the 12-month forecast horizon is 
especially striking, a result consistent with the in-sample analysis of the previous section. 
The predictive content of our portfolio credit spreads is again concentrated among firms in 
the first three quintiles of the EDF distribution (EDF -Q1- EDF -Q3), which yield reductions 
in the MSFEs on the order of 60 percent relative to the specification that includes the 
standard set of credit spread indexes. Moreover, these improvements in predictive accuract 
are also highly statistically significant according to the Diebold-Mariana test. 
The results reported in Table 3.4 point to significant improvements in the out-of-
sample forecasting performance of VAR specifications that rely on corporate bond spreads 
constructed from the low to middle ranges of the credit-risk distribution. To assess whether 
these improvements are due to a specific subperiod or a "one-time" event, Figure 3.2 plots 
the realized values of the 12-month growth in non-farm payroll employment and industrial 
production, along with the range of their respective out-of-sample forecasts based on the 
VAR specifications that include credit spreads in portfolios corresponding to the first three 
EDF quintiles (EDF-Q1- EDF-Q3); the dotted line in each panel depicts the average of 
these forecast. 
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Table 3.4: Out-of-sample predictive content of credit spreads 
Forecast Horizon h = 3 (months) 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
Credit Spreads RMSFE Ratio Pr > lSI RMSFE Ratio Pr >lSI 
Standard 0.947 5.211 
EDF-Q1 0.824 0.757 0.106 4.592 0.777 0.153 
EDF-Q2 0.842 0.791 0.160 4.667 0.802 0.093 
EDF-Q3 0.826 0.761 0.069 4.644 0.794 0.180 
EDF-Q4 0.946 0.999 0.996 4.647 0.795 0.219 
EDF-Q5 0.956 1.019 0.902 4.779 0.841 0.360 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.932 0.968 4.904 0.886 
Standard & EDF-Q2 0.924 0.953 5.040 0.936 
Standard & EDF -Q3 0.926 0.957 4.994 0.918 
Standard & EDF-Q4 0.951 1.010 5.397 1.073 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.922 0.948 5.226 1.006 
Memo: None 0.925 5.513 
Forecast Horizon h = 12 (months) 
Nonfarm Employment (EMP) Industrial Production (IP) 
Credit Spreads RMSFE Ratio Pr >lSI RMSFE Ratio Pr > lSI 
Standard 1.113 3.676 
EDF-Q1 0.693 0.387 0.002 2.089 0.323 0.000 
EDF-Q2 0.667 0.359 0.001 2.004 0.297 0.000 
EDF-Q3 0.740 0.442 0.000 2.279 0.384 0.000 
EDF-Q4 0.902 0.657 0.094 2.704 0.541 0.004 
EDF-Q5 0.872 0.613 0.092 2.574 0.490 0.001 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.827 0.552 2.571 0.489 
Standard & EDF-Q2 0.816 0.537 2.238 0.371 
Standard & EDF-Q3 0.814 0.535 2.376 0.418 
Standard & EDF -Q4 0.869 0.609 2.686 0.534 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.864 0.602 2.948 0.643 
Memo: None 1.115 3.882 
NoTE: Sample period : Monthly data from February 1990 to September 2008. Dependent variables in 
the V AR specification are 'ii'hEMP t+h and 'ii'hJp t+h , where h is the forecast horizon. Each VAR specification 
also includes a constant, current, and 11 lags of 'ii'EMPt and 'ii'IPt (see text for details) . "Ratio" denotes 
the ratio of the MSFE of each model relative to the MSFE of the model that includes standard credit 
spreads; Pr > lSI denotes the p-value for the Diebold and Mariano [1 995] test of the null hypothesis that 
the difference between the MSFE from the model that includes standard credit spreads and the MSFE from 
the model that includes EDF-based credit spreads is equal to zero . 
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Figure 3.2: Out-of-sample forecasts of economic activity indicators 
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NoTE: The panels of the figure depict pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of the 12-month growth in 
nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production. The solid line shows the actua l d ata; the shaded 
band shows t he range of forecasts based on VAR specifications augmented with credit spreads in t he 
first three quintiles of t he EDF distribution (EDF-Ql- EDF-Q3) ; and the dotted line shows the average 
of the three forecasts (see text for deta ils). 
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As indicated by the narrow shaded band, forecasts of employment and industrial out-
put growth based on credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios track quite well 
year-over-year growth in the actual series in both recessionary and expansionary times. 
In addition, the predictive accuracy obtained from using credit spreads in our EDF-based 
portfolios does not seem to reflect any "one-time" event or a specific subperiod. Impor-
tantly, our EDF-based forecasts capture the slowdown in economic activity associated 
with the 2001 recession as well as the subsequent recovery. These EDF-based forecasts 
also predict the slowdown in economic activity that has emerged since late 2006 with a 
high degree of accuracy. 
In light of the ongoing turmoil in financial markets, investors and policymakers are 
obviously concerned with the near-term economic outlook. Figure 3.2 also depicts the 
forecasts for these two measures of economic activity through December 2009. 14 The 
average of the three EDF-based forecasts indicates that over the 12 months ending in De-
cember 2009, U.S. nonfarm payrolls will fall about 7.5 percent , while industrial production 
is projected to drop around 20 percent, declines that are four times greater than those 
experienced during the 2001 recession. 
3.3.3 Predicting an index of economic activity 
The previous results focused on forecasting the growth employment and industrial output. 
In the FAVAR analysis below, real economic activity is summarized by a factor that relies, 
in addition to the growth in employment and industrial production, on nine additional 
macroeconomic indicators that measure economic activity. Some of these series are leading 
14The year-over-year forecasts for December 2009 are based on the realized values of the two forecast-
ing variables through December 2008, but we only use data through September 2008 to compute these 
forecasts. 
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indicators, or forward-looking variables such as new manufacturing orders, whereas other 
series such as unemployment are relatively sluggish. To assess the ability of credit spreads 
to forecast this broader set of economic indicators, we construct an index of economic 
activity, defined as the first principal component of these 11 time-series. 
Table 3.5 reports both the in-sample and out-of-sample results obtained from univariate 
forecasting specifications that include credit spread indexes along with the 12 monthly 
lags of the economic activity index. These results are very similar to those obtained using 
growth in payroll employment and industrial production: Specifications that include credit 
spreads in the lowest three EDF quintiles provide modest improvements in out-of-sample 
forecasting performance at the 3-month horizon , and quantitatively large and statistically 
significant gains-both in-sample and out-of-sample-at the 12-month horizon. 
As a final exercise, we explore the extent to which the predictive content of credit 
spreads depends on the maturity structure of the underlying securities. Because our 
credit spreads rely on proprietary measures of default risk and issue-specific bond yields, 
we are also interested in determining whether ratings-based credit spreads yield similar 
forecasting performance once one controls for maturity. These two issues are addressed 
by considering a simple in-sample forecasting exercise, in which the 12-month change in 
the index of economic activity is regressed on a 12-month lag of itself and a single credit 
spread index. We consider separately the credit spreads in our 20 bond portfolios as well 
as AA-rated and BBB-rated credit spreads for the same four maturity categories based on 
the Bloomberg Fair Value (BFV) model. 15 
15The BFV model provides daily estimates of the corporate bond yield curve utilizing prices of bonds 
with similar characteristics (i.e. , currency, market type, industry, and credit rating). For comparability 
with our bond-level data, the sample is restricted to dollar-denominated bonds issued by industrial firms. 
For this segment of the corporate bond market, zero-coupon yields for AA- and EBB-rating categories 
at the maturities of 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year , 3-year, 4-year, 5-year, 7-year, 10-year, 15-year, 
20-year, and 30-year were obtained from the Bloomberg BFV data base. These two rating categories 
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The results of this exercise, which are reported in Table 3.5, again indicate that long 
maturity low to medium risk credit spreads provide substant ial gains in predictive content 
relative to short maturity credit spreads. The adjusted R 2 's from the regressions of the 
12-month change in the economic activity index on the very long maturity credit spreads 
in the first three EDF quintiles (EDF-Q1- EDF-Q3) are about 65 percent , whereas those 
that rely on short maturity credit spreads are below 25 percent. At shorter maturities, 
the information content of credit spreads in our EDF-based portfolios exceeds that of 
t he AA- and EBB-rated counterparts. At longer maturities, the information content of 
our EDF-based credit spreads is essentially the same as that of spreads in the two rating 
categories. These findings suggest that EDF-based measures of default risk provide timely 
information that is especially useful for forecasting at shorter horizons. 
3.4 Factor-augmented VAR analysis 
This section examines the interaction between the credit spreads in our EDF-based bond 
portfolios and a wide range of measures of economic activity and inflation, the mone-
tary policy rate, yields on Treasury securities of various maturities , excess returns on the 
matched EDF-based portfolios of stocks , and other financial indicators. We use the factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) methodology proposed by Bernanke and Boivin 
[2003] and Bernanke et al. [2005] to summarize a large number of macroeconomic and fi-
nancial time series by a small number of unobservable (latent) factors . This methodology 
is then used to ident ify shocks to corporate bond spreads and trace out their dynamic 
represent t he highest and lowest ratings for which spreads at a ll maturities are available since Aprill991, 
the starting date of the Bloomberg data. Credit spreads at all maturities are computed by utilizing daily 
Treasury yields of the same maturities, derived from the estimates of the zero-coupon Treasury yield curve 
(see Giirkaynak et al. [2006]). For each rating categories, we then constructed the same four maturity 
categories as for our EDF-based portfolio and averaged the spreads in each maturity category. 
153 
effect on the macroeconomy. 
3.4.1 Specification, identification and estimation 
Let Xt, t = 1, 2, ... , T , denote a (n x 1) vector of observations on all the variables in t he 
FAVAR system in mont h t. We assume t hat Xt can be partitioned as Xt = [Xit X~tl' , 
where Xlt is the ( n 1 x 1) vector whose elements correspond to measures of economic activity 
and inflation , Treasury yields, excess equity returns , and other financial indicators, and 
elements of the (n2 x 1) vector X2t correspond to credit spreads in our EDF-based bond 
portfolios . We assume that the information in t he vector of observable variables Xt can 
be summarized by a set of latent factors denoted by the (k x 1) vector Ft , with k < n. 
The following assumption are made with regards to this latent factor structure: A subset 
of factors- denoted by the ( k1 x 1) vector F1t-spans all t he information contained in the 
observed vector Xt , whereas the remaining factors, denoted by the (k2 x 1) vector F2t, are 
specific to credit spreads in our EDF-based portfolios-the so-called credit factors. 
The relationship between the observed variables in Xt and the latent factors Ft 
[F{t F~tl' is linear and is given by t he observation equation: 
(3.3) 
where A ij , i, j = 1, 2, are conformable matrices of factor loadings, and Vt = [vit v;tl' 
denotes the ( n x 1) vector of idiosyncratic measurement errors. 16 The dynamics of the 
16 Consistent with t he assumptions underlying approximate factor models , the process for the vector 
of measurement errors V t can be weakly serially correlated and exhibit some degree of cross-sectional 
dependence (see, for example , Bai and Ng [2002]) . Because the latent factors enter equation 3.3 without 
lags, the a bove specification corresponds to the static form of a dynamic factor model. However, as 
discussed by Stock and Watson [2005], this is not a restrictive assumption , because t he static factors can, 
in principle, contain an arbitrary number of lags of some underlying dynamic factors. 
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latent factors are described by an autoregressive process of the form 
(3.4) 
where cp(L) denotes a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L of finite order p, and Et = 
[E~t E;tl' is the (k X 1) vector of reduced-form VAR disturbances with a covariance matrix 
~ = E[EtE~] ; following standard practices, we assume that the idiosyncratic measurement 
errors are uncorrelated with VAR innovations- that is , E[vitEjt] = 0, for t = 1, ... , T; 
i = 1, ... , n; and j = 1, ... , k. 
To identify the vector of credit factors F2t , we impose the following restrictions on the 
system of equation 3.3 and 3.4. First , we assume that A 12 = 0 in equation 3.3. This 
restriction on the factor loadings implies that once we have conditioned on the factors in 
Flt , the remaining information content of credit spreads in our EDF-based portfolios has 
a systematic component specific to the corporate bond market that is reflected in its own 
factor structure. Although the credit factors in F2t have no contemporaneous effect on 
the vector Xlt , they affect the factors in F1t- and, by extension, the vector of observed 
variables X1t-with a lag through the dynamics of the VAR equation 3.4. The second 
identifying assumption is that the factors in Flt and F2t are orthogonal, an assumption 
that separates the residual information content from the corporate bond market from the 
factors summarizing the state of the economy. 
A five-step estimation procedure that is computationally easy to implement and that 
imposes the specified restrictions is used to estimate and identify the credit factors. First, 
the (T x k1) matrix of factors F1 is estimated as the first k1 principle components of 
the (T X nl) data matrix xl corresponding to the vector of variables xlt. Second, each 
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column of the (T x n2) data matrix X2 corresponding to the vector of variables in X 2t-
that is , credit spreads associated with our EDF-based bond portfolios- is regressed on the 
k1 factors in F1 , withE denoting the corresponding (T x n2) matrix of OLS residuals. 
Third, the (T x k2) matrix of factors F2 is estimated as the first k2 principle components 
of the data matrix E from the second step. Fourth, factor loadings are estimated by 
regressing each column of the (T x n) data matrix X on the estimated factors F 1 and 
F2 , imposing the restriction A12 = 0 . And fifth , the VAR(p) model in equation 3.4 is 
estimated by OLS using the estimated factorsY 
Structural shocks affecting the vector of credit factors F2t are identified using the 
Cholesky decomposition of :E, the covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR distur-
bances in equation 3.4. In computing the Cholesky decomposition, the credit factors are 
ordered last , and the individual components of F2t are ordered in descending order with 
respect to their associated eigenvalues. Thus identified "credit market shocks" correspond 
to unexpected movements in corporate bond spreads that are contemporaneously uncorre-
lated with indicators of economic activity and inflation, interest rates, and other financial 
indicators as summarized by the vector of factors Ht-
As noted above, the vector X lt contains a broad set of macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables, whereas elements of the vector X2t correspond to credit spreads in our 
EDF-based bond portfolios . The variables included in Xlt can be classified into five broad 
categories: economic activity indicators , inflation indicators, risk-free interest rates, equity 
market indicators, and other financial indicators. In particular, the following 11 monthly 
indicators of economic activity are included in our FAVAR specification: (1) the difference 
17The latent factors F 1 and F 2 are estimated using asymptotic principal components, the method 
whose properties are discussed in detail by Stock and Watson [2002a) and Bai and Ng [2002). Note that 
the residuals from t he second step, by construction, orthogonal to F1 , implying that the estimated factors 
F 2 are also orthogonal to F1 . 
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of the civilian unemployment rate; (2) the log-difference of nonfarm payroll employment ; 
(3) the log-difference of industrial production index; ( 4) the difference in capacity utiliza-
tion index; (5) the log-difference of real durable goods orders ; (6) the log-difference ofreal 
nondurable good orders; (7) the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) diffusion index 
of activity in the manufacturing sector; (8) the log-difference of real personal consumpt ion 
expendit ures (retail control category); (9) the log-difference of real disposable personal 
income; (10) the log-difference of housing starts; (ll) and the log-difference of Conference 
Board's leading economic indicator index. 
Price developments are summarized by the following six inflation indicators: (1) the 
log-difference of the Consumer Price index (CPI); (2) the log-difference of the core CPI; 
(3) the log-difference of the Producer Price index (PPI); (4) the log-difference of the core 
PPI; (5) t he log-difference of the Journal of Commerce index of (spot) commodity prices; 
(6) the log-difference of the price of oil as measured by price of a barrel of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) crude. 
Our FAVAR specification also includes the entire term structure of interest rates , start-
ing at the short end with the effective federal funds rate and continuing with the constant 
maturity Treasury yields at 6-month, 1-year, 2-year , 3-year, 5-year , and 10-year horizons , 
for a total of seven interest rates. Because nominal yields exhibit a discernible downward 
trend over our sample period (1990- 2008), t hey are converted into real t erms to ensure 
their approximate stationarity. 18 
18To do so , we utilize both the rea lized inflation and survey measures of inflation expectations reported 
by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Because the SPF is conducted at a quarterly frequency, 
monthly estimates of inflation expectations are obtained from a linear interpolation of quarterly values. 
Specifically, the real federal funds rate is measured as the difference between the nominal rate and realized 
inflation, where the realized inflation is given by t he the difference between the log of the core CPI price 
index and its lagged value 12 months earlier. The real 6-month Treasury yield is measured as the difference 
between t he nominal yield and the equally-weighted average of the realized inflation given above and the 
one-year ahead expected CPI inflation as reported in the SPF. For the remaining Treasury yields, t he 
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Developments in equity markets are summarized by the following eight series: (1) the 
total value-weighted excess market return from CRSP; (2) the excess equity returns of 
firms in our five EDF-based stock portfolios; and (3) the Fama-French "SMB" and "HML" 
factors to account for the different dynamics of equity returns in our EDF-based stock port-
folios. The final group of variables in the vector X1t- six series-includes: (I) the implied 
volatility on the S&P 500 index options (VIX) to capture uncertainty in the equity mar-
ket ; (2) the implied volatilities on Eurodollar and ten-year Treasury note futures, measures 
of uncertainty associated with movements in short- and long-term interest rates, respec-
tively; (3) the log-difference of the trade-weighted exchange value of the dollar against 
major currencies to control for the international dimension of the U.S. financial system; 
and ( 4) two standard measures of liquidity- namely, the difference in the yields between 
the "off-the-run" and "on-the-run" 10-year Treasury note and the difference between the 
5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year Treasury note. 
Thus in our baseline specification, the vector Xlt contains 38 monthly macroeconomic 
and financial time series , and the 20 elements of vector X2t correspond to the average 
credit spreads in the 20 corporate bond portfolios classified by maturity and default risk. 
With this specification, our assumptions identify credit market shocks that are orthogonal 
to the excess equity returns of firms whose outstanding bonds are used to construct the 
EDF-based bond portfolios underlying the information content of the vector X 2t. Hence, 
the FAVAR traces out the effect of a shock to corporate bond spreads that is unrelated to 
news contained in stock returns of the same set of firms. 
expected inflation at each specific horizon is constructed by calculating the appropriately weighted average 
of the one-year ahead and the ten-year ahead expected CPI inflation reported in the SPF. For example, in 
calculating the 5-year real 'freasury yield, we employ a simplifying assumption that the expected inflation 
over the next five years is equal to an equally-weighted average of one-year ahead and ten-year ahead 
expected inflation as reported in the SPF. 
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The remaining question concerns the number of latent factors (k1 and k2 ) and the 
order of the VAR system p. In our baseline specification, k1 = 4 and k2 = 2.19 Under 
this parametrization, four common factors- denoted by Flt = [F{t F'ft Fft FttJ'-are 
assumed to summarize the information contained in the vector Xlt , whereas the residual 
component of credit spreads in our EDF-based bond portfolios can be represented by two 
factors , denoted by F2t = [Fit F?tJ' . The order of the VAR system is set top= 6, a lag 
length chosen according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
3.4.2 Shocks to corporate bond spreads 
Before turning to our main results, we briefly discuss the estimates of the factors Flt = 
[F{t F'ft Fft Fttl' and credit factors F2t = [Flt F'ftl' from the baseline specification. The 
first four panels of Figure 3.3 depict the four factors associated with macroeconomic and 
financial variables contained in the vector x lt, and the bottom two panels show the esti-
mates of the two credit factors identified using the information from the corporate bond 
market. (Tables summarizing correlations between the six factors and all the variables in 
Xt are shown in Appendix A.) 
19Recently, Bai and Ng [2002, 2007] and Stock and Watson [2005] have proposed several methods of how 
to select formally the number of factors in such models. Because of the added complexity reflecting our 
identification procedure, we adopted a more informal approach. Specifically, employing reasoning similar 
to that of Forni et al. [2005] and Giannone et al. [2005], k1 was chosen by looking at the increase in the 
explained variation of the 38 macroeconomic and financial series in X 1t that resulted from increasing the 
number of factors in Flt. Given our choice of k1 , the number of credit factors k2 was selected using t he 
same approach. As a robustness check, we increased the number of factors extracted from the data matrix 
X 1 from four to five, and to six , and we increased the number of factors extracted from t he data matrix 
X 2 t o three. None of t he resulting FAVAR specifications yielded materially different conclusions. 
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Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic and credit market factors 
(Baseline Specification) 
Macroeconomic factor 1 Macroeconomic factor 2 
Std. deviations Std. deviations 
Macroeconomic factor 3 Macroeconomic factor 4 
Std . deviations Std. deviations 
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NoTE: The panels of the figure depict estimat es of the six factors from the baseline FAVAR speci-
fication. T he first four factors summarize the 38 macroeconomic and financial variables included in the 
vector X 1t, and the last two factors summarize t he residual information content of credit spreads in the 
20 EDF-based bond portfolios included in the vector Xu (see text for details). Shaded vertical bars 
correspond to NBER-dated recessions . 
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Figure 3.4: Response of corporate bond spreads 
(Baseline Specification) 
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NOTE: The panels of the figure depict the effect of an orthogonalized one standard deviation shock 
to credit factor 1 on corporate bond spreads in the 20 EDF-based bond portfolios (see text for details). 
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Figure 3.4 depicts responses of credit spreads in the 20 bond portfolios to a one standard 
deviation orthogonalized shock to the first credit factor. (Impulse responses for all the 
variables in our baseline specification, along with their respective 95-percent confidence 
intervals, are shown in Appendix B. 20 ) This credit market shock widens corporate bond 
spreads across the entire spectrum of credit quality and across all maturities . The response 
of credit spreads associated with riskier bond portfolios is significantly greater than that of 
the less risky portfolios and is also more persistent. Furthermore, the jump in the riskiest 
corporate bond spreads is somewhat more pronounced at the short end of the maturity 
spectrum. 
The impact of this credit shock on selected macroeconomic variables is shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. A shock to the first credit factor is clearly contractionary, as evidenced by the fact 
that industrial production declines about 1 percentage points over a 24-month period.21 In 
addition to being statistically significant , the cumulative contraction in industrial output 
in response to a credit shock is economically significant, especially given that the response 
of credit spreads is in the order of only 10-50 basis points for most of the credit-risk dis-
tribution. The increasing slack in resource utilization following a shock to the corporate 
bond market is associated with a modest decline in the level of core CPI prices. These 
20 The confidence intervals of the impulse response functions are based on a two-stage bootstrap proce-
dure that takes into account both the serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence of the measurement 
errors in equation 3.3. In particular, we first estimate the factors and factor loadings following the esti-
mation procedure described above. We then perform a sieve bootstrap on the residuals of the observation 
equation 3.3. For each bootstrapped sample, we also re-estimate the factors F1 and F 2, thereby taking into 
account that the factors appear as generated regressors in equation 3.4. Second, for each bootstrap loop 
of the observation equation, we apply the "bootstrap-after-bootstrap" procedure of Kilian [1998] to the 
state-space equation 3.4 using the bootstrapped factors. This procedure is designed to take into account 
the small sample bias, the lack of scale invariance, and the skewness of the distribution of the impulse 
response functions of the VAR system. 
21 As discussed above, the macroeconomic and financial variables contained in the vector Xlt were , 
if necessary, transformed using log or simple differencing to ensure their stationarity. In such a case, 
we cumulate their impulse responses to depict the impact of the credit market shock on levels of these 
variables; similarly, we compute and show the cumulative responses of both the excess market return and 
the excess equity returns of firms in the five EDF quintiles. 
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macroeconomic developments, in turn, lead to a fall in the general level of real interest 
rates. In particular, real short-term interest rates decline about 15 basis points at the 
trough, but longer-term real Treasury yields fall somewhat less along the path, implying a 
steepening of the real Treasury yield curve in response to the innovation in the corporate 
bond spreads. 
The contractionary effects of this credit market shock implies a cumulative decline in 
the excess stock market return of about 2 percentage points over the horizon shown. The 
cumulative excess equity returns of the least and the most risky firms also fall initially, 
though the latter effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The impact of this 
adverse credit market shock is also reflected in stock market uncertainty, as the option-
implied volatility on the S&P 500 (VIX) increases notably in the first six months after 
the shock. In summary, a shock to the first credit factor implies a modest increase in the 
overall level of corporate bond spreads that leads to a sizable contraction in industrial 
output, a deceleration in core prices , lower real interest rates and equity returns, and a 
rise in stock market uncertainty. 22 
To examine the economic importance of credit market shocks, we calculate the pro-
portion of the forecast error variance attributable to the innovations associated with the 
first credit market factor. Figure 3.6 reports the average proportion of the forecast er-
ror variance at different horizons for selected variables in our FAVAR specification that 
is explained by our identified credit market shock, along with the respective 95-percent 
confidence intervals. According to results in Figure 3.6, shocks to corporate bond spreads 
account, on average, for more than 30 percent of the variation in the growth of industrial 
22In contrast, the orthogonalized shock to the second credit factor has a statistically and economically 
insignificant effect on real economic activity. 
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production at the two- to four-year forecast horizon. The shock to the first credit factor 
also explains a significant fraction of the variation in both short- and long-term real in-
terest rates and accounts for 30 percent of the forecast error variance in the excess equity 
returns . This credit market shock also accounts for a large fraction of the variation in cor-
porate bond spreads but at a higher frequency. Thus, variation in corporate bond spreads 
at the one- to two-year horizon appears to explain a substantial fraction of the variation 
in both real activity and real interest rates at the two- to four-year forecast horizon, a 
result consistent with the predictive power for economic activity of corporate bond spread 
at long-run forecast horizons. 
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Figure 3.5: Response of selected macroeconomic and financial variables 
(Baseline Specification) 
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NOTE: The panels of the figure depict t he effect of an orthogonalized one standard deviation shock to 
credit factor 1 on selected m acroeconomic and financial variables (see text for details) . The shaded bands 
represent the 95-p ercent confidence intervals computed using a sieve bootstrap with 10 ,000 replications. 
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Figure 3.6: Forecast error variance decomposition of a credit market shock 
(Baseline Specification) 
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NOTE: The panels of the figure depict the fraction of the forecast error variance for selected macroe-
conomic and financial variables that is attr ibuted to an orthogonalized one standard deviation shock to 
credit factor 1. The shaded bands represent the 95-percent confidence intervals comput ed using a sieve 
bootstrap with 10 ,000 replications. 
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3.4.3 Shocks to excess equity returns 
The baseline FAVAR specification analyzed the information content of corporate bond 
spreads that is orthogonal to both the aggregate stock market return and the average of 
excess returns of firms in our EDF-based stock portfolios. As a point of comparison, this 
section examines whether excess equity returns in our EDF-based stock portfolios also 
contain information regarding economic activity that is not captured by either standard 
macroeconomic indicators or the aggregate stock market return. 
To do so, we consider an alternative FAVAR specification that relies only on excess 
equity returns in our EDF-based stock portfolios to identify a shock to financial markets. 
Specifically, instead of the 20 credit spreads associated with our EDF-based bond port-
folios , the elements of the vector X 2t in this alternative specification correspond to the 
(average) excess equity returns in our five EDF-based stock portfolios . The elements of 
the vector Xlt , except for removing the excess equity returns in the five EDF-based port-
folios, are left unchanged. 23 This alternative FAVAR specification thus identifies shocks 
to firms ' earnings contained in our EDF-based stock portfolios that are orthogonal to in-
dicators of economic activity and inflation, real interest rates, and aggregate stock market 
developments. 24 
Figure 3. 7 depicts the effect of a one standard deviation orthogonalized shock to the 
first factor- identified using excess stock returns-on the average excess equity return in 
each of the five quintiles of the credit-risk distribution. This shock has clear negative im-
23 The same identification scheme as in the baseline specification is employed to identify credit shocks; 
in addition, k 1 = 4, k2 = 2, and p = 6, exactly the same as in the baseline case. 
24We have also considered a specification that that includes both the stock returns and the corporate 
bond spreads in the vector X2t· These results are very similar to our baseline specification, a result that 
provides further evidence that corporate bond spreads contain unique information not captured by other 
financial asset prices. 
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plications for stock returns of firms across the spectrum of credit quality. Upon its impact, 
excess stock returns in our EDF-based stock portfolios fall between 2 and 4 percentage 
points , with returns of the riskiest firms registering the largest decline. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.8, the macroeconomic implications of this shock- given the width of the 95-percent 
confidence intervals- are ambiguous, a result suggesting that the two factors extracted 
from the residual component of excess equity returns have little systematic component 
and largely reflect idiosyncratic news about earnings growth. 
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Figure 3. 7: Response of excess equity returns 
(Alternative Specification) 
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NOTE: The panels of the figure depict the effect of an orthogonalized one standard deviation shock 
to financial factor 1 on excess equity returns in the five EDF-based stock portfolios (see text for details). 
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Figure 3.8: Response of selected macroeconomic and financial variables 
(Alternative Specification) 
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NOTE: The panels of the figure depict the effect of an orthogonalized one standard deviation 
shock to financial factor 1 on selected macroeconomic and financial variables (see text for details). The 
shaded bands represent the 95-percent confidence intervals computed using a sieve bootstrap with 10 ,000 
replications. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Our results indicate that credit spreads on senior unsecured corporate debt have a sub-
stantial predictive power for future economic activity relative to that of previously used 
default-risk indicators such as the paper-bill spread or the high-yield credit spread. This 
improvement in forecasting performance reflects the information content of spreads on 
longer-maturity bonds issued by firms at the high-end and middle of the credit-quality 
spectrum. According to our FAVAR results, shocks to corporate bond spreads lead to 
quantitatively large swings in economic activity and real interest rates. Such credit mar-
ket shocks explain a sizable fraction of the variance in economic activity at the two- to 
four-year horizon. These findings are consistent with the notion that an unexpected wors-
ening of conditions in credit markets can cause a long-lasting economic downturn and 
that shocks to credit markets have played an important role in business cycle fluctuations 
during the previous decade and a half. 
The fact that credit market shocks generate such large effects may come as a bit of 
surprise. One possibility is that credit markets provide better signals regarding future 
prospects of firms than does the stock market. In that case , a shock to credit markets may 
still reflect news regarding underlying cash flows rather than a disruption in the supply of 
credit. But we are then left with the puzzle as to why stock prices do not incorporate all 
the relevant information about the firms' profit opportunities? Although various theories 
of stock market behavior that emphasize departures from the standard efficient markets 
paradigm may help justify these findings, our results imply developments in corporate 
credit markets provide important information regarding the future course of economic 
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activity. 25 
We offer two alternative explanations for our results. First, the recent empirical and 
theoretical asset pricing literature has emphasized the inability of standard structural mod-
els of default to explain both the level and movements in credit spreads (see, for example, 
Collin-Dufresne et al. [200lb]). According to this literature, a large part of the variation 
in credit spreads is due to macroeconomic factors , particularly to liquidity and risk pre-
miums. In the corporate bond market , the key investors are banks , insurance companies, 
and other financial intermediaries. To the extent that financial markets are segmented, 
the risk attitude of the marginal corporate bond investor may reflect the willingness or 
ability of these institutions to bear risk. Thus , as conditions in the financial sector deterio-
rate, the premium on the risk of default rises, which causes a drop in investment spending 
and a contraction in future economic activity, an argument consistent with the results of 
Philippon [2009] who finds that corporate bond spreads do particularly well at forecasting 
business fixed investment. 
Second, the financial sector creates direct linkages between the banking sector and non-
bank financial activity. For example, the ability of nonfinancial corporations to finance 
short-term liquidity needs by issuing commercial paper relies importantly on the ability 
of these firms to obtain back-up lines of credit from banks. As monetary policy tightens, 
or financial conditions in the banking sector deteriorate, banks may be forced to cut 
back on their lines of credit. More generally, the process of credit disintermediation may 
increase liquidity risk for nonfinancial firms , which, in the case of a severe deterioration 
in economic and financial conditions, may turn into insolvency risk. Again, disturbances 
25See Philippon [2009] for an overview of such theories and their potential implications for the informa-
tion content of stock and bond returns. 
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emanating from the financial sector would cause a rise in the cost of credit for nonfinancial 
firms. In addition, to the extent that monetary policy shocks are not fully summarized by 
movements in the Federal funds rate, these credit market disturbances may also reflect the 
anticipated tightening of monetary policy, which manifests itself in the disintermediation 
process sooner than it is reflected in the observable movements in standard indicators of 
monetary policy. This alternative is consistent with the findings of Gertler and Lown 
[1999] and Mueller [2007] who document a close relationship between changes in bank 
lending standards and credit market conditions over the course of the business cycle. 
As emphasized by Primiceri et al. [2006], there is strong empirical evidence supporting 
the notion that "intertemporal disturbances" are a major source of business cycle fluctua-
tions . In dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that allow for financial accelerator 
mechanisms, such as those developed by Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] and Bernanke et al. 
[1999], these disturbances may be linked directly to changes in credit conditions. The rich 
amount of information contained in corporate bond spreads may be particularly useful for 
measuring and identifying the importance of these financial mechanisms. To understand 
the inter-related effects of movements in risk premiums, changes in the health of financial 
institutions, and economic activity would require extending these models to include finan-
cial market participants and changing risk attitudes in a fully-specified general equilibrium 
framework. 
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Table 3.5 : Predictive content of credit spreads for economic activity index 
Forecast Horizon h = 3 (months) 
In-Sample Out-of-Sample 
Credit Spreads Pr > W1 Pr > W2 Adj . R2 RMSFE Ratio Pr > lSI 
Standard 0.000 0.525 0.841 
EDF-Q1 0.000 0.520 0.716 0.726 0.135 
EDF-Q2 0.000 0.527 0.722 0.739 0.096 
EDF-Q3 0.000 0.511 0.730 0.754 0.107 
EDF-Q4 0.000 0.457 0.874 1.081 0.626 
EDF-Q5 0.000 0.495 0.780 0.860 0.410 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.000 0.002 0.605 0.763 0.824 
Standard & EDF-Q2 0.060 0.000 0.577 0.820 0.951 
Standard & EDF -Q3 0.000 0.004 0.575 0.820 0.951 
Standard & EDF-Q4 0.000 0.009 0.549 0.864 1.056 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.000 0.000 0.585 0.762 0.821 
Memo: None 0.393 0.852 
Forecast Horizon h = 12 (months) 
In-Sample Out-of-Sample 
Credit Spreads P r > W1 P r > W2 Adj . R 2 RMSFE Ratio Pr > lSI 
Standard 0.004 0.407 1.132 
EDF-Q1 0.000 0.607 0.568 0.252 0.000 
EDF-Q2 0.000 0.618 0.574 0.257 0.000 
EDF-Q3 0.000 0.591 0.650 0.330 0.000 
EDF-Q4 0.000 0.455 0.985 0.757 0.300 
EDF-Q5 0.000 0.381 0.945 0.697 0.270 
Standard & EDF-Q1 0.000 0.000 0.726 0.724 0.409 
Standard & EDF-Q2 0.000 0.000 0.742 0.690 0.372 
Standard & EDF-Q3 0.000 0.000 0.732 0.706 0.384 
Standard & EDF-Q4 0.000 0.000 0.677 0.809 0.511 
Standard & EDF-Q5 0.000 0.000 0.617 0.884 0.610 
Memo: None 0.178 1.065 
NOTE: Sample period: Monthly data from February 1990 to September 2008. Dependent variable is 
the h-month moving average of the index of real economic activity, where h is the forecast horizon. Each 
regression specification includes a constant, current, and 11 lags of the economic activity index (see text for 
details). Pr > W1 denotes the p-value for the robust Wald test of the null hypothesis that coefficients on 
standard credit spread indexes are jointly equal to zero; Pr > W 2 denotes the p-value for the robust Wald 
t est of the null hypothesis that coefficients on EDF-based credit spreads in a particular quintile are jointly 
equal to zero. "Ratio" denotes the ratio of the MSFE of each model relative to the MSFE of the model 
that includes standard credit spreads; Pr > lSI denotes t he p-value for the Diebold and Mariano [1 995] test 
of the null hypothesis that the difference between the MSFE from the model that includes standard credit 
spreads and the MSFE from the model that includes EDF-based credit spreads is equal to zero. 
174 
Appendices 
3.A Factors and macroeconomic and financial variables 
Table 3.A contains correlations between the six latent factors and the 38 macroeconomic 
and financial time series included in the vector Xlt in the baseline FAVAR specification; 
Table 3.B contain correlations between the six latent factors and credit spreads in the 
20 EDF-based bond portfolios included in the vector X2t· All correlations are computed 
over the sample period from February 1990 to September 2008. 
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Table 3.A: Correlations between estimated factors and macroeconomic series 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
Variable (data transformation) p1 1 p2 1 p 3 1 p 4 1 p,1 2 p,2 2 
Unemployment Rate (.6.) 0.01 0.07 -0.54 0.12 -0.13 -0 .01 
Payroll Employment (.6-ln) 0.20 0.11 0.71 -0 .01 -0.02 -0.06 
Capacity Utilization (.6.) -0.13 -0.23 0.75 -0 .08 0.18 0.13 
Industrial Production (.6-ln) 0.06 -0.18 0.74 -0 .14 0.15 0.09 
ISM Mfg. Activity Index -0 .12 -0.08 0.71 0.10 -0.05 -0 .07 
Leading Indicator Index ( .6-ln) -0.34 0.17 0.46 -0 .36 0.08 0.09 
Real Durable Goods Orders (.6-ln) -0.05 -0.02 0.34 -0.16 0.15 0.04 
Real Nondurable Goods Orders (.6-ln) -0 .06 -0.16 0.31 0.44 0.09 0.04 
Real PCE ( .6-ln) -0 .09 -0.04 0.22 0.44 0.08 -0.07 
Real DPI (.6.ln) 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.25 0.01 -0 .06 
Housing Starts (.6.ln) -0.14 -0 .03 0.05 -0.12 -0 .05 -0 .03 
Consumer Price Index ( .6.ln) 0. 19 -0.22 0.00 0.75 -0.07 0.12 
Core Consumer Price Index ( .6-ln) 0.42 0.06 -0.13 0.05 -0.14 0.37 
Producer Price Index (.6-ln) 0.03 -0 .24 0.08 0.84 0.04 0.02 
Core Producer Price Index (.6-ln) 0.18 0.05 -0.05 0.41 -0.09 0.09 
Commodity Price Index (.6-ln) -0 .12 0.02 0.25 0.25 0.13 -0.03 
Price of WTI Crude ( .6-ln) 0.01 -0 .14 0.16 0.36 0.01 -0.02 
Real Federal Funds Rate 0.83 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.09 -0.30 
Real 6-month Treasury Yield 0.90 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.12 -0.25 
Real 1-year Treasury Yield 0.94 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.14 
Real 2-year Treasury Yield 0.96 0.22 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 
Real 3-year Treasury Yield 0.95 0.22 0.10 -0.05 -0 .01 0.02 
Real 5-year Treasury Yield 0.92 0.19 0.08 -0 .08 -0.05 0.16 
Real 10-year Treasury Yield 0.82 0.14 0.03 -0 .10 -0 .09 0.32 
Excess Equity Return EDF-Q1 -0.16 0.87 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Excess Equity Return EDF-Q2 -0.25 0.89 0.01 0.07 0.10 -0.01 
Excess Equity Return EDF-Q3 -0.27 0.89 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.02 
Excess Equity Return EDF-Q4 -0.30 0.89 -0.01 0.08 0.11 -0.01 
Excess Equity Return EDF-Q5 -0.27 0.81 0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.07 
Excess Market Return -0.20 0.90 0.01 0.09 -0 .02 0.04 
Fama-French HML Factor -0.02 -0.28 0.09 -0.13 0.12 -0.05 
Fama-French SMB Factor -0.15 0.19 -0.08 0.10 0.01 0.04 
S&P 500 Implied Volatility (VIX) 0.11 -0.33 -0.42 -0 .09 0.30 -0.09 
3-month Eurodollar Implied Volatility 0.75 0.11 -0 .06 -0.04 -0.09 0.39 
10-year Treasury Note Implied Volatility -0 .29 -0 .18 -0 .14 -0.05 0.07 0.26 
Exchange Value of the Dollar (.6-ln) 0.17 -0 .03 0.01 -0.43 -0 .01 -0 .06 
On/ Off-the-run Treasury Premium (10-year) -0 .16 -0 .11 -0 .22 -0 .07 0.26 0.25 
Swap-Treasury Spread (5-year) 0.29 -0.09 -0 .44 0.09 0.65 -0.14 
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Table 3.B : Correlations between estimated factors and credit spreads 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
EDF Quintile/ Maturity Category p1 1 p2 1 p3 1 p4 1 p,1 2 p,2 2 
EDF-Q1 / Short Maturity -0.13 -0 .16 -0 .39 0.01 0.35 0.76 
EDF-Q2/ Short Maturity -0 .26 -0.23 -0.53 -0.02 0.51 0.51 
EDF-Q3/ Short Maturity -0.18 -0.21 -0.58 -0 .08 0.54 0.43 
EDF-Q4/ Short Maturity -0.31 -0 .30 -0.54 -0.01 0.62 0.17 
EDF-Q5/ Short Maturity -0. 17 -0.20 -0.54 -0.04 0.60 -0.05 
EDF -Q1 / Intermediate Maturity -0.05 -0 .22 -0.58 0.01 0.67 0.32 
EDF-Q2/ Intermediate Maturity -0.17 -0.22 -0.53 0.03 0.62 0.42 
EDF-Q3/ Intermediate Maturity -0.22 -0 .26 -0 .56 -0.01 0.67 0.25 
EDF-Q4/ Intermediate Maturity -0 .36 -0.26 -0.53 -0.01 0.67 -0.05 
EDF -Q5 / Intermediate Maturity -0 .29 -0.21 -0.54 -0.11 0.58 -0.16 
EDF-Q1 / Long Maturity 0.19 -0.16 -0.46 0.03 0.78 -0 .12 
EDF-Q2/ Long Maturity 0.10 -0.16 -0.43 0.12 0.76 -0.13 
EDF-Q3/ Long Maturity 0.04 -0.19 -0.48 0.02 0.77 -0.22 
EDF-Q4/ Long Maturity -0.11 -0.21 -0.45 0.02 0.77 -0.27 
EDF-Q5/ Long Maturity -0.13 -0.23 -0.51 -0.08 0.61 -0 .30 
EDF-Q1/ Very Long Maturity 0.47 -0.06 -0.38 0.04 0.70 -0.14 
EDF-Q2/ Very Long Maturity 0.34 -0 .12 -0.47 0.09 0.70 -0.20 
EDF-Q3/ Very Long Maturity 0.32 -0.11 -0.5 0.04 0.71 -0.19 
EDF-Q4/ Very Long Maturity -0.23 -0.24 -0.45 0.07 0.68 -0.29 
EDF-Q5/ Very Long Maturity -0.18 -0.16 -0.47 0.13 0.61 -0 .27 
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3.B Impulse response functions 
Figures 3.A- 3.D depict the impact of an orthogonalized one standard deviation shock 
to credit factor 1 on the 38 macroeconomic and financial time series included in the 
vector Xlt in the baseline FAVAR specification; Figures 3.E- 3.F depict the impact of an 
orthogonalized one standard deviation shock to credit factor 1 on credit spreads in the 
20 EDF-based bond portfolios included in the vector X2t · The shaded bands represent 
the 95-percent confidence intervals computed using a nonparametric sieve bootstrap with 
10,000 replications (see main text for details) . 
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Figure 3.A: Economic activity indicators 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
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Figure 3.B: Inflation indicators and the exchange value of the dollar 
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Figure 3.C: Interest rates, interest rate uncertainty, and liquidity indicators 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
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Figure 3.D: Equity market indicators 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
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Figure 3 .E: Short and intermediate maturity credit spreads 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
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Figure 3.F: Long and very long maturity credit spreads 
(Baseline FAVAR Specification) 
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